Crews v. Roberson

• Decision Date: 10 May 1940
• Docket Number: No. 28119.,28119.
• Parties: CREWS. v. ROBERSON.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

10 S.E.2d. 114

62 Ga.App. 855

CREWS.

v.ROBERSON.

No. 28119.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

May 10, 1940.

Rehearing Denied July 26, 1940.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The "Jack Jones" Form for a trover suit, given in the Act of the Legislature (Ga. L.1847, 203, § 2), is, by the will of the legislature, sufficient in all cases within the provisions of the sections of this Act, and no additional averments are necessary. The practitioner pursuing this simplified form should not, by demurrer, be forced into using a repetitious, circumlocutionary, and verbose common law form of pleading.

2. In a trover suit, if the description of the property is altogether general, as for example: "one horse, " and there is nothing in the description by which the thing attempted to be described can be separated from the general mass of similar articles, the requirement of the law is not met, however, if the horse is described as "one bay horse bought from a named person, " this presents an entirely different aspect of the matter which is sufficient. Therefore, a description "650 sticks of tobacco" would not be sufficient, but where the description of "650 flue cured sticks of tobacco" singles them out from the altogether general mass of sticks of tobacco and limits the range of parol evidence to the identity of those 650 sticks of tobacco which are described as "being in weight about 800 pounds of cured tobacco, of the value of $240.00; said described tobacco being part of the same that was planted, grown, gathered, and cured by W. L. Crews as a share-cropper of I. J. Roberson on said I. J. Roberson's farm in Wayne County, Georgia, during the year 1939, " this description is sufficient, and, if necessary, parol evidence would be admissible to show that these particular articles are included within the words of the description. Thomas Furniture Company v. T. & C. Furniture Company, 120 Ga. 879, 882, 48 S.E. 333.

Error from City Court of Jesup; Raymond Pierce, Judge.

Action of bail trover by I. J. Roberson against W. L. Crews. To review a judgment overruling a demurrer to the petition, defendant brings error.

Affirmed.

C. E. Symmes and Warner B. Gibbs, both of Jesup, for plaintiff in error.

Thomas & Thomas and H. A. Strickland, all of Jesup, for defendant in error.

MacINTYRE, Judge.

I. J. Roberson brought an action of bail trover against W. L. Crews. His petition as amended alleged: "That W. L. Crews of said county is in possession of certain personal property, to-wit: About six hundred and fifty (650) sticks of flue cured tobacco, same being in weight about eight hundred (800) pounds of cured tobacco, of the value of two hundred and forty ($240.00) dollars; said described tobacco being part of the same that was planted, grown, gathered and cured by W. L. Crews as a share-cropper of I. J. Roberson on said I. J. Roberson's farm in Wayne County, Georgia, during the year 1939, to which the petitioner claims title; that W. L. Crews refuses to deliver the above-described property to petitioner or pay him the profits thereof; and that the yearly value of said property is two hundred and forty ($240.00) dollars." The petition prayed that process might issue requiring the said W. L. Crews to be and appear at the next term of the City Court of Jesup of said county to answer the petitioner's complaint.

The defendant demurred to the petition, his grounds being that the petition sets forth no cause of action against him and there is no such legal description of the property as to put him on notice of what property is claimed by plaintiff. The judge overruled' the demurrer and the defendant excepted.

1. In 1847 (Ga.L.1847, 203), the Legislature of Georgia enacted into law a bill introduced by John A. Jones, a member of the Legislature from Paulding County, "to simplify and curtail pleadings at law." This Act gave six forms, which forms are sufficient writs or complaints in all cases within the provisions of the Act. Cameron v. Moore, 10 Ga. 368, 369. The Act declares that these writs are sufficient, "any law, usage, or practice to the contrary notwithstanding." Section 2 of that Act prescribed a form for what is now known as a trover action. That section is as follows: "And be it further enacted, That the form of an action for the recovery of personal property may be as follows, to-wit: Georgia, ---- County. To the Court for said county. The peti tion of (A. B.) sheweth that (C. D.) of said county, is in possession of a certain (here describe the property) of the value of---- dollars, to which your petitioner claims title; that the said (C. D.) has enjoyed the profits of the same since ----; that the said----is of the year--- dollars; and that thely value of -- said (C. D.) refuses to deliver said---- to your petitioner, or to pay him the profits thereof; wherefore, your petitioner prays process may issue requiring the said (C. D.) to be and appear at the next ---- Court to be held in and for said county, to answer your petitioner's complaint."

The declaration in the instant case pursues the form prescribed by the Statute of 1847, § 2, and is sufficient. No additional averments are necessary to let in the proof necessary to a recovery. Hotch-kiss v. Newton, 10 Ga. 560, 566. This is so by the will of the Legislature. Where a practitioner seeks to adopt the simple form of pleading as provided in this Act of 1847, let us not shackle him and lead him backward into the paths of repetitious, circumlocutionary and verbose forms of common law pleading against his will. Floyd v. Morgan, 60 Ga.App. 496, 499, 4 S.E.2d 91. Whether we, in our State have appreciated the "Jack Jones" of simplified pleading or not, "the commissioners sent to this country from England, to look into the mysteries of American Law Reform, have transmitted a copy of this Act home, and it now stands upon the Statute Book of the British Parliament as a law of the Realm." Tuggle v. Wilkinson, 17 Ga. 90, 91; Floyd v. Morgan, supra. "The 'Jack Jones Forms' [of simplified pleading] were embodied into the New York Code of Procedure some fifty years ago, and of course credited to England. Perhaps one half of the States of the Union have adopted the New York Code in one or another form, calling it 'Code Pleading' and in Georgia they were law and practice long before the New York Code was framed. Thus the 'Jack Jones Forms' prevail in more than half of the States of the Union and throughout the world-broad empire of Britain." Floyd v.-Morgan, supra, 60 Ga.App. at page 501, 4 S.E.2d at page 95.

It is evident that, in the nature of things, the end of pleading which should be obtained is the production of one or more points of issue where a single fact is affirmed by one party and denied by the other. At common law, beginning with the plaintiff, the parties alternately presented their statements of their contentions under distinct names, to-wit, the plaintiff's declaration; the defendant's plea; the plaintiff's replication; the defendant's rejoinder; the plaintiff's surrejoinder; the defendant's rebutter; the plaintiff's sur-re-butter, after which they had no distinctive names. Theoretically, the function of each of these was to narrow the field of controversy until there evolved a single point, affirmed on one side and denied on the other, called the issue upon which the parties were to go to trial. The object was to develop the real issue. When the "Jack Jones" Form of declaration or petition is used in a suit for personal property (trover) it does not set forth evidentiaryfacts as to how, where, and when the plaintiff obtained title, but merely-sets forth the legal effect of the preliminary evidentiary facts which is the ultimate fact, namely, that the plaintiff claims title to certain described personal property, and...