Creek Red Nation, LLC v. Jeffco Midget Football Ass'n, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15-cv-01087-CMA-KLM
• Parties: Creek Red Nation, LLC, and Highlands Ranch Youth Football Association, a Non-profit Corporation, Plaintiffs, v. Jeffco Midget Football Association, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

175 F.Supp.3d 1290

Creek Red Nation, LLC, and Highlands Ranch Youth Football Association, a Non-profit Corporation, Plaintiffs,

v.Jeffco Midget Football Association, Inc., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15-cv-01087-CMA-KLM

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Signed March 30, 2016

Daniel J. Caplis, Babar Waheed, The Law Offices of Daniel J. Caplis, P.C., Denver, CO, Mark Lee Bryant, Mark L. Bryant, Attorney at Law, Englewood, CO, for Plaintiffs.

Dennis Boyd Polk, Heather S. Hodgson, Holley, Albertson & Polk, P.C., Lakewood, CO, Edward J. Hafer, John M. Palmeri, Nicole Christine Irby, Gordon & Rees, LLP, Denver, CO, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. #18)

CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO

, United States District Judge

Currently before the Court is Defendant Jeffco Midget Football Association, Inc.'s (“JMFA”) Motion to Dismiss, which was filed on June 2, 2015. (Doc. # 18.) Plaintiffs Creek Red Nation, LLC (“CRN”) and Highlands Ranch Youth Football Association (“HRYFA”) responded to JMFA's motion on June 4, 2015. (Doc. # 19.) JMFA did not reply to Plaintiffs' response. For the following reasons, JMFA's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

CRN is “a group of six youth football teams primarily made up of minority children.” (Doc. # 1 at 1 ¶ 2.) CRN alleges that, after four years of participation as a member association, JMFA wrongfully expelled CRN. (Doc. # 1 at 2 ¶ 2.) To “save the children of CRN from the expulsion,” HRYFA—another participating member of JMFA—“immediately took in the CRN teams so that the CRN teams could play in JMFA under the HRYFA banner.” (Doc. # 1 at 2 ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs allege that JMFA “then expelled all 24 HRYFA teams, in order to keep out the CRN teams.” (Doc. # 1 at 2 ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs allege that JMFA's actions were based on racial animus. (Doc. # 1 at 6 ¶¶ 32-38.)

In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981

(claim one), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (claim two),

42 U.S.C. § 2000a

(claim three), and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24–34–601 (claim four), as well as claims for breach of contract (claim five) and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (claim six). (Doc. # 1 at 9-12 ¶¶ 58-80.)

II. ANALYSIS

JMFA moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

. Rule 12(b)(1) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is not a judgment on the merits of the plaintiff's claim. Instead, it is a determination that the court lacks authority to adjudicate the matter. See

Castaneda v. INS , 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir.1994) (recognizing that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise jurisdiction when specifically authorized to do so). The burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co. , 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir.1974).

Rule 12(b)(6)

provides that a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint, but it may not rely on mere conclusions. Id . at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

A. Whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring claims for the alleged violations

JMFA contends that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981

, 1985, and 2000a because “they do not allege any immediate or threatened injury to their members, who are the holders of those claimed civil rights.” (Doc. # 18 at 4.) Instead, according to JMFA, “Plaintiffs allege only injury to the organizations themselves as a result of their expulsion from [JMFA].” (Doc. # 18 at 4.)

A challenge to a plaintiff's standing to bring a particular claim is properly raised in a Rule 12(b)(1)

motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court construes JMFA's motion as a facial challenge to Plaintiffs' complaint. “In addressing a facial attack, the district court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true.” United States v. Rodriguez

–

Aguirre , 264 F.3d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir.2001).

“[T]he term ‘standing’ subsumes a blend of constitutional requirements and prudential considerations.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. , 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982)

. To establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he or she has personally suffered an injury in fact; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) that it is likely, not merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Beyond these constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must also satisfy the following prudential principles: (1) the plaintiff generally must assert his or her own legal rights; (2) the court must refrain from adjudicating “generalized grievances”; and (3) the plaintiff's complaint must fall within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional right in question. Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan , 14 F.3d 1444, 1450–51 (10th Cir.1994)

.

An organization may, in some situations, have standing to bring claims on behalf of its members. In order to have “organizational standing,” the organization must demonstrate (1) that its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) that the interests the organization seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) that neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation in the lawsuit of the individual members. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n , 432 U.S. 333, 342–43, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977)

.

JMFA argues that Plaintiffs lack “organizational standing” because they “do not allege that their expulsion from JMFA has caused their members any immediate or threatened injury as a result of JMFA's actions, but rather that JMFA's actions have caused the organizations themselves immediate or threatened injury because CRN teams will be forced to break up.” (Doc. # 18 at 7 (emphasis in original).) JMFA further argues that the individual members would lack standing to sue in their own right because, individually, they are not prohibited from playing football in JMFA. (Doc. # 18 at 7.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue that they have in fact alleged harm to their members. (Doc. # 19 at 2.) Plaintiffs point to their allegation that, if CRN and HRYFA are not permitted to play in JMFA, “HRYFA will have to break up all six of the CRN teams and most of the approximate 18 HRYFA teams or leave some of the children off of each team.” (Doc. # 1 at 19 ¶ 55.) Plaintiffs argue that, if their teams are broken up or certain players are left off teams, “it is reasonable to infer that the separated and abandoned children will suffer emotional and psychological harm” due to the “lost relationships with players, coaches, and other team officials,” as well as “the loss of joy from not being able to practice and play with the players and for coaches with whom they have developed relationships over multiple seasons and years.” (Doc. # 19 at 2.)

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. The facts, as alleged by Plaintiffs, lead to the reasonable conclusion that the individual players will be harmed by being wrongfully denied the opportunity to play football with the teams and individuals of their choosing. The Court rejects the argument that the individual players will not suffer harm because they can nevertheless play for a different team. Such reasoning strikes the Court as too similar to the discarded belief that discrimination is not harmful if an “equal” alternative exists. The discrimination itself is the harm. Thus, the Court finds that, contrary to JMFA's argument, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged harm to their individual members.

Furthermore, the Court notes that, in addition to having standing to assert claims on behalf of their members, Plaintiffs also have standing in their own right to seek judicial relief from injury to themselves and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the organizations themselves may enjoy. See Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)

( “There is no question that an association may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy.”)

B. Whether Plaintiffs state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981

42 U.S.C. § 1981

guarantees equal rights under the law to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. Subsection (a) of the statute specifically enumerates the following rights as protected: the right to “make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)

. Subsection (c) provides that the rights enumerated in subsection (a) “are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c).

JMFA argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981

because Plaintiffs do not allege that JMFA was acting “under color of State law.” (Doc. # 18 at 7-10.) To support this argument, JMFA interprets 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to apply against only “nongovernmental actors who are acting under...