Cribb v. Rogers
| Citation | 12 S.C. 564 |
| Decision Date | 17 December 1879 |
| Docket Number | CASE No. 779. |
| Parties | W. T. CRIBB ET AL. v. MARY ROGERS ET AL. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
1. A deed of land to A in consideration of “love, good-will and natural affection,” reserving to grantor “the use of said lands during my natural life only,” habendum to A, her heirs and assigns forever, conveys the fee to A in proesenti, charged with a life-estate in favor of the grantor. Cases cited, and Dinkins v. Samuel, 10 Rich. 66, limited.
2. A fee may be granted with a reservation of the usufruct to grantor for life.
Before WALLACE, J., Marion, April, 1879.
Action for recovery of a tract of land. At the trial the Circuit judge permitted defendants to introduce testimony to show a valuable consideration. Margaret Lewis, mentioned in the deed, and one of the defendants herein, was a step-daughter of grantor, and Mary Rogers was her tenant. Verdict for defendants.
The character of the claim and the terms of the deed under which defendants held are fully stated in the opinion of the court.
Messrs. Harllee & Montgomery, for appellants, cited 10 Rich. 66; 4 McC. 14; 4 Kent. 5; 2 Black. Com. 104; Wms. on Real Prop. 55, 155-6; Gen. Stat. 427, § 8.
Mr. J. G. Blue, for respondent, cited 1 Mills 148;10 Rich. 66; 2 Strob. Eq. 376; 3 Strob. 21.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The plaintiffs claim as heirs-at-law of D. Cribb, and the defendants under the following deed of lands: “I, Dempsey Cribb, of the county and state aforesaid, for and in consideration of the love, good-will and natural affection which I have and bear to Margaret Lewis, have given, granted and conveyed, and by these presents do give, grant, release, convey and deliver to the said Margaret Lewis, a certain tract, piece or parcel of land, containing four hundred and sixty-seven acres, more or less, reserving for myself the use of said lands during my natural life only, said lands being situated,” &c. Then follows the description of the lands conveyed “to the said Margaret Lewis, her heirs and assigns forever.” The deed concludes with a general covenant of warranty, and was duly executed and attested.
The only question affecting the validity and operation of the deed, as sufficient to pass a fee in the lands conveyed, arises out of the words, “reserving for myself the use of said lands during my natural life only.” The fact that the usufruct is separated from the fee is not inconsistent with the vesting of the fee. The grantor may convey the fee to one and the usufruct to another; hence the reservation of the usufruct to himself violates no rule governing the vesting of the fee. The grantee takes the fee, burdened with a use in favor of the grantor for his natural life.
It has been argued that under the operation of the statute of uses the fee was, at the moment of its creation, thrown upon the grantor by the execution of its uses, and thus the deed rendered ineffectual. The statute of uses could not operate until there was such a title in the grantee, as the deed was intended to vest, and this was a fee. The only effect of the statute would, assuming its operation, be to cast upon the grantor an estate commensurate with the uses created by the deed, and that would be a life-estate, leaving a remainder in fee vested in the grantee, which would owe its existence as such, not to the deed, but to the operation of the statute. The rules of the common law, as it regards the support required for a remainder, are, therefore, inapplicable, for the deed does not create a remainder as such. The statute cannot operate to defeat the deed, for it was not intended to have such effect, but only to effectuate its purposes by raising estates competent to give the fullest support to its uses.
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 1 Mills C. R. 48. That case fully sustains the conclusions just stated. The same conclusions were...
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Glasgow v. Glasgow, 16617
...must be to the grant, not to some other provision in the deed; * * *.' Cases from this court of controlling similarity to this are Cribb v. Rogers, 12 S.C. 564, and Senterfeit v. Shealey, 71 S.C. 259, 51 S.E. 142. In the former, the deed under construction was as follows: 'I, Dempsey Cribb,......
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Rembert v. Vetoe
...uses: Chancellor v. Windham, 1 Rich. 161, 42 Am. Dec. 411; Kinsler v. Clark, 1 Rich. 170; Dinkins v. Samuel, 10 Rich. 68; Cribb v. Rogers, 12 S.C. 564, 32 Am. Rep. 511; Jacobs v. Insurance Co., 52 S.C. 110, 29 S.E. Sumner v. Harrison, 54 S.C. 353, 32 S.E. 572; Cook v. Cooper, 59 S.C. 560, 3......
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Koen et al. v. Bartlett et al.
...for waste is, in the view here taken, immaterial. That a fee may well be granted with reservation of the usufruct for life, see Cribb v. Badgers, 12 S. C. 564; Waugh's Ex'rs v. Waugh, 84 Pa. St. 350; Hoe v. Brady, 2 Dev. 395; Hatch v. Thompson, 3 Dev. 411; Hodges v. Spicer, 79 X. C. 223. Be......
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Shealy v. South Carolina Elec. and Gas Co.
..."purpose" clause merely defines the "usufruct" 3 of the land which can be held separate from the title to the land. Cribb, et al. v. Rogers, et al., 12 S.C. 564 (1879); Glasgow v. Glasgow, 221 S.C. 322, 70 S.E.2d 432 (1952). However in Cribb and Glasgow, supra, we merely upheld the retentio......