Crawley v. State

• Decision Date: 24 July 1974
• Docket Number: No. 48465,48465
• Parties: David Jackson CRAWLEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 62

513 S.W.2d 62

David Jackson CRAWLEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 48465.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

July 24, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 18, 1974.

Frank J. Baughman, Amarillo, for appellant.

George E. Dowlen, Dist. Atty., Canyon, Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

CORNELIUS, Commissioner.

Appellant was convicted of the offense of willful injury, to the extent of over $50.00, to personal property belonging to another. Punishment, which was assessed by the court at appellant's election, was set at ten years' confinement.

The indictment charged that appellant willfully injured a 1969 Dodge automobile belonging to Billy Neal Sewell. To sustain the charge the State first proved that on or about the date specified in the indictment the appellant, in his automobile, collided with the automobile being driven by Billy Neal Sewell while the parties were travelling on 45th Street in the City of Amarillo. That street is apparently a controlled access highway similar to a freeway, with cross-streets intersecting it via overpasses. The collision occurred on 45th Street just after it goes under the McCarty Street overpass, at a point where an exit lane turns off 45th Street leading to an intersection with Georgia Avenue. The appellant had just entered 45th Street, to the rear of Mr. Sewell, from an entrance lane which merged into the traffic lanes on 45th Street. As Sewell moved to his right into the exit lane leading to Georgia Avenue the collision with appellant's automobile occurred, after proving the collision involving Sewell, the State then proceeded to prove that the appellant had also been involved in six other collisions at the identical point on 45th Street where the collision with Sewell occurred. These collisions occurred on June 11, September 15, September 30, October 4, October 18, and October 19, of 1972, and were all virtually identical with the collision involving Sewell. It was the State's theory that in the collision with Sewell, as in the other cases, the appellant deliberately entered the freeway at such a time, and maneuvered his automobile in such a position, that a collision was inevitable, and that he was thus guilty of the willful injury of Sewell's automobile.

The appellant introduced evidence that he did not violate any traffic regulation in connection with the wrecks proven by the State, and that, in fact, the other parties had been ticketed for unlawfully changing lanes immediately prior to each collision.

At the punishment stage of the trial, the State produced evidence that the appellant had been involved in some forty other similar, if not identical, wrecks, and that his reputation for being a peaceful and law-abiding citizen was bad. It was also proven that as to many of the wrecks the appellant collected repair estimates from insurance companies amounting to as much as $500.00 or $600.00 each. Estimates totalling $6,363.43 were introduced into evidence.

In his ground of error No. 1 the appellant contends that the trial court should not have allowed the evidence to be admitted showing the involvement of appellant in the six other collisions which occurred at the same location and under identical conditions as those of the collision with Sewell.

It is well settled that when intent is an issue, evidence of extraneous offenses or acts on the part of the accused are admissible to show such intent, or a particular scheme or design used by him. Albrecht v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 486 S.W.2d 97; Granato v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 822; Cage v. State, 320 S.W.2d 364. As pointed out in Albrecht v. State,supra, evidence of extraneous offenses or acts is particularly relevant and permissible when intent is an essential element of the State's case, and such intent cannot be inferred from the act itself. Granato v. State, supra; Hampton v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 402 S.W.2d 748; Williams v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 398 S.W.2d 931. In the case at bar, intent--The willful injury--is an essential element of the offense. Article 1350, Vernon's Annotated Texas Penal Code. The collision which forms the basis of the indictment in the case at bar is not, of itself, such an act or occurrence from which guilty intent can be inferred. It is only when proof is made of a consistent series of collisions involving the appellant, all occurring in the same way, at the same location, and within a relatively short period of time, that reasonable persons are justified in finding that the appellant deliberately manipulated circumstances so as to accomplish the willful damage to Sewell's automobile. This case is thus a class example of the relevancy of extraneous acts to prove intent. The court properly charged the jury that their consideration of the extraneous acts must be limited to their efficacy to prove intent. There consequently was no error in allowing the evidence of these occurrences.

The appellant also asserts in Ground No. 1 that the extraneous acts were not admissible because they did not constitute criminal offenses under the penal laws of our State. There is no merit to this contention. That the acts relied upon to prove intent, or scheme or design, did not themselves constitute criminal offenses or result in prosecution, does not render them inadmissible. Williams v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 500, 279 S.W.2d 348; Bedford v. State, 75 Tex.Cr.R. 309, 170 S.W. 727; McArthur v. State, 132 Tex.Cr.R. 447, 105 S.W.2d 227. In fact, acts not amounting to crimes would appear to be less prejudicial to the accused than those constituting criminal offenses. Ground of error No. 1 is overruled.

Ground of error No. 2 urges that the State failed to prove the extent of the injury consistent with the allegations of the indictment. Art. 1350, V.A.P.C. provides that it shall be unlawful to willfully injure or destroy, or attempt to injure or destroy, the personal property of another. It further provides that when the value of the property destroyed or the extent of the injury '. . . is of the value of Fifty ($50.00) Dollars, or more . . .' the punishment shall be two to twenty years' confinement. In the present case the indictment charged that appellant willfully injured the property of Sewell, '. . . said Injury being of the value of over $50.00.' Such language...