Crenshaw v. State
Decision Date | 11 July 1910 |
Citation | 130 S.W. 569 |
Parties | CRENSHAW et al. v. STATE. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Union County; Geo. W. Hays, Judge.
A. C. Crenshaw and another were convicted of violating the peddling statute of 1909 (Acts 1909, p. 292), and they appeal. Affirmed.
Marsh & Flenniken and Moore, Smith & Moore, for appellants. Hal L. Norwood, Atty. Gen., and Wm. R. Rector, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellants were tried before a justice of the peace of Union county and convicted of a charge of violating the peddling statute of 1909 (Laws 1909, p. 292), which provides that "before any person, either as owner, manufacturer, or agent, shall travel over and through any county and peddle or sell any lightning rod, steel stove range, clock, pump, buggy, carriage or other vehicle, or either of said articles, he shall procure a license," etc. On appeal to the circuit court they were again convicted and appealed to this court.
The case was heard on the following agreed statements of facts:
We decided in State v. Byles, 126 S. W. 94, that the statute in question is valid, but it is now insisted that, as applied to the transactions set forth in the statement, it is a burden on interstate commerce, and to that extent void. Appellant Ganaway solicited orders for ranges, and appellant Crenshaw made deliveries thereof after they were ordered and shipped to El Dorado, Ark., for delivery to the respective purchasers. They were working under the same employer, and pursuant to a plan whereby one was to solicit orders and the other to deliver the articles sold. So if the two acts constituted an offense when performed by one person, its unlawful character would not be changed when performed by two persons, acting in concert, but both would be guilty.
The statute is directed against peddling, and undertakes to define what constitutes peddling within the meaning of the statute. This definition varies from the common-law definition of peddling, in that it is not essential that the vendor deliver his wares at the time he makes sales thereof, in order to come within its terms. In the statutory definition the words "peddle" and "sell" are used synonymously, but in order to come within the terms of the statute it is essential that a sale must be by one traveling over and through the county. The statute does not reach to mere sales. In other words, one who simply brings his wares into a county and sells them does not fall within the statute. There must be added the element of traveling from place to place, over and through the county, for the purpose of selling, in order for the statute to reach to it. It should also be especially noted that the statute does not discriminate against nonresidents of the state or of any county, nor against the wares manufactured without the state. It applies to all alike which fall within the description.
Does the method in which appellants conducted business for their employer exempt them from the operation of the statute? We think not.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, delivered by Mr. Justice Gray in Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296, 15 Sup. Ct. 367, 39 L. Ed. 430, announces the law applicable to the case and sustains the views we express. In that case, the agent of a nonresident manufacturer of sewing machines was engaged in peddling machines in Missouri without obtaining a license as required by the statutes of that state. He asserted his right to sell free of license, on the ground that the transaction constituted interstate commerce. All of the prior decisions of that court are reviewed, and the following conclusions announced:
It is true, in that case the vendor carried the machines with him from place to place, and made deliveries as he sold them. But we cannot see that that alters the principle, for the Legislature has the power to define the act of peddling, and that definition should be upheld by the courts, unless it is manifestly evasive.
The other decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States which are relied on by counsel do not conflict with the case above cited. Robbins v. Shelby County...
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Sholars v. Davis
... ... under this method of doing business he does not come within ... the scope of a peddler as denounced by the statutes of the ... State of Louisiana, especially Act 205 of 1924, as amended by ... Acts 299 of 1926 and 241 of 1928." ... Defendant ... further contends before ... 323; ... Johnston vs. State, 16 Ala.App. 425, 78 So. 419 ... Counsel ... cite numerous authorities, including the case of Crenshaw ... vs. State of Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389, 33 S.Ct. 294, 57 ... L.Ed. 565; Crenshaw v. State,, 95 Ark. 464, 130 S.W ... 569, holding that persons ... ...