Wieland v. Department of Transp., State of Ind.
Decision Date | 19 May 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 3:98CV0648 AS.,3:98CV0648 AS. |
Citation | 98 F.Supp.2d 1010 |
Parties | Hilda Garza WIELAND, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF INDIANA (By and Through), Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Richard Carl DeLaney, Michael Hartburg, Gordon Bendall Branham McNeely and DeLaney, Huntington, IN, for Hilda Garza Wieland, plaintiff.
Theresa A. Stevens, Indiana Attorney General, Indiana Government Center South, Indianapolis, IN, for Department of Transportation, State of Indiana, defendants.
This cause is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties have fully briefed the issues and the Court heard oral argument on March 6, 2000. The issue is now ripe for ruling.
The case is brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. and § 1981. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The complaint in this case was filed by counsel on behalf of Hilda Garza Wieland (Garza)1, an Hispanic female, on or about December 18, 1998. The defendants are in truth the State of Indiana because this plaintiff was employed by the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT). Garza began working for INDOT on November 29, 1994, in the Fort Wayne division, as a "Highway Maintenance Worker 3 (HWM3) at the North Manchester Unit thereof." Garza is a member of a workforce that has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and that agreement was in effect throughout the relevant time period.
Part of this dispute arose when co-employee, Glenda Ervin, who originally held the "working leader" (WL) position for Garza's unit, resigned that position. The WL position was not a management job, but was a step above the HMW3 worker with slightly higher pay and was classified as HMW3 (WL).2 On September 11, 1996 Ervin requested a voluntary demotion and returned to an HMW3 classification.3 Garza expressed an interest in Ervin's former position. A male employee, Jeff Brubaker likewise expressed an interest in that job. Del Auer, the subdistrict manager, recommended yet another person for the working leader position, namely, Phil Hill because of his long service and highly competent work.4 The position was not posted as such, no-one made a formal application and there were no interviews because it is asserted none were required under the union's CBA. Hill was transferred to the position on July 13, 1997. Garza complained openly about Hill's appointment to the WL position. She alleges that management failed to offer her the position because she was female. INDOT asserts that the job was awarded based on seniority as required by the CBA, and claims that if Hill had not accepted the job, Brubaker was next in line.5
Garza also alleges she was subjected to race, sex and national origin harassment and a hostile environment. She claims INDOT retaliated against her after she complained of the not being offered the WL position by subjecting her to excessive drug testing and giving her undesirable work assignments. Finally, she argues that conditions became so intolerable that she was constructively discharged. INDOT seeks summary judgment on all claims.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Bragg v. Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 164 F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 1998); Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, 968 F.Supp. 409 (S.D.Ind.1997), aff'd 153 F.3d 805 (7th Cir.1998).
The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate, "with or without supporting affidavits," the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in the moving party's favor. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56); Larimer v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 137 F.3d 497 (7th Cir.1998), reh'g denied. A question of material fact is a question which will be outcome determinative of an issue in the case. The Supreme Court has instructed that the facts material in a specific case shall be determined by the substantive law controlling the given case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Once the moving party has met the initial burden, the opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate `specific facts shows that there is a genuine [material] issue for trial.'" Id. The nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, Weicherding v. Riegel, 160 F.3d 1139 (7th Cir.1998); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920-21 (7th Cir.1994), reh'g denied, nor may that party rely upon conclusory allegations in affidavits. Smith v. Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317, 320 (7th Cir.1995). This general standard is applied with added rigor in employment discrimination cases, where intent is inevitably the central issue. DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793 (7th Cir.1995); McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368 (7th Cir.1992); Tomasello v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 8 F.Supp.2d 1090 (N.D.Ill.1998). Accordingly, "affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination." Collier v. Budd Co., 66 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir.1995); Courtney v. Biosound, Inc., 42 F.3d 414, 418 (7th Cir.1994).
On a motion for summary judgment, the entire record is considered with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant and all factual disputes resolved in her favor. Schneiker v. Fortis Insurance Co., 200 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir.2000); Baron v. City of Highland Park, 195 F.3d 333, 337-38 (7th Cir.1999). The burden of establishing a lack of any genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant. Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir. 1999); Essex v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 111 F.3d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir.1997). The nonmovant, however, must make a showing sufficient to establish any essential element for which she will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265; Shank v. William R. Hague, Inc., 192 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir.1999); Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir.1997). Applying the above standard, this Court addresses Defendant's motion.
Garza's Complaint alleges race, sex and national origin harassment, discriminatory failure to promote, retaliation, and constructive discharge in violation of Title VII and § 1981(a).
A. Discriminatory Failure to Promote
Garza applied for the working leader position that was voluntarily vacated by Ervin, a female. She claims she was denied the promotion due to her sex. Furthermore, Garza claims that the State of Indiana, through INDOT, has a de facto policy of preferring male working leaders over female working leaders. The State of Indiana categorically denies any such policy.
Garza can avert summary judgment for INDOT either by putting in enough evidence of discriminatory motivation to create a triable issue, the "direct method," or by establishing a prima facie case under the "burden shifting formula." Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. See also, Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 95 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir.1996) (direct method); McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (burden shifting). Here, Garza attempts to make her case under both methods. For summary judgment purposes, however, when the defendant provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for non-promotion the court may avoid deciding whether the plaintiff has met her prima facie case and instead decide to dismiss the claim because there is no showing of pretext. See E.E.O.C. v. Our Lady of the Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 149-50 (7th Cir.1996). INDOT has provided a non-discriminatory reason for its failure to promote Garza. Accordingly the Court may move directly to the issue of pretext. Abioye v. Sundstrand Corp., 164 F.3d 364, 368 (7th Cir.1998), cert. denied 527 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 2337, 144 L.Ed.2d 235 (1999).
Title VII contains an exception which applies to collective bargaining agreements and seniority. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). It provides that:
"it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority ... system, ... provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race."
Id. Applying this section, courts have determined that absent a discriminatory purpose, the operation of a seniority system cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the system has some discriminatory consequences. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1864, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 65, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1535, 71 L.Ed.2d 748 (1982); Chambers v. Parco Foods, Inc., 935 F.2d 902, (7th Cir.1991); Wattleton v. Int'l Broth. of Boiler Makers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, Local No. 1509, 686 F.2d 586 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied. INDOT argues that the terms of the CBA that was in effect prevented it from offering the working leader position to Garza. First, INDOT asserts that the move to the working leader position was a transfer not a promotion, therefore Garza has no failure to promote claim.6 In transfer situations, the CBA requires INDOT to...
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