Crighton v. Schuylkill County

• Decision Date: 06 March 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 94-5658.
• Citation: 882 F. Supp. 411
• Parties: Lynda CRIGHTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SCHUYLKILL COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

882 F. Supp. 411

Lynda CRIGHTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SCHUYLKILL COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 94-5658.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

March 6, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Catherine Merino Reisman, Willig, Williams & Davidson, Philadelphia, PA, for plaintiffs.

Robert M. Britton, Leah Perry, Post & Schell, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for defendant John Kline.

Robert St. Leger Goggin, Marshall, Dennehy, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Philadelphia, PA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HUYETT, District Judge.

This Memorandum and Order concerns the First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Linda Nedig, Bernadine DeAngelo, Carol Kalinich, Sandi Mendinsky, and Barbara Schwartz (collectively "Plaintiffs"). Pending before the Court is Defendants Schuylkill County, Warden David J. Kurtz, Paul Sheers, Franklin L. Shollenberger, Maryann Conway, Sheriff Francis McAndrew, Claude A. Lord Shields, and A. Thompson Rhoads' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.

I. Introduction

Plaintiffs are correctional officers employed by Schuylkill County ("the County") in the Schuylkill County Prison. Plaintiffs assert claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the following defendants: John Kling, a former supervisor at the prison; the County; Warden David J. Kurtz; A. Thompson Rhoads, County Administrator; and five members of the Schuylkill County Prison Board — Paul Sheers, Franklin L. Shollenberger, Maryann Conway, Sheriff Francis McAndrew, and Claude A. Lord Shields. With the exception of the County, Defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities.

Plaintiffs allege that since Defendant Kling was hired in 1989, he subjected female Schuylkill County Prison employees to a hostile work environment on the basis of their sex. First Am.Compl. at 3. Plaintiffs allege numerous examples of the behavior Kling directed towards Plaintiffs. First Am. Compl. at 4-7. In the summer of 1994, the County investigated Defendant Kling, and in September 1994, the County terminated his employment. First Am.Compl. at 7-8.

Counts I through IX seek relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of equal protection and civil rights. Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX raise similar claims against the County, Kurtz, Sheers, Shollenberger, Conway, McAndrew, Shields, and Rhoads, respectively. In each count, Plaintiffs allege that the named defendant failed: (1) to provide Plaintiffs with a workplace free from physical and verbal sexual harassment, (2) to respond to complaints, (3) to thoroughly investigate complaints in a timely manner, (4) to discipline workers who perpetrated, acquiesced in, or ignored sexual harassment, and (5) to disseminate an anti-sexual harassment policy. First Am.Compl. at 11. Furthermore, Count I alleges that because Warden Kurtz knew about Kling's behavior since 1989, the County was liable pursuant to section 1983 for violations of the equal protection clause caused by a sexually discriminatory hostile working environment created by Defendant Kling in the prison.

Count X alleges Defendants violated the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"), Pa. Const. art. I, § 28, while Count XI alleges the County violated Art. I, § 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Counts XII, XIII, and XIV raise state negligence claims against Defendants Kurtz, Sheers, Shollenberger, Conway, McAndrew, Shields, and Rhoads.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

When deciding a motion to dismiss, district courts take as true all factual allegations in the complaint and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from them. Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pa., 36 F.3d 1250, 1255 (3d Cir.1994); Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir.1988). A district court may dismiss a complaint only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no facts which would justify relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Ransom, 848 F.2d at 401.

B. Section 1983 Claim

The Supreme Court has set forth the two essential elements of a section 1983 action: "(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).

1. Individual Capacity Claims

Defendants argue that the complaint fails to set forth facts suggesting that Defendants Sheers, Shollenberger, Conway, McAndrew, Shields, and Rhoads may be liable in their individual capacities. Defs.' Br. at 7. Counts IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX do not allege that they personally harassed Plaintiffs.

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1291 (3d Cir.1994). To impose liability on a supervisor, "there must be some affirmative conduct by the supervisor that played a role in the discrimination." Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir.1990). The necessary involvement may be shown through (1) allegations of personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence, or (2) proof of direct discrimination by the supervisor. See id. However, Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044, 110 S.Ct. 840, 107 L.Ed.2d 835 (1990), supports Plaintiffs' argument that section 1983 liability may be imposed for adopting and maintaining a practice, custom, or policy of reckless indifference to Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

As it does not appear beyond a doubt that Plaintiffs can prove no facts to support their claims, the Court will not dismiss Counts IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX.

2. Claims Against Defendants in their Official Capacities

Defendants argue that the claims against Defendants Kurtz, Sheers, Shollenberger, Conway, McAndrew, Shields, and Rhoads in their official capacities merge with the claims against the County and that Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985), requires the Court to dismiss the claims against these seven defendants in their official capacities.

While Brandon v. Holt held that judgments against public servants their official capacities impose liability on the entities they represent, 469 U.S. at 471-73, 105 S.Ct. at 878, Brandon does not direct a district court to dismiss claims against defendants sued in their official capacities when a government entity is also named. Motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) test the validity of the complaint. A claim that is redundant is not necessarily invalid. The Court will not dismiss the claims against Defendants Kurtz, Sheers, Shollenberger, Conway, McAndrew, Shields, and Rhoads in their official capacities.

3. Qualified Immunity for Warden Kurtz and Other Defendants

Defendants seek dismissal on the grounds of qualified immunity for Warden Kurtz, and in a footnote, for the other individual defendants as well. As Defendants point out, "the right to be free of discrimination based upon sex in the workplace was well grounded in law and widely known to the public by 1986." Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1479 (3d Cir.1990). See Defs.' Mem. at 9-10. Because the Court is not satisfied that Defendants have shown that the "offending" conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have known, at this time, the Court rejects the qualified immunity defense.

4. Statute of Limitations

Some of the alleged incidents arose more than two years prior to the date the suit was filed. The appropriate limitations period for section 1983 claims is Pennsylvania's two year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.Ann. § 5524(2) (Supp.1994). Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1989).

Defendants argue that because the suit was filed on September 14, 1994, the allegations set forth in paragraph 18(f) of the complaint and any alleged complaints made to the warden or any other County employee prior to September 14, 1992 are time barred and should be dismissed. Plaintiffs oppose this argument, claiming that there was a continuing violation alleged, and that therefore, the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the last occurrence of discrimination rather than the first.

Where a plaintiff produces evidence of a continuing violation of his or her rights, the limitations period for bringing actions may be tolled. See Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1081 (3rd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122, 102 S.Ct. 3510, 73 L.Ed.2d 1384 (1982). To successfully use this theory, a plaintiff will have to show that (1) at least one act occurred within the filing period, and (2) the violation was more than an isolated or sporadic act. See West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir.1995).

The Court determines that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a continuing violation. First, all alleged incidents involved sexual harassment or the moving defendants' failure to act. Second, the harassing incidents are alleged throughout the period 1989 to 1993. Finally, the harassment did not cause a discrete event such as a lost job or a denied promotion, and thus, it did not trigger a duty for the Plaintiffs to assert their rights arising from that deprivation. See West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d at 755-56.

5. County's Liability for Kling

Defendants argue that Count I seeks to hold the County liable for claims based upon Kling's conduct only. Defs.' Response at 1. Defendants argue that because Kling had no policymaking responsibility, his conduct cannot bind the County, and therefore...