Crawford v. TRW, INC.

• Decision Date: 26 February 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-CV-71910-DT.,92-CV-71910-DT.
• Citation: 815 F. Supp. 1028
• Parties: Jerry CRAWFORD and Catherine Crawford v. TRW, INC. et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

815 F. Supp. 1028

Jerry CRAWFORD and Catherine Crawford v. TRW, INC. et al.

No. 92-CV-71910-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

February 26, 1993.

Scott M. McDonald, Detroit, MI, for plaintiff.

Ellen F. Moss, Southfield, MI, Joel Goodman, Berkley, MI, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO REMAND AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is presently before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand this action to the Macomb County Circuit Court, and on Defendants' subsequent Motions for Summary Judgment. The principal issue presented in all of these Motions is whether Plaintiffs' defamation/intentional infliction of emotional distress action is preempted under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 et seq. (the "LMRA").

The parties have fully briefed the pertinent issues in this matter and, therefore, as indicated to counsel at the scheduling/status conference conducted by the Court in this case, it will decide the instant Motions "on the briefs" pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(e)(2). This Opinion and Order sets forth the Court's ruling.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jerry Crawford is an hourly employee of Defendant TRW, Inc.¹ As an hourly employee, the terms and conditions of Mr. Crawford's employment with his employer are governed by a collective bargaining agreement entered into between TRW and UAW Local No. 247 (the "CBA"). During the course of his employment at TRW's Sterling Heights Van Dyke plant, Mr. Crawford has held several union positions. He currently holds the union position of district committeeman, a position he was elected to hold until May of 1994.

The incidents giving rise to the instant defamation/intentional infliction of emotional distress action are as follows.

In December of 1990, TRW reduced its workforce at the Sterling Heights facility by laying off 36 employees. This lay-off caused another hourly employee, Defendant Daniel King, to be "bumped" from the third shift to the second shift in his same job classification. Although Mr. King had more seniority with TRW than Plaintiff Crawford, King was bumped instead of Crawford because, pursuant to the terms of the CBA, as a union official, Mr. Crawford was able to exercise "superseniority".²

King filed a grievance contesting the fact that he was bumped, charging in his grievance that TRW violated the union contract because it had "granted superseniority to a union official where it doesn't apply."³ Then, a month after filing his grievance, in January 1991 King filed an unfair labor practice charge against TRW with the National Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB"), alleging that TRW violated the National Labor Relations Act by retaining Crawford on the third shift instead of him.

On February 19, 1991, officials from Local 247 and TRW met to discuss King's grievance. They agreed that the Company had correctly applied the CBA in retaining Crawford in a third shift position, and they settled King's grievance along those lines. Two weeks later, King, apparently disagreeing with his union's agreement with TRW's interpretation of the CBA and dissatisfied with the union's agreement not to pursue his grievance, amended his NLRB charge to assert, in addition to his charge against TRW, an unfair labor practice against his local union.

The NLRB issued a complaint against both TRW and UAW Local 247 in April 1991 and set a July 29, 1991 hearing on King's unfair labor practice charges. Just prior to the scheduled NLRB hearing date, the local union, TRW and King reached a settlement disposing of King's charges. Pursuant to the settlement, King was paid $611.12 by each TRW and his local union in exchange for his dismissal of his NLRB complaints and his agreement that neither TRW nor Local 247 would be required to acknowledge that their actions under the collective bargaining agreement were in violation of law.

As a result of the settlement, an official NLRB Notice was posted by Local No. 247, pursuant to NLRA regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 101.1 et seq., on the union bulletin boards at TRW's Van Dyke plant. That Notice provided as follows:

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS

POSTED PURSUANT TO A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT APPROVED BY A REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AN AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

We represent the employees of TRW, Inc., hereafter the Employer in the following appropriate unit:

All hourly production and maintenance employees at the Employer's Sterling Heights plant, excluding all supervisory employees, plant protection employees and office and confidential employees.

WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause the Employer to discriminate against employees who are not Union officials by improperly applying and enforcing the provision in our contract with the Employer which provides for special seniority rights of Union officials by allowing Union officials to exercise those rights for job preference.

WE WILL, jointly with the Employer, make whole employee Daniel King, for any loss of wages he may have suffered as a result of being bumped from his job by the exercise of special seniority rights for job preference by Union official Jerry Crawford.

LOCAL UNION NO. 247, INTERNATIONAL UNION UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, (UAW) AFL-CIO-CLO (Labor Organization)

Dated: Aug. 9, 1991 By: /s/ (Representative) (Title)

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED

This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office.

UAW's Brief, Ex. C.⁴

Posted along side the NLRB Notice, were letters from the UAW and TRW explaining why the settlement occurred. The letter posted by Local 247 was a letter from the UAW International Union's Associate General Counsel to the President of Local 247, which stated in pertinent part:

Dear Dan:

You have asked me to explain why I recommended that the local settle the pending unfair labor practice case with Charging Party Dan King regarding his superseniority dispute.

First, we continue to take the position that there was no violation of the National Labor Relations Act here. Article 15.1 and 15.2 of the labor agreement provides that union officials can be bumped from their jobs as long as they are qualified to perform the lower paying job and are not removed from their representation group. Crawford has never been qualified on either the laborer's classification or the truck driver's classification. A union official is entitled to use superseniority to avoid him from being displaced from his election district or group. Crawford did nothing wrong in refusing to accept a lower-paying job which he was not capable of performing. Nothing in the law requires that a union official be reduced to a classification he is not capable or qualified to perform.

Second, the NLRB hearing, otherwise scheduled for July 29, would have been focused solely on the question of whether or not Crawford could perform these duties. The costs involved in conducting such a hearing ... would have been far greater than the approximate $600 the settlement is presently costing the Union.

* * * * * *

Since the cost of proving that Crawford was not qualified to perform the laborer or truck driver job would have been far more than simply paying off King, we recommended saving the membership dues money.

TRW Brief, Ex. G.⁵

TRW's letter consisted of one sentence: "this letter will clarify our mutual agreement that Article 15.1 and 15.2 of the collective bargaining agreement are not intended to provide classification superseniority to union officials."⁶

Five and a half months after the posting of the NLRB Notice and the UAW's and TRW's letters of explanation of the settlement of the King grievance, on January 30, 1992, Plaintiffs Jerry Crawford and his wife, Catherine Crawford, filed the instant lawsuit claiming that Jerry Crawford has been defamed by King's grievance and the posting of the NLRB Notice and the UAW's and TRW's letters of explanation as set forth in footnotes 3-6, supra (Count I). Catherine Crawford further claims that as a result of the foregoing, she has suffered a loss of consortium (Count II). Lastly, in Count III Plaintiffs allege that the defamatory actions of King, the UAW, UAW's Associate General Counsel, Betsy Engel, and his employer TRW amount to intentional infliction of emotional distress upon both Jerry Crawford and his wife, Catherine (Count III).

As indicated above, Mr. Crawford is complaining principally about two things in this lawsuit: The grievance filed by King on December 6, 1991 — which does not mention Crawford by name — and that part of the NLRB Notice and the explanatory letters regarding settlement of King's unfair labor practice charges which Crawford interprets as implying that he was the "cause" of King's temporary layoff and the Union having to spend $611.12 of the membership's money.

Defendants timely removed Plaintiffs' action to this Court on the basis of complete preemption under Section 301 of the LMRA. Plaintiffs subsequently moved to remand.

III. DISCUSSION

A. REMOVAL

Normally, a defendant may remove an action to federal court only if that court has "original jurisdiction" over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). If a court lacks diversity jurisdiction over an action — as in the instant case — in order to remove the state court action to federal court, the defendant must establish that the action "arises under" the Constitution or law of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

To determine whether a claim arises under federal law, a court, under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, generally looks to the plaintiff's complaint. Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936)...