Crawley v. State

• Decision Date: 13 March 1912
• Citation: 74 S.E. 537,137 Ga. 777
• Parties: CRAWLEY v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

74 S.E. 537

137 Ga. 777

CRAWLEY v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

March 13, 1912

Syllabus by the Court.

The defendant's statement and the testimony of certain witnesses introduced by him put in issue the character of the decedent, and the court properly admitted evidence offered by the prosecution to show the character of the deceased as to peaceableness and violence.

The court did not err in charging the jury as follows "Proof of the violent and turbulent character of the deceased is admissible only when it is shown prima facie that the deceased was the assailant, that the accused had been assailed, and that the defendant or defendants were honestly seeking to defend himself or themselves. But if you find from the evidence that the defendants were the aggressors, and that the defendants overtook the deceased, and one of them began or entered into a difficulty with the deceased, with a preconceived intent of having a difficulty, or began the attack without provocation from the deceased, if he was a bad character, then the bad character of the deceased would not offer the defendant any excuse for taking his life, if he or they took his life; for it is the same offense to kill a bad person as it is to kill a good person." It aptly states the law as to the issue there dealt with, and was authorized by the evidence.

While the charge of the court upon the subject of justifiable homicide, as laid down in sections 70 and 71 of the Penal Code, was not entirely free from criticism, lacking both in comprehensiveness and accuracy, it was not, under the evidence and the statement of the prisoner, such error as to require the grant of a new trial, especially in view of the fact that the court fully covered the law of justifiable homicide as laid down in the Code sections just referred to.

Even if the admission in evidence of a "no bill" returned by the grand jury against the decedent, charged with the murder of a brother of the defendant, was irrelevant, it was not of sufficient materiality to be ground for a reversal.

The charge fully covered and fairly submitted the material issues in the case, and the evidence authorized the verdict of guilty.

There was no abuse of discretion in refusing to grant a new trial upon the newly discovered evidence submitted to the court.

Error from Superior Court, Pike County; R. T. Daniel, Judge.

Jim Crawley was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.

J. F Redding, E. H. Dupree, E. M. Owen, and T. E. Patterson, for plaintiff in error.

J. W Wise, Sol. Gen., Cleveland & Goodrich, and T. S. Felder Atty. Gen., for the State.

BECK J.

Jim Crawley was jointly indicted with Reginald Crawley and Stiles Mitchell for the murder of William Carden. The three defendants were tried together, and Stiles Mitchell and Reginald Crawley were acquitted. Jim Crawley was convicted; the jury recommending that he be imprisoned in the penitentiary for life. A motion for a new trial was filed by Jim Crawley, and upon the hearing it was overruled. The only eyewitnesses to the killing, who were near enough to see and hear all that occurred, were the three defendants named in the indictment. Each of these made a statement tending to show that at the time of the shooting the decedent was attempting to feloniously attack one of the three defendants, who were riding together in a buggy, with intent to shoot and kill one or both of the Crawleys, who are brothers.

1. The court properly permitted counsel for the state to introduce evidence tending to develop before the jury the question as to whether the slain man was of a peaceable or a violent disposition and character. The privilege of showing the character of the deceased in the first instance was the prerogative of the defendant alone. But the defense had shown, before the state attempted to introduce such evidence, that the deceased had made numerous threats against the life of the accused; and the accused in his statement declared that the decedent was a dangerous man, "and I knew he would shoot me the first chance he got. *** He had threatened to do so many times, to so many people who had told me, lots of them. I could take hours of your time and give you the names of what he told them. *** Now, going back to the time when Mr. Carden shot and killed my brother, I want to say that he has hounded me around and made these threats, which have come to me from all directions, that he was going to kill me." Then follows, in the statement of the prisoner, a further enumeration of instances when he was waylaid by Carden and his footsteps were pursued; instances showing that Carden was a man of violent character, and relentless in his determination to finally take advantage of a fitting opportunity for the purpose of slaying the accused. Witnesses had been introduced, before this statement was made, who gave testimony corroborating the prisoner's statement in regard to the making of threats against the life of the accused. In no other way could the defense have more effectually put the character of the decedent in issue. It has been held that the defendant can put his own character in issue by his statement alone (Jackson v. State, 76 Ga. 552); and if he can put his own character in issue merely by his statement, it would seem that he could put that of the slain man in issue. But the defense did not limit the attack upon the character of the deceased to the defendant's statement. There was proof of circumstances tending to show that Carden was a man of violent character. "Where the defendant has offered evidence of threats against himself, made by the deceased, the prosecution has been permitted to introduce evidence of the good character of the latter." 3 Enc.Ev. 14, and citations. After the defense had thus distinctly put the character of the slain man in issue, and had introduced, for the consideration of the jury, testimony which tended to demonstrate that the deceased was a man of violent character, in the interest of truth, and for the purpose of aiding the jury in their efforts to reach a correct conclusion as to this material issue, the court properly refused to exclude evidence offered to show that the deceased was a man of an entirely different character from that portrayed in the statement of the accused and by his witnesses.

2. Movant insists that the court erred in charging the jury as follows: "Proof of the violent and turbulent character of the deceased is admissible only when it is shown prima facie that the deceased was the assailant, that the accused had been assailed, and that the defendant or defendants were honestly seeking to defend himself or themselves. But if you find from the evidence that the defendants were the aggressors, and that the defendants overtook the deceased and one of them began or entered into a difficulty with the...