Monger Family Ltd. P'ship v. Scully

• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-cv-01162-NYW
• Decision Date: 21 March 2022
• Parties: MONGER FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Plaintiff, v. PETER J. SCULLY, KARL D. KJOLHEDE, and SUSAN B. KJOLHEDE, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

1

MONGER FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Plaintiff, v. PETER J. SCULLY, KARL D. KJOLHEDE, and SUSAN B. KJOLHEDE, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-cv-01162-NYW

United States District Court, D. Colorado

March 21, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Nina Y. Wang United States Magistrate Judge

This matter comes before the court on Defendants Peter J. Scully Karl D. Kjolhede, and Susan B. Kjolhede's (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7) (“Motion to Dismiss” or “Motion”) [Doc. 37, filed July 20, 2021]. The court considers the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and the Order of Reference dated July 19, 2021 [Doc. 35]. See also [Doc. 23]. The court finds that oral argument would not materially assist in the resolution of the issues in the Motion. For the reasons explained herein, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND^[1]

Plaintiff Monger Family Limited Partnership's (“MFLP” or “Plaintiff”) owns a ranch located in Routt County, Colorado (“Monger Ranch” or the “Ranch”), [Doc. 1 at ¶ 2], and this action involves a dispute over MFLP's right to access the Ranch via a road that crosses the properties owned by Defendants Peter J. Scully (“Defendant Scully”); and Karl Kjolhede and Susan Kjolhede (together, the “Kjolhede Defendants”). [Id. at ¶¶ 1-9].

In or around 1908, an approximately three-mile public highway was constructed in Routt County which ran from County Road 46 to County Road 44 (the “Trull Creek Road” or the “Road”) pursuant to a since-repealed federal statute, Revised Statute 2477 (“R.S 2477”).^[2] [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 12-13; Doc. 1-2 at 1]. According to the map contained in Exhibit A of the Complaint [Doc. 1-1], the lands crossed by the Trull Creek Road are now owned by the following, in order from west to east: the Kjolhede Defendants (the “Kjolhede Parcel”); Defendant Scully (the “Scully Parcel”); the United States Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) (the “BLM Parcel”); MFLP (i.e., the Ranch); and other landowners to the east of the Monger Ranch. See [Doc. 1-1]; see also [Doc. 1 at ¶ 9]. At issue in this action is the approximately three-quarter mile portion of the Trull Creek Road to the west of the Monger Ranch that crosses the Kjolhede Parcel, Scully Parcel, and the BLM Parcel (“Access Road”).^[3] See [id. at ¶¶ 1, 9]. MFLP alleges, however, that “[a]ccess across the BLM Parcel to the Monger Ranch is not in dispute and is not part of the subject matter of this action” which “only involves MFLP's right to use that portion of road as constructed across the lands owned by Defendants Scully and Kjolhede.” [Id. at ¶ 9].

MFLP alleges that for more than one hundred years-beginning “[s]ometime in about 1907 or 1908, ” [id. at ¶ 11]-MFLP and members of the Monger family have accessed, and continue to access, the Monger Ranch via the Access Road. See [id. at ¶¶ 1, 9, 11-13]; see also [Doc. 1-1].

Thereafter, “and in particular on May 4, 1921, . . . the public, the Monger family and MFLP's predecessors” used the Access Road to access “the BLM parcel and Monger Ranch for residential and agricultural purposes.” [Id. at ¶ 20]; see also [id. at ¶ 18].

The Trull Creek Road was abandoned and vacated in 1930 by the Routt County Board of County Commissioners, at the request of the Parties' predecessors, who represented that “the condition of this road is not fit for travel at any time of the years; that there is no lands adjoining this road occupied for farm and ranch purposes, which will be left without a public road should this highway be abandoned and vacated.” [Id. at ¶ 24; Doc. 1-9 (“Vacation Petition”)]. MFLP alleges the “[t]he vacation ordinance did not include the metes and bounds description of the [ ] Access Road right of way . . . that were contained in the documents under which the right of way was created.” [Doc. 1 at ¶ 25]. Notwithstanding the vacation of the Trull Creek Road in 1930, MFLP and its predecessors continued to use the Access Road thereafter “for access to the BLM Parcel and the Monger Ranch for residential and agricultural purposes.” [Id. at ¶¶ 26, 28, 30].

In 2019, MFLP entered into a contract to sell the Monger Ranch to family members, with the purchase price “to be paid in part by public funding of a conservation easement.” [Id. at ¶ 32]. MFLP alleges that, “[a]s a condition to granting a conservation easement, the Monger Ranch must have access to a public road.” [Id.]. Defendants have objected to MFLP's use of the Access Road and limited MFLP's use of the road to agricultural purposes only. [Id. at ¶¶ 33, 37]. MFLP alleges that it “takes the position that the [ ] Access Road is a public road . . . whereas the Defendants assert that it is not”. [Id. at ¶ 37]. MFLP now seeks the court's determination and declaration that MFLP is entitled to the use the Access Road across the Kjolhede Parcel and Scully Parcel in order to access the Monger Ranch and the BLM Parcel for all uses available for a public road. See [id. at ¶¶ 46, 57, 67, 72].

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

MFLP initiated this action on April 27, 2021 by filing a Complaint wherein it asserts four claims for relief, all styled as claims for Declaratory Judgment. See [Doc. 1]. In doing so, MFLP invokes this court's original federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and its supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for its related state law claims. [Id. at ¶ 7]. Count I seeks a declaration “to determine the rights, obligations and status of the parties under [Revised Statute] 2477.” [Doc. 1 at ¶ 36]; see also [id. at ¶¶ 35-46]. Count II seeks an implied easement under federal law. [Id. at ¶¶ 47-57]. Count III seeks an easement by estoppel under Colorado law. [Id. at ¶¶ 58-67]. And Count IV seeks an easement by prescription under Colorado law. [Id. at ¶¶ 68-72].^[4] MFLP originally filed the Complaint against Defendant Scully; the Kjolhede Defendants; United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC d/b/a United Wholesale Mortgage (“United Wholesale Mortgage”); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”); and the Public Trustee of the County of Routt, Colorado (“Routt County Public Trustee”). [Doc. 1]. The Parties have consented to the undersigned's jurisdiction for all purposes. See [Doc. 23; Doc. 25; Doc. 35].

On June 16, 2021, MFLP stipulated to the dismissal of Defendant Wells Fargo from this action, [Doc. 22], and later stipulated to the dismissals of Defendants United Wholesale Mortgage and the Routt County Public Trustee. See [Doc. 26; Doc. 32]. On July 19, 2021, the court conducted a Scheduling Conference and set a discovery deadline of January 31, 2022 and a dispositive motion deadline of March 2, 2022. [Doc. 33 at 9; Doc. 36 at 2]. On July 20, 2021, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, seeking to dismiss all claims in the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7). [Doc. 37]. MFLP responded to the Motion on August 10, 2021, [Doc. 38], and Defendants replied on August 17, 2021, [Doc. 39]. On December 3, 2021, the Parties filed a Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Outcome of Motion to Dismiss and Entry of Revised Case Management Order (“Motion to Stay”), [Doc. 43], and the court granted the Motion to Stay on December 16, 2021, [Doc. 44]. The Motion to Dismiss is thus ripe for determination.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal courts are ones of limited jurisdiction; “[t]hey possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute … which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is not a judgment on the merits of the plaintiff's claim. Instead, it is a determination that the court lacks authority to adjudicate the matter.” Creek Red Nation, LLC v. Jeffco Midget Football Assn., Inc., 175 F.Supp.3d 1290, 1293 (D. Colo. 2016) (citing Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994)). “A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Caballero v. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, 945 F.3d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Safe Streets All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 878 (10th Cir. 2017)).

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss “must be determined from the allegations of fact in the complaint, without regard to mere conclusory allegations of jurisdiction.” Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 1971). Further, under a 12(b)(1) motion, “a court has ‘wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts.” Stuart v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995)). In such an instance, “a court's reference to evidence outside the pleadings does not convert the motion into a Rule 56 motion.” Stuart, 271 F.3d at 1225. The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974).

II. Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations . . . and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. United States, 561...