Criger v. Mustaba Inv. Co.
| Decision Date | 14 December 1937 |
| Docket Number | 44144. |
| Citation | 276 N.W. 788,224 Iowa 1111 |
| Parties | CRIGER v. MUSTABA INV. CO. et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Washington County; J. G. Patterson Judge.
This is a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law brought by claimant for fatal injury sustained by her husband on June 13, 1936. She alleges that such injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The defendants, in addition to pleading a general denial, allege that Criger was excluded from the provisions of the Compensation Act under paragraph 3 of section 1361 of the Code of 1935; and also that, at the time of the injury, Criger was a person holding an official position or standing in a representative capacity of the defendant Mustaba Investment Company, and that by reason thereof, under the terms of Code § 1421, par. 3, subd d., he was not an employee within the meaning of the law under examination. The matter first came up before the deputy industrial commissioner, who, after hearing, found that the deceased was engaged in an " agricultural pursuit" within the meaning of the law, and was likewise " standing in a representative capacity" of the Mustaba Investment Company within the meaning of that statute. On this finding, recovery was denied. A petition for review being brought before the commissioner, the decision of his deputy was sustained on the ground that at the time of his death Criger was engaged in an agricultural pursuit or operation connected therewith; but that he was not standing in a representative capacity. On appeal the district court reversed the finding of the industrial commissioner and fixed compensation. Defendants, being dissatisfied, appeal to this court.
Reversed.
Huebner & Huebner, of Des Moines, for appellants.
Harold E. Wilson and Hugh E. Chance, both of Muscatine, for appellee.
No attempt will be made to set out in detail the many and varied activities of the decedent while in the service of the Mustaba Investment Company. There is substantially no conflict in the evidence, and it will be sufficient for our purpose to sketch in outline such facts as seem determinative of the question before us.
The defendant Mustaba Investment Company (which will hereafter be referred to as the Mustaba Company) was the owner of approximately twenty various farms, which were being operated by tenants who furnished the machinery and otherwise attended to the production of such crops as were raised thereon. Some of the buildings on the various properties were in need of repairs and the decedent was employed by the Mustaba Company to attend to such repairs, and, in addition, to engage in certain other activities with reference to such farms. Some of these will be later pointed out.
At the time of his injury, Criger had been employed by the Mustaba Company for a period of approximately four and a half years. The record discloses that during this period he was a trusted employee, but had no independent authority to act without consulting his employer except to a very limited extent. It was the habit of the officers of the Mustaba Company, when the matter of repairs was involved, to make an inspection of the buildings to be repaired and then designate the repairs to be made. From that time on Criger was authorized to hire enough men to do each particular job and to pay the men at not to exceed a fixed figure. He likewise had the right to discharge those he employed. Criger had no authority to sign checks. The men were paid by checks signed by an officer of the company. The deceased had no certain orders as to what he should do from day to day, and upon which farms he should be engaged; he some times looked after work on more than one farm at the same time. He kept in constant touch with his employers either personally or by telephone. On occasion he looked after the matter of settlement between the tenants and the owners to the extent of seeing that his employers got their proper share of the crops. The kind of crops to be planted was usually determined by the tenants and the owners directly, though it appears that on rare occasions Criger was sent by the company to one or the other of the farms for that purpose. Prior to his employment by the Mustaba Company he had been a carpenter, and from thence forward to the time of his death his whole time was taken up with affairs of the farms owned by that company. He had no other employers and no other employment. He gave his time exclusively to these farms, and had a fixed salary of $100 per month and house rent.
At the time of his death Criger was going from one farm to another in the discharge of his duties, and on the highway met with an accident which resulted in his death.
Much more might be added to indicate the activities of the deceased, in the way of making repairs upon buildings and fences, and general supervision of the farms to which his employment was directed, but the foregoing will be sufficient to give the outline.
On this state of affairs claimant alleges that her husband was not engaged in an agricultural pursuit within the meaning of the Compensation Law; but was in such position, by reason of the extent and variety of his duties and the character of the employer itself as an investment corporation, to come within the provisions of the statute.
As already pointed out, the defendants resisted this contention on the two propositions above stated. To these we direct our attention.
1. We have recently had occasion to examine the statutes and the authorities on a somewhat analogous question, in Trullinger v. Fremont County (Iowa) 273 N.W. 124, and it will not be necessary to go over that ground again. Further examination of the authorities cited by the parties in the case before us, and additional investigation by us, has not persuaded us to alter our position as then announced.
It will be recalled that in the Trullinger Case, supra, the injured party was an employee of Fremont county, acting under the direction of the county engineer in the operation of heavy road...
To continue reading
Request your trial