Cremins v. Clancy
Decision Date | 17 May 1993 |
Citation | 415 Mass. 289,612 N.E.2d 1183 |
Parties | Paul J. CREMINS & another 1 v. John W. CLANCY, Jr. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Daniel C. Crane, Cambridge, for plaintiffs.
Paul L. Cummings, Brookline (Bradley MacDonald, with him), for defendant.
Before LIACOS, C.J., and NOLAN, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.
In this case, transferred here on our own motion, the plaintiffs, Paul J. and Donna A. Cremins, claimed that the defendant, John W. Clancy, Jr., who was seventeen years old at the time of the incident, was negligent because, while acting as a social host, he permitted Brian B. Jordan, a seventeen year old classmate and friend, to become intoxicated on beer knowing that Jordan would operate his own automobile. Jordan subsequently caused an accident in which the plaintiffs were seriously injured. A jury in the Superior Court answered "no" to one of the special questions which asked them whether the defendant had been "negligent in his conduct as a social host." 2 We affirm the judgment for the defendant which was entered on the jury's verdict, and the order denying the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.
Based on the evidence most favorable to the plaintiffs, the jury could have found the following facts. At approximately 7 P.M. on December 22, 1989, Jordan, who was driving his own automobile, arrived at the defendant's home accompanied by Eric Callahan, who was also seventeen years of age. The defendant's parents were not at home. Jordan had two cases of beer in the trunk of his automobile. The beer was brought into the defendant's residence and eventually placed on the kitchen counter. The defendant, Jordan, and Callahan partied with three other friends who were also seventeen or eighteen years old. Over the next two and one-half hours, the defendant, Jordan, and the four other youths proceeded to play a drinking game called "Quarters," while helping themselves as they wished to the supply of beer on the counter.
At approximately 9 P.M., three of the youths left to go to a shopping mall. At some point thereafter, the defendant indicated that it was time for him, Jordan, and Callahan to leave. The unconsumed beer, which Jordan had brought to the defendant's home earlier in the evening, was placed in the back of a station wagon belonging to the defendant or his family. The defendant drove the station wagon, "cruising" around town for about one hour. Jordan continued to drink beer while the defendant drove.
At some point in the evening, the defendant, Jordan, and Callahan stopped at the home of Brett Jackson, another friend. Jordan was obviously intoxicated when he arrived at the Jackson residence. Around midnight, Jordan solicited from another youth a ride back to the defendant's home to retrieve his (Jordan's) automobile. (The defendant stayed at Jackson's residence.) Jordan retrieved his automobile and drove, alone, in the direction of his home, which was six or seven miles away from the defendant's residence. While enroute, Jordan's automobile crossed into the opposite lane and collided head-on with the plaintiffs' vehicle. Jordan was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The defendant knew that it was illegal for Jordan and the other youths to drink and that drinking impaired a person's ability to drive safely. The jury would have been warranted in finding that the defendant knew, or should have known, that Jordan was intoxicated when Jordan left the defendant's automobile to join the party at the Jackson residence.
1. The case against the defendant was tried (and the judge instructed the jury) on the principles of social host liability expressed in McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 398 Mass. 152, 496 N.E.2d 141 (1986). We indicated in McGuiggan that "[w]e would recognize a social host's liability to a person injured by an intoxicated guest's negligent operation of a motor vehicle where a social host who knew or should have known that his guest was drunk, nevertheless gave him or permitted him to take an alcoholic drink and thereafter, because of his intoxication, the guest negligently operated a motor vehicle causing the third person's injury." Id. at 162, 496 N.E.2d 141. In accordance with this statement, the plaintiffs maintained that the defendant, as a social host, at the least, "permitted" Jordan to consume beer at the defendant's home, and again later in his car, while aware that Jordan was intoxicated and would shortly be driving his car some distance to return to his home.
Having received the case in this posture, the jury, during deliberations, asked the judge several questions, one of which was, "Can [the defendant] be considered a social host while in his car?" The judge answered this question: "No." The plaintiffs' counsel objected to the answer and contends that it was reversible error for the judge not to have answered the question affirmatively. The plaintiffs argue that the location of a defendant's activities should not govern whether the defendant has a duty as a social host, and that, in the circumstances existing while the defendant, Jordan, and Callahan were "cruising" around town, the defendant was under a duty which required him to prevent Jordan from drinking more beer.
We need not decide whether the answer given by the judge to the jury as to the defendant's status as a social host while in the automobile was correct. The basic question is whether, in the circumstances depicted by the evidence, a common law duty in negligence was imposed on the defendant for the protection of travelers on the highway. Wallace v. Wilson, 411 Mass. 8, 12, 575 N.E.2d 1134 (1991).
We have rejected arguments that defendants, who neither provided alcoholic beverages nor made them available, owed a common law duty to travelers on the highways or to others, to supervise their premises even though they knew, or reasonably should have known, that underage drinking was taking place on the premises. See Wallace v. Wilson, supra ( ); Dhimos v. Cormier, 400 Mass. 504, 509 N.E.2d 1199 (1987) ( ).
In Ulwick v. DeChristopher, 411 Mass. 401, 582 N.E.2d 954 (1991), we considered the principles from the McGuiggan decision on which this case was tried. The underage defendant in the Ulwick case hosted a "B.Y.O.B." ("Bring Your Own Booze") drinking party while his parents were away. He provided no liquor but furnished a social atmosphere, soda, mixers, ice, and other necessities for a drinking party, and generally acted in a way which encouraged the underage guests to drink. A guest at the party became obviously intoxicated (a fact apparent to the defendant). Shortly after leaving the party, the intoxicated guest drove an automobile, causing a serious accident.
On these facts, we stated in Ulwick: Id. 411 Mass. at 406, 582 N.E.2d 954. We also indicated in Ulwick that the general principles in prior cases such as Wallace v. Wilson, supra, Dhimos v. Cormier, supra, and McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, would continue to be followed. Id. 411 Mass. at 407, 582 N.E.2d 954. We concluded in Ulwick, that "[t]hese principles, and the consideration that the duty of care follows from control over the liquor supply, furnish practical limits of potential liability." Id.
The plaintiffs, acknowledging the principles expressed in the Ulwick decision, argue at length that the facts of this case demonstrate that the defendant had a legal duty, based on the extent of his control over the liquor consumed by Jordan. We disagree. Here there was evidence that Jordan had brought the beer to the defendant's home. Like the underage host in Ulwick, the defendant provided a setting and atmosphere, first in his home and later in his car, where Jordan could drink. Jordan and the others helped themselves. The defendant considered the supply of beer to belong to him, Jordan, and Callahan together. In these circumstances, we do not think the defendant had the obligation, or the means, effectively to control the supply of beer and, therefore, stop Jordan from drinking beer which was in large part Jordan's to consume. In the absence of a right to exercise effective control, the defendant was not subject to a duty to act to protect the...
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