Crespo-Medina v. Danzig, CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-0298 (E.D. Pa. 9/21/2001)
| Decision Date | 21 September 2001 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-0298. |
| Parties | ALVARO CRESPO-MEDINA Plaintiff, v. RICHARD DANZIG, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY THE PENTAGON Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff Alvaro Crespo-Medina ("Plaintiff" or "Crespo-Medina") filed this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the United States Constitution, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 43 § 951 et seq., seeking economic and injunctive relief, alleging that his former employer, the Department of Navy (the "Navy"), discriminated against him on the basis of his race (Hispanic) and national origin (Puerto Rican). Plaintiff's complaint also seeks damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
Presently before this Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendant's Motion in part and denies in part, dismissing all counts brought against the Defendant with the exception of Plaintiff's claim that he was discriminated against in violation of Title VII when the Navy removed Plaintiff from the flextime and compressed work week program.
Plaintiff is a former employee of the Navy where he was employed as an Electronics Engineer, GS-12, until his termination effective May 19, 2000. On March 23, 1999, Crespo-Medina filed a formal complaint of discrimination with the Navy alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race and national origin with regard to various personnel actions taken by his employer, the Navy. Plaintiff claimed that he was removed from the flextime and compressed work week program; that he was subjected to a pattern of continuous harassment and intimidation by supervisors and section employees; that he was subjected to an unfair distribution of travel, overtime, compensatory time, distribution of equipment and distribution of training; and that Plaintiff was forced to relocate to unwanted office space.
On June 23, 1999, the Navy issued a Notice of Partial Acceptance/Dismissal of Crespo-Medina's discrimination complaint, dismissing all claims made by Plaintiff with the exception of his removal from the flextime and compressed work week program. With respect to the dismissed claims, this notice constituted the Navy's final decision on Crespo-Medina's complaint.
On March 1, 2000, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") remanded the appeal of the dismissed issues to the Navy for further administrative processing due to new EEOC regulations. On March 8, 2000, Crespo-Medina requested a hearing. Later that month, on March 29, 2000, the EEOC issued an Acknowledgment and Order, acknowledging receipt of Crespo-Medina's request for a hearing and giving the parties 30 days to identify any claims the EEOC had dismissed from the formal complaint of discrimination and to comment on the appropriateness of each dismissal.
During the investigation of Crespo-Medina's formal complaint of discrimination, Plaintiff suffered a work related injury and was unable to return to work until May 1, 2000, approximately one year after Plaintiff incurred the injury. Soon after Crespo-Medina's return to work, and while his formal complaint of discrimination was still pending, the Navy issued a Decision on Proposed Removal of Crespo-Medina from employment. The stated basis for the Navy's proposed removal was the excessive unauthorized absences of Plaintiff. Crespo-Medina immediately appealed the Navy's removal decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the "MSPB") by way of letter written by his attorney.
Around the same time that Crespo-Medina filed his appeal to the Navy's Decision on Proposed Removal, Plaintiff missed the 30-day deadline ordered by the EEOC in its Acknowledgment and Order dated March 29, 2000, which required the parties to identify and comment on the appropriateness of any claims the EEOC had dismissed from Plaintiff's formal complaint of discrimination. Consequently, on May 18, 2000 the EEOC issued an Order affirming the dismissals and limiting the issues of Crespo-Medina's appeal of the Notice of Partial/Acceptance Dismissal to his removal from the flextime and compressed work week program. Subsequently, the EEOC issued an Order, on the merits of the one claim which was not dismissed, finding no discrimination with respect to the Navy's decision to remove Crespo-Medina from the flextime and compressed work week program. The EEOC's Order additionally imposed sanctions on Crespo-Medina for his failure to cooperate and failure to comply with the administrative judge handling this appeal. On October 23, 2000, the Navy issued a final Order regarding the outcome of Crespo-Medina's discrimination complaint concerning his removal from the flextime and compressed work week program.
With respect to Crespo-Medina's concurrent appeal to the MSPB concerning the Navy's Decision on Proposed Removal, Plaintiff requested the MSPB to dismiss his appeal of May 19, 2000 without prejudice, to allow him to refile within 60 days. Crespo-Medina's request was granted by the MSPB on August 29, 2000, stating that Crespo-Medina must refile his appeal no later than October 30, 2000.
On November 22, 2000, Crespo-Medina refiled his appeal of the Navy's Decision on Proposed Removal. Before the MSPB had an opportunity to act on his appeal, on January 18, 2001, Crespo-Medina filed the instant suit pursuant to Title VII and various state causes of action, alleging discrimination in connection with the Navy's personnel actions cited in Crespo-Medina's original formal complaint of discrimination filed with the Navy on March 23, 1999, retaliatory discharge in connection with the Navy's Decision on Proposed Removal and various new allegations of discriminatory practices. Subsequently, the MSPB issued a decision with respect to Crespo-Medina's refiled appeal to the MSPB concerning the Navy's Decision on Proposed Removal, dismissing the appeal as untimely. Thereafter, Crespo-Medina filed a Petition for Review of the MSPB dismissal, which is currently pending before the MSPB.
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must only consider those facts alleged in the complaint. See ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994). The reviewing court must take all well pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). The pleader must provide sufficient information to outline the elements of the claim, or to permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). A complaint should be dismissed if "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59, 65 (1984).
Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII claim on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies is treated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), governing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, rather than Rule 12(b)(1) governing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to discrimination based on race and national origin through the Navy's adverse personnel actions, including his removal from employment. Title VII permits civilian employees of Military Departments to file civil actions based on allegations of racial and national origin discrimination within 90 days of a final action taken by the Military Department or a final action on a complaint filed with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1994). However, "[a] complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted unless it asserts the satisfaction of the precondition to suit specified by Title VII:" plaintiff must have first timely exhausted available administrative remedies, which includes "prior submission of the claim to the EEOC for conciliation or resolution." Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1022; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 (2000).
Evaluating whether or not Plaintiff has first exhausted his administrative remedies involves two lines of inquiry; one relating to the submission of Plaintiff's formal complaint of discrimination on March 23, 1999 and one relating to Plaintiff's appeal of the Navy's Decision of Proposed Removal to the MSPB. Because each differs in its required administrative remedies, this Court will examine the proper procedures of each, and the Plaintiff's compliance therewith, to determine whether Plaintiff's complaint has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under Title VII.
ù Plaintiff's Formal Complaint of Discrimination
The EEOC regulatory procedures require an aggrieved employee to initiate contact with an EEO counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) (2000). The EEO counselor ordinarily has thirty days to resolve the dispute informally or notify the employee of the right to file a formal written administrative complaint within fifteen days of receipt of the notification. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(d) (2000). After the filing of a formal complaint, the EEO counselor investigates the alleged events and issues a final agency decision within 180 days. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(e) (2000). A complainant may appeal the final action or dismissal of a complaint with the EEOC. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.401(a) (2000). Such appeal must be filed within 30 days of the employee's receipt of the...
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