Creacy v. Industrial Com'n

• Decision Date: 20 November 1961
• Docket Number: No. 19713,19713
• Citation: 366 P.2d 384,148 Colo. 429
• Parties: Mary Lois CREACY, formerly known as Mary Lois Hale, Claimant in the Matter of the Death of Willard Hale, Plaintiff in Error, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of State of Colorado, Jeffries Eaves, Inc., a corporation, and Travelers Insurance Company, a corporation Defendants in Error.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 384

366 P.2d 384

148 Colo. 429

Mary Lois CREACY, formerly known as Mary Lois Hale, Claimant in the Matter of the Death of Willard Hale Plaintiff in Error, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of State of Colorado, Jeffries Eaves Inc., a corporation, and Travelers Insurance Company, a corporation Defendants in Error.

No. 19713.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Nov. 20, 1961.

Smith, Pyle, Johnson & Makris, Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error Industrial Comm.

Wood, Ris & Hames, Denver, for defendants in error Jeffries Eaves, Inc., and Travelers Ins. Co.

HALL, Chief Justice.

The Industrial Commission of Colorado awarded compensation, in the total sum of $11,466 payable at the monthly rate of $159.25, to Mary Lois Hale as the dependent widow of Willard Hale, who suffered fatal injuries in the course of his employment. The decedent had no children.

Mary Lois Hale, now Creacy, remarried and thereupon petitioned the Industrial Commission for a lump sum settlement of one half of the balance of her unpaid compensation. Her claim was based on CRS '53, 81-11-4.

The Commission held that her right to compensation terminated upon her remarriage, as provided by CRS '53, 81-11-7; that she had been paid compensation to the date of her remarriage and that nothing further was payable to her. Her petition for the lump sum settlement was denied and the employer and insurer were relieved of the duty of making any further payments.

This award and order of the Industrial Commission was reviewed by the district court and by it affirmed. Mary Lois Creacy is here by writ of error seeking reversal.

Creacy contends that CRS '53, 81-11-4 and 81-11-7 are not irreconcilable, and they should be reas together and effect given to both sections, and Tavenor v. Royal Indemnity Co., 84 Colo. 521, 272 P. 3 (1928) which held these sections to be irreconcilable should be overruled.

She further contends that subsequent to the decision in Tavenor v. Royal Indemnity Co., sections 81-11-4 and 81-11-7 were both included in the compilation of 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, and both were reenacted by the legislature when it adopted the Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, and that these actions are tantamount to a legislative declaration that section 81-11-4 is still in full force and effect.

In the original Workmen's Compensation Act, Chapter 210, Session Laws 1919, the pertinent sections were numbered as Sections 55 and 58. The 1919 enactment of Sections 55 and 58, so far as relevant here, provided:

'Section 55. In the case of remarriage of the husband or wife of a deceased employe, without children, he or she shall receive, at the time of marriage a lump sum settlement without commutation equal to one-half of the amount of compensation then remaining unpaid; * * *.'

'Section 58. When the right to a death benefit shall become fixed it shall cease, lapse or terminate upon the happening of any of the following contingencies:

'(a) Upon marriage, with the exception as to lump sum settlement, as herein provided. * * *.'

The two sections were consistent and harmonious in the original forms and continued so until 1923, when Section 58 was amended to read:

'Death benefits shall terminate upon the happening of any of the following contingencies and shall thereupon survive to the remaining dependents, if any, to-wit:

'(a) Upon marriage.'

By this amendment to Section 58, the pre-existing saving clause relating to a partial lump sum settlement to a widow upon her remarriage was eliminated, and the widow's right to compensation terminated upon her remarriage. Section 58 was further amended by Section 4, Chapter 219, Session Laws 1951, the pertinent portions being identical with the 1923 amendment, and again it omitted the saving clause for the benefit of a widow upon remarriage. The 1923 and the 1951 amendments provided all Acts and parts of Acts in conflict with the Section as amended, were repealed.

Section 55 was never amended; it now appears as CRS '53, 81-11-4; Section 58 of the 1919 enactment, as amended, now appears as CRS '53, 81-11-7. For clarity and convenience, both sections will hereafter be referred to by the C.R.S. designation. The pertinent parts of the current sections of the statutes are:

81-11-4:

'In the case of remarriage of the husband or wife of a deceased employee, without children, he or she shall receive, at the time of marriage a lump sum settlement without commutation equal to one half of the amount of compensation then remaining unpaid. * * *.'

81-11-7:

'Death benefits shall terminate upon the happening of any of the following contingencies and shall thereupon survive to the remaining dependents, if any:

'(1) Upon marriage.'

In Tavenor v. Royal Indemnity Co., supra, the facts were similar to the facts here. There the widow, following her remarriage, applied for a lump sum settlement under what is now CRS '53, section 81-11-4. We there held that the provisions of CRS '53, 81-11-4 and 81-11-7, were in irreconcilable conflict and that Section 81-11-4 was repealed by implication in the enactment of Section 81-11-7, as amended. We are now urged to overrule Tavenor.

Tavenor represents well-settled law in this jurisdiction. Under the doctrine of stare decisis courts are very reluctant to undo settled law. This doctrine has for its object, uniformity, certainty, and stability of the law and the rights acquired thereunder. The rule of stare decisis is not a doctrine of mortmain; it does not exclude room for growth in the law and the courts are not without power to depart from a prior ruling, or to overrule it, where sound reasons exist and where the general interests will suffer less by such departure than from a strict adherence.

The doctrine will not be departed from for slight or trivial causes, and certainly not where such departure would promote injustice or defeat justice.

The rule in Tavenor was laid down a third of a century ago, has been genertally recognized in the practice and by the courts, and has not been previously contested. There have been no legislative changes in the law in this behalf and the rule and the doctrine have become thoroughly established in the jurisprudence of this state. No reason is advanced which calls for deviating from stare decisis, and we decline to do so.

Mr. Chief Justice Burke, speaking of stare decisis in this jurisdiction, in Wolf v. People, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P.2d 926, 927, stated:

'* * * The question would thus seem to be definitely and finally disposed of in this jurisdiction under the rule of stare decises (sic). We are not unconscious of the fact that that rule is frequently ignored, with the general approval of the courts, for certain definite and often valid reasons. Among these are doubtful decisions handed down by closely divided courts and recent decisions...