Crews v. State, 58128

Decision Date10 June 1974
Docket NumberNo. 58128,No. 2,58128,2
Citation510 S.W.2d 425
PartiesThomas Beecher CREWS, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Edward A. Boeschenstein, St. Louis, for appellant.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., G. Michael O'Neal, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

HENRY I. EAGER, Special Commissioner.

This is an appeal from an order denying appellant's motion to vacate three concurrent life sentences imposed on pleas of guilty to first degree murder and two armed robbery charges. The pleas were entered on December 1, 1956, and this motion was filed on May 14, 1970. A full evidentiary hearing was held on December 10, 1971, with defendant and two witnesses in attendance on writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum. Defendant was and is most adequately represented by appointed counsel. The judge who imposed the sentences heard and ruled upon the motion. We accept jurisdiction under our order of April 9, 1973, since the proceeding involves life sentences and the notice of appeal was filed before that date.

We state the substance of movant's contentions raised in his briefs here, but not in the same order or wording as in the points in his brief. They are: that the interrogation at the time of his pleas did not comply with the criteria established by our Rule 25.04, V.A.M.R.; that a manifest injustice was caused since (a) defendant did not in fact plead guilty; (b) that he was misled by discussions of parole; (c) that his mental condition was unstable, and (d) he misunderstood the number of charges to which he was to plead; further, that the Court erred in believing the testimony of his former attorney, Mr. Bruntrager, and in disbelieving him and his witnesses; and, lastly, that in permitting convictions for murder and for a first degree robbery when both arose out of the same set of occurrences, he was placed twice in jeopardy. We shall designate the movant as the defendant.

Defendant was represented over a period of months and up to the time of his pleas, by Mr. Raymond Bruntrager, a lawyer highly experienced in criminal causes. There is some controversy in the record as to whether he was retained by defendant (or his family) or was appointed. Bruntrager testified that he was retained. We consider this immaterial. Bruntrager was also employed to represent one James Bradley who had been indicted for the same murder and presumably for the accompanying robbery. Bruntrager represented defendant at all times here in question. The two robbery indictments were returned in March, 1956; the murder indictment on May 1, 1956. The victim of the homicide was Thomas Mulrooney, a police officer, and the slaying occurred at the time of or immediately after one of the robberies referred to. It is substantially conceded that defendant took part in the robbery in which Mulrooney was shot, but he has steadfastly maintained that Bradley fired the fatal shot.

On December 1, 1956, defendant appeared before Judge Scott in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, accompanied by Mr. Bruntrager. Judge Scott recited the charge of first degree murder and asked defendant 'how do you plead to that charge?' Mr. Bruntrager answered as follows: 'We withdraw former plea of not guilty and enter plea of guilty as charged, subject to the recommendation of the Circuit Attorney's office.' The Assistant Circuit Attorney then stated the facts 'which have been coming to the Court's attention during the past days' (Bradley's trial), including: the fact that defendant Crews was the 'second man inside' at the time the officer was shot; that the evidence indicated that 'some shots were fired from (sic) Mr. Crews from 32 pistol * * *' which did not take effect; that defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree, since the 'act of one is the act of all,' and that the State recommended life imprisonment. Bruntrager replied that defendant said that the gun he held at the time 'went off' when he heard the shotgun blast, but that it was not pointed at anyone; he asked the Court to consider defendant's age (28) and that he did not actually cause the death. The Court asked defendant if he had anything to say before sentence and the defendant, personally, said 'no.' On further invitation of the Court, Bruntrager further stated: that he had talked to the defendant on a 'number of occasions,' and discussed the plea as recently as 15 or 20 'minutes ago' and asked him if he wanted to talk to anyone to which he said 'no'; that Bruntrager had been able to bring a sister to his office but defendant said he did not wish to talk to her; that he had fully advised defendant of his right to trial by jury and that he 'fully understands his legal rights.' Thereupon the Court sentenced the defendant to a term of life imprisonment.

Following this the first robbery charge was taken up, and the Court asked defendant if he had consulted with his lawyer; defendant answered: 'Yes, sir.' Bruntrager stated that he had consulted with the defendant. When asked 'how do you plead to the charge?' defendant personally answered 'Guilty.' The Assistant Circuit Attorney identified the case as involving the robbery 'which has been in evidence' and recommended a life sentence. Upon direct inquiry defendant said that he had nothing to say and that he had no one to whom he wished to speak. Sentence was imposed. Substantially the same proceedings took place on the second robbery charge, defendant stating personally that he plead 'guilty.'

At the evidentiary hearing the defendant testified in substance: that he was 42 years of age; that he finished the seventh grade of school, after failing some grades; that he had talked to Bruntrager at the jail about six months before the hearing on the pleas, that Bruntrager asked about a fee, and told him he had nothing to worry about. Defendant remained in jail and approximately five days before his pleas of guilty on December 1, 1956, Bradley went to trial on his murder charge. The case was tried for four or five days, and Bradley finally interrupted the trial to enter a plea of guilty. This plea was entered on December 1, 1956, just before defendant's pleas. Bradley had been confined in reasonable proximity to defendant and they had conferred many times about their cases. During Bradley's trial he was brought back to the jail each night and he and Crews conferred nightly about the progress of the trial and the lengthy selection of the jury. Bradley and Crews were particularly upset because the Court excused those jurors on voir dire who would not 'uphold' the death penalty; Bradley said that they had a 'bunch of witnesses' against him and told defendant what they were saying; he said also that it looked 'pretty bad,' and they discussed whether Crews should plead guilty, although he admittedly knew that he had the right to a trial. Defendant had read newspapers and had listened to the radio and television reports on Bradley's trial, and he was 'extremely nervous' and could not sleep.

Continuing with defendant's testimony, he stated: that Bruntrager had him brought out to the jail lobby (or interview room) on the morning of his pleas just after Bradley had plead guilty; that Bradley was there and also Mr. McSweeney, the Assistant Circuit Attorney; that Bruntrager said that he had had a hard time stopping the Bradley trial, and that defendant had better plead guilty or he would get the gas chamber; that he could get 'life on a plea,' that 12 years 'did' a life sentence and that he would be out on parole in about nine or ten years; that Bruntrager then talked him into agreeing, and he was then taken to a cell near the courtroom, where Bruntrager came and again talked to him; that he, defendant, then said that he had changed his mind and that they went into McSweeney's office where the 'gas chamber' was again discussed; that they said he would be out in 12 years and that they would help him on a parole in nine-ten years; that Bruntrager had told him that day that it was too late for a mental examination when he, Crews, suggested it; that he was 'all mixed up,' but finally told them that he would plead guilty. The proceedings in the courtroom then followed. Defendant had been advised previously of the fact that Bradley intended to plead guilty.

Somewhat out of context we note that defendant also testified: that Bruntrager never asked him about witnesses or an alibi (but here we also note that Bruntrager heard the testimony in the trial of Bradley on the same facts); that the guards in the jail continually harassed both him and Bradley, getting them up in the night, moving their stuff, and telling them that they could 'hear the pill drop' (in the gas chamber); that all this made him extremely nervous and upset. Defendant's evidence is somewhat confusing as to whether he knew of the pendency of the robbery charges, but he had been arraigned on them. He testified that he thought, when he went into the courtroom, that he was only going to plead guilty to the murder charge; however, when shown the full transcript of the pleas, he confirmed all of his answers and the other proceedings in detail, including the interrogation and his personal pleas to the robbery charges. Defendant admitted having had at least three prior felony convictions in each of which he had pleaded guilty, because he 'was guilty.'

James Z. Bradley, defendant's co-actor, testified: that he plead guilty on December 1, 1956, to the murder charge, after four or five days of trial; that he was represented by Mr. Bruntrager, who was employed by his mother; that he conferred each night at the jail with Crews concerning the developments in his trial; that he told Crews that any prospective jurors who had any scruples against the death penalty were excluded from the panel; that the guards at the jail had harassed Crews and himself as stated above; that he was then serving four life sentences, one on the present murder plea; that he...

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