Crawley v. State, 2D01-3815.
| Decision Date | 04 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D01-3815.,2D01-3815. |
| Parties | Peter Lewis CRAWLEY, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Howardene Garrett, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and William I. Munsey, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Peter Crawley challenges the order revoking his community control and the resulting judgment and sentence. We affirm these without comment. Crawley also challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw plea after sentencing. The standard of review for the trial court's denial is abuse of discretion. See Cella v. State, 831 So.2d 716, 720 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and thus, we affirm.
Initially, Crawley was charged with two counts of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, a motor vehicle, in violation of section 784.045, Florida Statutes (1999), and one count of driving while license suspended or revoked, third offense, in violation of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Crawley received concurrent suspended sentences of ten years for the two aggravated batteries and five years for driving while licence suspended. Crawley was placed on community control for two years to be followed by a two year term of probation.
Six months thereafter, an affidavit for violation of community control was filed. A hearing on the violations was held, and the public defender was appointed to represent Crawley. After being placed under oath, Crawley admitted that he had violated the terms and conditions of his community control. Consequently, the trial court revoked his community control and sentenced him to sixty months in prison with seventy-one days' credit for time served.
Several weeks after he was sentenced, Crawley filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In the motion, Crawley submitted that his plea of guilty had not been voluntary for three reasons. First, he had not been advised that he was waiving his right to an evidentiary hearing; second, he had not "detoxed" from his prior usage of cocaine and was drugged; and last, he had not had sufficient time to consult with his attorney regarding the consequences of his plea.
We begin by noting that a probation violation hearing need not meet the strict requirements of a criminal trial. Allen v. State, 662 So.2d 380 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). As this court recognized in Donley v. State, 557 So.2d 943, 944 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), "At a probation revocation hearing, the court must advise the probationer of the charges, and then if admitted, the court may revoke the probation." The record shows that Crawley was provided with an appropriate revocation hearing.
The record directly refutes Crawley's first two contentions. After Crawley's lawyer informed the trial court that Crawley wanted to admit violating the terms of his community control, the trial court asked Crawley if he understood that he had the right to have a hearing and if he wanted to give up that right. Crawley said that he did. In addition, the trial court asked Crawley if he was under the influence of any narcotics or alcohol. Crawley replied that he was not, and Crawley's statements were coherent and appropriate. Thus Crawley's own words and actions during the hearing rebut his assertions on appeal.
The record also defuses Crawley's final argument. Simply because the public defender was appointed at the time of the hearing to represent Crawley does not mean that Crawley had insufficient time to consult with his lawyer. A review of the transcript shows that Crawley's lawyer was familiar with Crawley's scoresheet, was aware that Crawley had been on community control for seven months, and knew that Crawley wanted to be sent to an outpatient drug treatment program. At no time, either before the plea was entered or after sentence was imposed, did Crawley or his lawyer request more time to meet or to prepare.
Not only did Crawley have adequate time to confer with counsel, the trial court also sufficiently advised him. In an effort to make certain that...
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Boule v. State, 2D04-275.
...Boule's motion. Our review of the trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw plea is for abuse of discretion. Crawley v. State, 851 So.2d 739, 740 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Gunn v. State, 841 So.2d 629, 631 (Fla. 2d DCA Because Boule filed his motion after sentencing, it is governed by Florid......