Criddle v. Board of Com'rs of Bonneville County

• Decision Date: 29 July 1926
• Citation: 248 P. 465,42 Idaho 811
• Parties: C. E. CRIDDLE, Respondent, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

248 P. 465

42 Idaho 811

C. E. CRIDDLE, Respondent, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO, Appellant

Supreme Court of Idaho

July 29, 1926

COUNTIES-COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS-JURISDICTION TO FIX SALARIES.

1. County board of commissioners may fix salaries of officers under C. S., sec. 3699, on information naturally coming to it on account of performance of its duties, and need not hear evidence before making order.

2. Under C. S., sec. 3699, board of commissioners has jurisdiction to fix salaries of county officers, and district court on appeal therefrom may only determine whether board abused its discretion.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, for Bonneville County. Hon. Ralph W. Adair, Judge.

Judgment fixing salaries of county officers. Reversed.

Judgment reversed. Costs to appellant.

Otto E McCutcheon and A. D. Erickson, for Appellants.

In fixing salaries under provisions of C. S., sec. 3699, the commissioners exercise a judicial discretion. (Reynolds v. Commissioners, 6 Idaho 787 at 791, 59 P. 730.)

The true question to be determined on the appeal is, did the board of commissioners abuse the discretion vested in it by making the order? (Reynolds v. Commissioners, supra; Stookey v. Commissioners, 6 Idaho 542 at 548, 57 P 312.)

No order made in the exercise of discretion will be reversed on appeal, except that it clearly appears from the record that there was, as a matter of law, an abuse of legal discretion. (18 R. C. L. 124, sec. 38; 22 R. C. L., p. 490, sec. 170; 29 Cyc. 1432, sec. 3.)

On an appeal from an order of the board of county commissioners where they are vested with discretionary power, the court may pass on questions of law only, and not the facts upon which the board exercised its discretion. (Sullivan v. Commissioners, 22 Idaho 202 at 209, 125 P. 191.)

The judgment and discretion of the county commissioners cannot be supplanted and displaced on appeal by that of another officer in the person of the district judge. For the legislature deemed it necessary to submit this question to the judgment and discretion of some official board or body and so it concluded that the board of commissioners was the proper body. (Sullivan v. Board of County Commissioners, supra.)

Harry Holden, C. E. Crowley and E. M. Holden, for Respondents.

On appeal from such order the matter must be heard anew in the district court and the order appealed from may be approved, reversed or modified. (C. S., sec. 3512; Feltham v. County Commissioners of Washington County, 10 Idaho 182, 77 P. 332; Feltham v. County Commissioners, 28 Idaho 269, 153 P. 562.)

In Washington County v. National Bank of Weiser, the board of county commissioners exercising their discretion, and after due hearing, made and entered an order equalizing the assessed valuation of certain property. This order was appealed from as in the instant case. The district court, pursuant to C. S., sec. 3512, heard and tried the case de novo and modified the order of the board. This action of the district court was approved on appeal. (Washington County v. National Bank of Weiser, 35 Idaho 438, 206 P. 1054.)

WM. E. LEE, J. William A. Lee, C. J., and Givens and Taylor, JJ., concur. BUDGE, J., Dissenting.

OPINION

WM. E. LEE, J.

--C. S., sec. 3699, makes it the duty of the board of county commissioners, at its April session, next preceding any general election, to "fix" the annual salaries of the various county officers, except prosecuting attorney, for the term commencing on the second Monday in January after such session, and prohibits the board from fixing the salary of any such officer in a greater sum than the maximum or less than the minimum therein stated. At the April, 1924, session, the board of commissioners of Bonneville county fixed the salaries of all the county officers named in the section, except prosecuting attorney, to be paid during the biennium commencing on the second Monday in January thereafter. With respect to certain offices, the amounts fixed were lower than were then being paid. Three appeals were taken from the action of the board to the district court. That court heard testimony, admitted documentary evidence, made findings of fact, conclusions of law and entered judgment in favor of respondent and against the county in each case, directing that the order be modified by increasing the salaries lowered by the order of the board, to the scale paid during the then existing biennium, except as to the office of probate judge, the salary of which the court raised $ 200 more than the county had ever paid the incumbent of that office and $ 300 more than was fixed in the order of the board.

It is suggested that the evidence admitted by the trial court was insufficient to justify the findings of fact and that there was error in concluding that the board had abused its legal discretion in making the order.

The legislature has made it the duty of the board of county commissioners to fix the salaries to be paid to the incumbents of the various county offices (except county commissioners), and the only statutory requirements are the time when such action shall be taken and the maximum and minimum limitations within which each salary shall be fixed. In these respects, the board complied with the statutory requirements. Therefore, Smith v. Canyon County, etc., 39 Idaho 222, 226 P. 1070, has no application. In Reynolds v. Board of Commissioners, 6 Idaho 787, 59 P. 730, which appears to have been determined on the ground that the findings were insufficient, this court said that in fixing the salaries of county officers,

"They (the board) are called upon to exercise a judicial discretion, and to act so as to carry out the intent of the statute, with due regard for the rights and interests of both office-holder and taxpayer."

And further,

"The true question to be determined on the appeal is, did the board of commissioners abuse the discretion vested in it in making the order in question? . . . . The action of the board should not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion, . . . ."

The court found that, in fixing the salary of the office of sheriff, the board "did not take into consideration the character of the services to be performed; amount of labor to be performed; the dangers or responsibilities of said office; the time required in the performance of said duties; the fact that the office is self sustaining and not a burden upon the taxpayers; did not take into consideration the surrounding circumstances as affecting the cost of living at the county seat in a manner compatible with the dignity of the office of sheriff; and did not know at the time of the making said order what were the statutory duties of the office of sheriff." The findings with respect to the other offices are substantially the same.

The commissioners heard no evidence before making the order. The only knowledge of the facts the board had before it in making the order is gleaned from the testimony of one member of the board, from which it appears that it had the reports of the officers and auditors and that information that naturally comes to it on account of the performance of its duties: The board supervises the official conduct of all the county officers; it authorizes the employment of necessary clerks and assistants and fixes their salaries; it passes on claims against the county and makes the tax levy to bring funds into the treasury with which to pay the county's expenses. The testimony of the one member of the board shows that, while the board may not have possessed as full a knowledge of the duties of the various officers as it would have been possible to acquire, it did have a general comprehension of the statutory duties of the various officers, the time and labor required in their performance, the character of the services required as well as the responsibilities imposed. Inquiries were made with respect to salaries paid by business concerns for assistants, the cost of living, and salaries paid to like officers of other counties of the state. Among those who testified were the incumbents of certain of the offices. The weight of the evidence undoubtedly was that the salaries should not have been lowered.

Had jurisdiction to fix salaries in the first place been in the trial court no doubt the evidence would sustain the amounts found by it to be proper. But, as has been stated, the law placed this duty on the board, and the duty of the trial court was to determine if the board abused its discretion. Viewed from this aspect, it would seem that in requiring the board to fix the salaries of county officers, the legislature must have had in mind the fitness of the board for such...