Cridland v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 970206

• Decision Date: 02 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 970206,970206
• Citation: 571 N.W.2d 351,1997 ND 223
• Parties: Norma CRIDLAND, Claimant and Appellant, v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS COMPENSATION BUREAU, Appellee, and Hulstrand Construction, Inc., Respondent. Civil
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 351

571 N.W.2d 351

1997 ND 223

Norma CRIDLAND, Claimant and Appellant, v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS COMPENSATION BUREAU, Appellee, and Hulstrand Construction, Inc., Respondent.

Civil No. 970206.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Dec. 2, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 20, 1998.

Stephen D. Little (argued), of Dietz, Little & Haas, Bismarck, for claimant and appellant.

Lawrence A. Dopson (argued), Special Assistant Attorney General, Bismarck, for appellee.

Gary R. Wolberg (appearance), of Fleck, Mather & Strutz, Bismarck, for respondent.

MARING, Justice.

¶1 Norma Cridland appealed a judgment affirming a workers compensation bureau order apportioning benefits previously paid her and requiring her to repay more than $24,000. Cridland's appeal raises issues about whether a Bureau order awarding her benefits precludes the Bureau from later apportioning those benefits between her work injury and a noncompensable injury. We hold, in the absence of new evidence or a change in medical condition, the Bureau's order awarding Cridland benefits for her work injury, entered with knowledge of the noncompensable injury and after a formal adjudicative hearing, precludes the Bureau from relitigating the effect of the noncompensable injury on her work injury. We reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate Cridland's benefits.

¶2 On September 3, 1993, a truck ran into Cridland during the course of her employment as a highway flagger for Hulstrand Construction, and she filed a claim for workers compensation benefits. Dr. G.D. Ebel described Cridland's injury as a "[m]ild bruised area low mid back" and diagnosed "[l]ow back pain." On September 13, Dr. J.M. McNulty reported that, although Cridland's lower back had improved, she still had some pain. Dr. McNulty diagnosed a lumbar sprain and indicated Cridland would not be able to return to work for at least three weeks. On September 21, Dr. McNulty reported Cridland's pain had diminished and her range of motion had increased.

¶3 On September 26, 1993, Cridland slipped in her bathroom and fractured her right hand. An October 11, 1993 report by Dr. McNulty said Cridland had fallen approximately ten days ago "fracturing her right hand and reinjuring her back" and "had a significant set back from this injury."

¶4 On October 18, 1993, the Bureau issued a notice of informal decision accepting Cridland's claim for her work injury, and the Bureau awarded her related medical and disability benefits. On October 18, the Bureau received an x-ray report, dated September 27, which said Cridland had "slipped in bathroom" and suffered a probable fracture of her right wrist. On October 22, the Bureau received a medical report, dated September 27, which also said Cridland had "slipped in bathroom." On October 26, the Bureau received Dr. McNulty's October 11 report indicating Cridland had fractured her hand and reinjured her back.

¶5 In November 1993, the Bureau assigned Cridland's claim to a vocational rehabilitation vendor, noting "clmt fell @ Oct 1 in her home (bathroom) fracturing her R hand and reinjuring her back." An initial intake interview in January 1994, by Cridland's rehabilitation consultant reported that "[o]n 9/27/93 according to Ms. Cridland she slipped and fell in her bathroom fracturing her right hand in three places when she hit the wall. She claims that there was no re-injury to her back at that time" and that "[a]ccording to Dr. Hierling, Ms. Cridland's slip and fall accident on September 27, 1993, did not aggravate her lower back condition."

¶6 On January 14, 1994, a Bureau claims analyst wrote Dr. Ebel about whether Cridland's bathroom fall was related to her work injury. Dr. Ebel replied Cridland's bathroom fall was not related to her work injury.

¶7 Meanwhile, on December 6, 1993, the Bureau issued a notice of intent to reduce benefits, advising Cridland her benefits would be cut off if she did not provide the Bureau with further medical information. Cridland failed to respond to the December notice, and the Bureau issued an order denying Cridland further benefits on January 12, 1994. After obtaining medical records from Dr. Hierling, the Bureau issued an order reinstating benefits on March 29, 1994. However, on November 14, 1994, after Cridland failed to provide the Bureau with further medical records, the Bureau issued a notice of intention to discontinue benefits. On December 20, 1994, the Bureau issued an order denying further disability benefits effective December 4, 1994. Cridland requested a rehearing.

¶8 After a formal hearing, hearing officer Mikkelson issued a July 27, 1995 order reversing the Bureau's December 20, 1994 order. Hearing officer Mikkelson's memorandum opinion cited Dr. McNulty's October 11, 1993 report Cridland had fallen and fractured her right hand and reinjured her back; Dr. Charles Wagoner's December 20, 1993 report Cridland suffered from herniation of the L4/5 disc and protrusion of the L5/S1 disc; Dr. Charles Gauntt's March 3, 1994 impression Cridland had a lumbar strain with possible herniated disc and March 14, 1994 report of a disc bulge of L4/5 which is not responsible for her symptoms; Dr. Gail Benson's August 25, 1994 office note Cridland had a herniated disc on the right at L4-5; and Dr. James Ragland's January 4, 1995 recommendation to repeat an MRI to clearly see the disc herniation. Hearing officer Mikkelson concluded Cridland remained disabled as a result of her work injury and was entitled to reasonable medical expenses and disability benefits.

¶9 Neither Cridland, nor the Bureau appealed the July 27, 1995 order. Instead, the Bureau asked Dr. Melissa Ray to perform an independent medical examination of Cridland. Dr. Ray reported a September 1995 MRI revealed a "large herniated disc at L4-5 on the right." Dr. Ray concluded Cridland had suffered only a strain from her work injury and most of her lower back problems were from the bathroom fall. Dr. Ray attributed 25 percent of Cridland's back difficulties to her work injury and 75 percent to her bathroom fall. The Bureau issued an order accepting Dr. Ray's opinion, awarding Cridland benefits on a 25 percent aggravation basis, and requiring her to repay about $24,000 in medical and disability benefits previously paid by the Bureau. Cridland requested a rehearing.

¶10 After a formal hearing, administrative law judge Wahl recommended affirming the Bureau's aggravation and apportionment order, concluding (1) the Bureau had continuing jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-04 to review the award to Cridland, (2) the apportionment issue was not considered by administrative law judge Mikkelson and therefore the doctrine of administrative res judicata did not preclude the Bureau from deciding that issue, and (3) the only evidence about the effect of Cridland's bathroom fall on her lower back condition was Dr. Ray's opinion. The Bureau adopted the recommendation and the district court affirmed the Bureau's order. Cridland appealed.

¶11 In an appeal from a district court review of a decision by the Bureau, we review the Bureau's decision. E.g. Fuhrman v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bur., 1997 ND 191, p 6, 569 N.W.2d 269. Under N.D.C.C. §§ 28-32-19 and 28-32-21, we affirm the Bureau's decision unless its findings of fact are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, its conclusions of law are not supported by its findings of fact, its decision is not supported by its conclusions or law, or its decision is not in accordance with the law. Fuhrman at p 6. In considering whether the Bureau's findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, we decide only whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined the Bureau's factual conclusions are supported by the weight of the evidence from the entire record. Fuhrman at p 6.

¶12 Here, the dispositive issue involves the preclusive effect of the Bureau's July 27, 1995 order. Cridland contends hearing officer Mikkelson and the Bureau knew about the bathroom fall, and, with that knowledge, awarded her full medical and disability benefits for her work injury. She argues, in the absence of new facts, res judicata precludes the Bureau from relitigating the compensability issue decided by its July 27, 1995 order. She therefore asserts the Bureau's July 27, 1995 order precludes the Bureau from subsequently issuing an order apportioning benefits between her work injury and her bathroom fall. The Bureau responds the effect of Cridland's bathroom fall was not addressed nor decided by the Bureau's July 27, 1995 order, and the Bureau is not precluded from subsequently deciding the effect of that fall.

¶13 The preclusive effect of a prior proceeding on a subsequent action has traditionally been governed by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380, 383 (N.D.1992). See generally Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Introduction, pp. 1-15 (1982). In K & K Implement v. First Nat. Bank, 501 N.W.2d 734, 738 (N.D.1993) (citations and footnote omitted), we explained the rationale for precluding reconsideration of claims or issues under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel:

The doctrines promote efficiency for the judiciary and the litigants by requiring that disputes be finally resolved and ended.... "Courts apply the doctrine of res judicata to promote the finality of judgments, which in turn increases certainty, discourages multiple litigation and conserves judicial resources."... A party who brings some claims into one court without seeking complete relief and brings some related claims in another court, or who presents some issues in one court proceeding and reserves others to raise them in another court, invites wasteful expense and delay. Application of the law of res judicata conserves scarce judicial resources and avoids wasteful expense and delay.

¶14 In Hofsommer, 488 N.W.2d at 383 (citations omitted), we described the difference...