Crescent Planing Mill Co. v. Mueller
| Citation | 117 S.W.2d 247 |
| Decision Date | 26 May 1938 |
| Docket Number | No. 35227.,35227. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
| Parties | CRESCENT PLANING MILL CO. v. MUELLER et al. |
Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Louis County; Julius R. Nolte, Judge.
Suit by the Crescent Planing Mill Company, a corporation, against Julius Mueller, President of the District Council of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America for the City and County of St. Louis and Vicinity, and others, to enjoin a boycott of goods or materials manufactured, sold or furnished by plaintiff. From an adverse decree, defendants appeal.
Appeal transferred to the St. Louis Court of Appeals.
Grimm, Mueller & Roberts and Paul Dillon, all of St. Louis, for appellants.
Sullivan, Reeder & Finley, of St. Louis, for respondent.
BRADLEY, Commissioner.
This cause was commenced in the circuit court of St. Louis County to enjoin a boycott. Temporary injunction was issued and on trial was made permanent and defendants appealed to this court. The final judgment or decree, omitting preliminary portions, follows:
"It is ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court that the defendants, and each of them, and their associates and the named defendants, as officers of the Carpenters' District Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, and their successors in office, and all other persons to whom notice hereof shall come, be enjoined and restrained from boycotting or making effectual, promulgating, or in anywise proclaiming any boycott upon or against the plaintiff, its goods and business, and from sending, conveying or delivering, in any way, to any person, firm, corporation or association, any boycott notice, verbal or otherwise, upon or against the plaintiff, its materials, goods and business, and from in any way menacing, hindering or obstructing the plaintiff in interfering with its business, patronage, or customers, or from in any way impeding the plaintiff from the fullest enjoyment of all the business, patronage and custom which it may possess, enjoy or acquire, and from interfering with the plaintiff or its business by threats to any persons who might be or become customers of the plaintiff, by advising them that the members of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, of the City and County of St. Louis and vicinity, or the constituent local unions thereof, would refuse to handle and use goods or materials manufactured, sold or furnished by the plaintiff, and from causing or procuring, by any order, direction, request or command, any person or persons, whomsoever, to decline to accept employment from or cease employment by any person, firm or corporation, because of the fact that such person, firm or corporation has been or is about to be, or contemplates becoming a customer of the plaintiff."
At the outset we are confronted with a motion filed by plaintiff, respondent here, to transfer the cause to the St. Louis Court of Appeals. This motion proceeds on the theory that this court does not have jurisdiction of the appeal. Defendants, appellants here, have filed suggestions in opposition to the motion to transfer, and argue that the appeal to this court was proper.
Appellate jurisdiction of this court is circumscribed by the Constitution. By Sec. 12 of Art. 6, of the Constitution and Sec. 5 of the Amendment of 1884, Mo. St.Ann.Const. art. 6, § 12; Amend.1884, § 5, an appeal lies to this court in the following cases only: "In all cases where the amount in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars [now $7500, see Sec. 1914, R.S.1929, Mo.St.Ann. § 1914, p. 2587]; in cases involving the construction of the Constitution of the United States or of this State; in cases where the validity of a treaty or statute of or authority exercised under the United States is drawn in question; in cases involving the construction of the revenue laws of this State, or the title to any office under this State; in cases involving title to real estate, in cases where a county or other political subdivision of the State or any State officer is a party, and in all cases of felony."
Defendants contend that jurisdiction of the appeal is in this court, because, they say, the construction of the Constitution of the United States and of this state is involved, and that the amount in dispute exceeds the sum of $7,500. If either of these contentions is correct, then jurisdiction of the appeal is here.
We first dispose of the contention that a constitutional question is involved. Defendants filed answer March 23, 1936, but did not attempt to raise a constitutional question. On April 27, 1936, day trial began, the answer was amended by interlineation to allege "that the injunction prayed for by plaintiff, if granted, would be in violation of the rights guaranteed to defendants under the provisions of Article 14, Section 1, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Sections 14 and 30 of the Constitution of the State of Missouri." March 24, 1936, next day after the original answer was filed, defendants filed motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, and in this motion, among other allegations, alleged: "That the temporary injunction heretofore granted in the above entitled cause deprives these defendants of life, liberty and property without due process of law and contrary to the provisions of Art. 14, Sec. 1 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and of Sections 14 and 30 of the Constitution of the State of Missouri."
At the beginning of the trial and after plaintiff had introduced 4 exhibits, defendants interposed what may be termed an ore tenus demurrer to the petition, and among the grounds stated was this: "That to grant the plaintiff the relief prayed for in the petition would deprive these defendants of life, liberty and property without due process of law and contrary to the provisions of Art. 14, Section 1 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and of Sections 14 and 30 of the Constitution of the State of Missouri."
At the close of plaintiff's case, defendants asked that "all the evidence be stricken from the record", and the third reason assigned for the oral motion to strike was: "That to grant the plaintiff the relief prayed for in the petition would deprive these defendants of life, liberty and property without due process of law and contrary to the provisions of Article 14, Section 1 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and Sections 14 and 30 of the Constitution of the State of Missouri."
At the close of the whole case defendants stated that they desired "to renew their motion to dismiss this action and to dissolve the temporary injunction." After some colloquy between the court and counsel for defendants, counsel stated: "The motion is, that now at the end of all of the evidence in this case defendants desire to renew their motion to dismiss this action and to dissolve the temporary injunction for the following reasons: First, that under all the evidence in the case plaintiff has failed to prove any cause of action against these defendants or any of the defendants; second, under all the evidence in the case no grounds recognized by equity have been proven to justify and to permit an injunction to issue in favor of plaintiff and against defendants, or any of them."
No ruling was made on the motion last mentioned. In the motion for new trial, defendants said nothing specifically as to constitutional rights. In their suggestions in opposition to the motion to transfer, defendants say that their motion for a new trial and in arrest "certainly comprehends the Constitution of the State of Missouri and that of the United States." Two of the grounds in the motion for new trial are set out in the suggestions in opposition to the motion to transfer. These, we take it, are the specifications which defendants say comprehend the federal and state Constitutions. These specifications are: "Second: That the finding, judgment, verdict and decree of the Court are against the law as applied to the evidence in this case."
The 8th and 9th assignments in the motion for a new trial complain respectively of the overruling of the ore tenus demurrer to the petition, and the motion to strike at the close of plaintiff's case. The motion in arrest does not specifically mention constitutional rights. It alleges the insufficiency of the petition, and that "upon the face of the record" the judgment is contrary to law.
In the formal assignments of error defendants say: "The injunction granted to respondent is too broad and sweeping, and its issuance violates the right of the appellants under Sec. 14 and Sec. 30 of the Constitution of the...
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