Crim v. Board of Educ. of Cairo School Dist. No. 1

• Decision Date: 29 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-1749,97-1749
• Citation: 147 F.3d 535
• Parties: 78 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 418, 74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,549, 127 Ed. Law Rep. 554 Elton J. CRIM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CAIRO SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Charles Althoff, individually, Kenneth R. Jones, individually, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 535

147 F.3d 535

78 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 418,

74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,549, 127 Ed. Law Rep. 554

Elton J. CRIM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CAIRO SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Charles Althoff, individually, Kenneth R. Jones individually, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-1749.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 9, 1998.

Decided May 29, 1998.

Gene A. Turk, Jr. (argued), Carbondale, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Raymond J. Kelly, Joan E. Gale, Allegra R. Rich, Jill D. Leka (argued), Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

The Board of Education of Cairo School District No. 1 decided that it would not renew Elton Crim's contract as superintendent of schools for the district, and further decided that it would relieve him of his duties as superintendent for the remainder of his present contract year. Dr. Crim then filed suit against the Board, alleging racial discrimination under Title VII, a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and a state law breach of contract claim. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I BACKGROUND

A. Facts

On July 15, 1993, the Board hired Elton Crim, who is black, as superintendent of schools for the district. Dr. Crim signed a written contract with the Board. ¹ At that time, the seven-member Board was composed of six black members and one white member. After the November 1993 elections, however, the composition of the Board changed; it then consisted of four black and three white members. The newly elected members--three white members (defendants Charles Althoff, Scott Walston and Kenneth R. "Duke" Jones) and one black member (defendant Joseph Holder)--ran on a platform that focused on improving the school district's finances.

In January 1994, the Board conducted an evaluation of Dr. Crim's performance as superintendent. Just prior to the January meeting, Board member Jones told Dr. Crim that, based on his informal conversations with other Board members, he believed that the Board was not going to renew Dr. Crim's contract for the following school year. Jones then recommended that Dr. Crim resign; the superintendent did not. When the Board convened that evening, the individual Board members discussed with Dr. Crim their written evaluations of his performance. An unofficial "straw" vote taken at the meeting indicated that most of the Board did not want to renew Dr. Crim's contract; no official vote was taken, however. All agree that Dr. Crim told the Board what would occur if the Board "dumped" him; there is disagreement, however, about the tenor of his remarks. The defendants claim that Dr. Crim threatened that, if his contract was not renewed, he would stop funding bonds and stop the purchase of teacher order certificates (which apparently are necessary to hire teachers for the following school year). Dr. Crim contends that he simply informed the Board that if it "dumped" him, the district would not be able to get their teacher orders and funding bonds. He claims he conveyed this information not as a threat but as practical advice. He then left the meeting before its adjournment.

At the next Board meeting, held February 16, 1994, Board member Althoff presented a bill of particulars that set forth reasons for not renewing Dr. Crim's contract for the upcoming academic year. Althoff had compiled these reasons from comments made to him by other Board members concerning their dissatisfaction with Dr.Crim. At the closed executive session of the meeting, the Board discussed each item of the bill out of Dr. Crim's presence. It then reviewed the reasons with Dr.Crim. When the Board asked the superintendent if he would fulfill the remainder of his one-year contract even though he would not be renewed for the following year, Dr. Crim told the Board that he would not. He then left the meeting. At that point, the Board voted on the issues of Dr. Crim's nonrenewal and suspension. Four of the seven Board members, defendants Althoff, Jones, Walston and Holder, voted not to renew Dr. Crim's contract and to relieve him of his duties. Because the district was in the middle of a reduction-in-force collective bargaining negotiation with its teachers, the Board immediately appointed Dr. Elaine Bonifield, the assistant superintendent, who is white, as interim superintendent.

On February 17, 1994, the Board gave Dr. Crim written notice of its intent not to renew his contract for the following school year. Attached to the notice were the Board's "Resolution on Superintendent's Contract" and the final draft of the bill of particulars. The reasons for nonrenewal listed in the bill included the Board's displeasure with Dr. Crim for (1) withholding information about the district's financing from the Board members he said he did not trust; (2) threatening to interfere with the district's financing and teacher orders; (3) leaving the January Board meeting before its adjournment and before the discussion of proposed budget cuts; (4) scheduling Board meetings without following the proper procedures, such as adequate notice; (5) conducting a special Board meeting without a quorum; (6) filing erroneous tax documents with the County Clerk; (7) allowing official documents to leave his office with grammatical and typographical errors in them; (8) failing to seek legal advice; and (9) exhibiting a general lack of knowledge about school finance. As a final note, the bill stated that the Superintendent's contract, by its terms, did not require the Board to give him its reasons for nonrenewal. In fact, it reported, the contract would expire without any action on the part of the Board on June 30, 1994. ²

One week later, Dr. Crim requested a hearing. The hearing was held on March 29, 1994. Dr. Crim waived his right to a closed session hearing. During the hearing, the Board did not allow Dr. Crim to question any Board member as a witness.

Dr. Crim filed his complaint in federal court on March 2, 1994 and an amended complaint on August 11, 1995. ³ The district court dismissed Counts I and VI, which were based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a state law libel action. The defendants sought summary judgment on the remaining counts, Count II (Title VII), Counts III and IV (Fourteenth Amendment due process claims), and Count V (breach of contract).

B. Opinion of the District Court

Reviewing first Dr. Crim's Title VII claim, the district court noted that Dr. Crim had offered no direct evidence of discrimination. ⁴ Turning to the McDonnell Douglas indirect method of establishing discrimination, ⁵ the district court determined that the Board's proffered reasons for not renewing Dr. Crim's contract or for relieving him of his duties as superintendent for the remainder of the school year were legitimate and nondiscriminatory. Following the burden-shifting analysis used in employment termination cases, the district court found that Dr. Crim had failed to prove that the Board's proffered reasons were a pretext for racial discrimination.

According to the court, Dr. Crim had shown no factual dispute concerning the Board's honesty in its dissatisfaction with Dr. Crim's performance as superintendent, as stated in the bill of particulars, and in its belief that he would not continue to serve out the remaining time on his contract. ⁶ Moreover, noted the court, his evidence gave no indication of a connection between the Board's decisions and the fact that Dr. Crim is black. ⁷ The court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment on the Title VII count.

Turning to Dr. Crim's due process allegation, the court likewise found no merit to Dr. Crim's alleged deprivation of a property right without due process. The court determined that Dr. Crim had no property right in a second year of employment as superintendent under either his employment contract or state law. Moreover, although Dr. Crim did have a property right in the continuation of his employment for the present year, the court determined that he had suffered no deprivation because he had continued to receive full salary and benefits under the contract. The court held that Dr. Crim's due process claim thus failed. ⁸

Dr. Crim's breach of contract claim was equally unsuccessful. The court determined that, under his contract, the superintendent was not entitled to serve a second year or to be renewed automatically. With respect to his suspension, the court noted that Dr. Crim did not receive the required 14-day notice before the hearing, but concluded that he had suffered no compensable injury. Finally, the court found that Dr. Crim had offered no admissible evidence that he did not receive accrued vacation pay; therefore, the court held, no reasonable jury could find that Dr. Crim suffered any damages by the Board's breach of his employment contract. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

II DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment

We review de novo the district court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment. We shall affirm the district court's decision if the party seeking summary judgment has demonstrated, through its pleadings and the depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits it has filed, that no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). We view all the facts in the record and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, Dr. Crim, and we place the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact on the moving party, the Board. However, Dr. Crim may not rely upon mere allegations; he must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. See ...