Credit Bureau Of Eastern Idaho Inc v. Lecheminant

• Decision Date: 18 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 36381.,36381.
• Citation: 149 Idaho 467,235 P.3d 1188
• Parties: CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, INC., an Idaho Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Jeff D. LECHEMINANT and Lisa Lecheminant, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

149 Idaho 467

235 P.3d 1188

CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, INC., an Idaho Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Jeff D. LECHEMINANT and Lisa Lecheminant, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 36381.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, May 2010 Term.

June 18, 2010.

Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for appellants. Bryan N. Zollinger argued.

Smith & Banks, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for respondent. Marvin Smith argued.

W. JONES, Justice.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 14, 2006, the plaintiff, Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc. (CBEI) filed a complaint against Jeff Lecheminant (Jeff) and his then current wife, Lisa Lecheminant, to obtain a judgment in the amount of $803.16. On March 28, 2006, a magistrate court entered a default judgment for the full amount in favor of CBEI. In September of 2006, CBEI was made aware that Jeff had remarried and was currently married to Sandy Lecheminant (Sandy).¹ Also CBEI was informed that Sandy was employed at Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (EIRMC). That same month, CBEI filed an application with the magistrate court requesting the issuance of an order of continuing garnishment against EIRMC. The court, on September 28, 2006, entered an order requiring EIRMC to garnish Sandy's wages. On October 15, 2006, EIRMC and Sandy filed a claim of exemption asserting that Sandy's wages were exempt from garnishment pursuant to I.C. § 11-204. CBEI filed a motion to contest the claim of exemption. A hearing was held on October 21, 2007. On February, 21, 2008, the magistrate court entered a written order denying CBEI's motion to contest the claim of exemption and granting the claim of exemption.

CBEI filed a notice of appeal with the district court on February 28, 2008. On February 11, 2009, the district court entered a memorandum decision affirming the ruling of the magistrate court. CBEI filed a notice of appeal from the memorandum decision.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether CBEI has standing to challenge the constitutionality of I.C. § 11-204.

2. Whether I.C. § 11-204 is constitutional.

3. Whether I.C. § 32-912 allows for garnishment in this case.

4. Whether a debt must benefit the community in order to be satisfied out of the community property.

5. Whether the principle of extension can be applied to I.C. § 11-204.

6. Whether Miller v. Miller, 113 Idaho 415, 745 P.2d 294 (1987), is applicable to this case.

7. Whether the Lecheminants were required to file a cross-appeal under I.A.R. 15.

8. Whether antenuptial debts can be satisfied out of community property.

9. Whether a party must prevail in its effort to enforce a judgment in order to be awarded post-judgment attorney fees and costs under I.C. § 12-120(5).

10. Whether attorney fees should be awarded to CBEI under I.C. § 12-120(1) and (3) on appeal.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536, 540, 96 P.3d 637, 641 (2004) (citing Fremont-Madison Irr. Dist. & Mitigation Group v. Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc., 129 Idaho 454, 457, 926 P.2d 1301, 1304 (1996); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998)). Procedural issues are also a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 451, 210 P.3d 552, 559 (2009) (citing Blaser v. Cameron, 116 Idaho 453, 455, 776 P.2d 462, 464 (Ct.App.1989)).

IV. DECISION

A. CBEI has standing to challenge the constitutionality of I.C. § 11-204.

The Lecheminants claim CBEI lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of I.C. § 11-204 for two reasons: (1) CBEI does not fit within the class excluded from the benefit of I.C. § 11-204 and (2) CBEI does not possess a constitutionally protected right that it alleges was violated.

The district court dismissed the claim because it held that CBEI does not fit within the class unfairly burdened by I.C. § 11-204.

CBEI has standing to challenge the constitutionality of I.C. § 11-204. This Court has held that a party does not need to be a member of the class excluded from the benefit of a statute in order to have standing. This Court has held:

[I]t must appear that the alleged unconstitutional provisions operate to the hurt of the [litigant] and adversely affect his rights or put him to a disadvantage. It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that a person can be heard to question the constitutionality of a statute only when and insofar as it is being, or is about to be, applied to his disadvantage.

Harrigfeld v. Dist. Court of Seventh Judicial Dist. In & For Freemont [sic] County, 95 Idaho 540, 543, 511 P.2d 822, 825 (1973) (quoting State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 376-377, 399 P.2d 955, 962 (1965)).

In Harrigfeld, the plaintiffs, the wife of the decedent and the decedent's daughter, asserted a claim for damages for the death of their husband and father. 95 Idaho at 541, 511 P.2d at 823. The defendants petitioned this Court to obtain a writ of prohibition because they claimed the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action. Under the wrongful death statute in effect at the time of death of the decedent, the only parties with standing to sue for the wrongful death of a minor were the parents of the minor. Id. Conversely, the spouse or heirs of the decedent had standing if the decedent was an adult. Id. at 541-42, 511 P.2d at 823-24. The minority statute in effect at that time placed the age of majority for males at twenty-one and for females at eighteen. Id. at 542, 511 P.2d at 824. The decedent was considered a minor under the statute because he was only twenty years of age at the time of his death. Id. The plaintiffs opposed the writ, contending that because the statute provided females the benefits of adult status at the age of eighteen, under the Equal Protection Clause, males should receive similar treatment. Id. at 542-43, 511 P.2d at 824-25. The plaintiffs argued that they were the proper party to bring the claim. Id. at 543, 511 P.2d at 825. This Court held that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the minority statute. Id. This Court provided, “It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that a person can be heard to question the constitutionality of a statute only when and insofar as it is being, or is about to be, applied to his disadvantage.” Id. This Court then held that although the plaintiffs were not members of the class that was unfairly burdened by the statute, they had standing to assert the constitutional challenge because they had a personal interest in the matter. Id. Without standing, this Court wrote, the plaintiffs would be precluded from asserting their claim for damages for the death of their husband and father. Id.

In this case, like in Harrigfeld, application of I.C. § 11-204 will injure CBEI because it will prevent CBEI from garnishing Sandy's wages to collect on the judgment. Thus, though CBEI is not a member of the class that is unfairly burdened by I.C. § 11-204 (a married man attempting to protect his property from execution against his wife), it has a sufficient interest in the matter to have standing to assert the constitutional challenge.

B. Idaho Code § 11-204 is unconstitutional.

CBEI claims I.C. § 11-204 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The district court did not rule on whether I.C. § 11-204 is constitutional.

Idaho Code § 11-204, provides:

All real and personal estate belonging to any married woman at the time of her marriage, or to which she subsequently becomes entitled in her own right, and all the rents, issues and profits thereof, and all compensation due or owing for her personal services, is exempt from execution against her husband.

The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit states from treating different classes of people differently. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75, 92 S.Ct. 251, 253-54, 30 L.Ed.2d 225, 229 (1971) (citing McDonald v. Bd. of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 5 S.Ct. 357, 28 L.Ed. 923 (1885)). The Court, however, has required that any differentiation in treatment on the basis of sex “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” Id. (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561-62, 64 L.Ed. 989, 990-91 (1920)).

This Court holds that Idaho Code § 11-204 is unconstitutional, as it treats husbands and wives unequally. Under I.C. § 11-204, the earnings of a wife are exempt from execution against her husband, but the earnings of a husband are not exempt from execution against his wife. Additionally, the unequal treatment under I.C. § 11-204 is arbitrary and does not demonstrate a substantial relation to the objective of community property legislation. When I.C. § 11-204 was enacted, husbands managed and controlled community property. Action Collection Serv., Inc. v. Seele, 138 Idaho 753, 758, 69 P.3d 173, 178 (Ct.App.2003). At that time, I.C. § 11-204 provided an exception that allowed wives some control over their own earnings. The policy of the State of Idaho, however, was altered in 1974 to give husbands and wives equal right to manage and control their community property. I.C. § 32-912. Thus, Idaho Code § 11-204 no longer conforms with the object of community property law because it requires a distinction to be made between the earnings of husbands and wives, when the current policy is to treat the earnings as one-giving the right to manage and control community property to both...