Crim v. Jones
Decision Date | 20 May 1992 |
Docket Number | No. A92A0058,A92A0058 |
Citation | 204 Ga.App. 289,419 S.E.2d 130 |
Parties | CRIM et al. v. JONES. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Donald P. Geary, Atlanta, for appellants.
Meadows & Schrade, Richard D. Schrade, Jr., McDonough, for appellee.
Appellants Crim and Pruitt (collectively "Crim") appeal the grant of summary judgment to Jones in this action for damages for breach of a commercial lease agreement.
Crim leased space in a shopping center to Beaumont, who assigned the lease to Jones. Crim signed the assignment and expressly agreed to its terms with the proviso that Beaumont remain obligated "for the full performance of the provisions of the lease."
Crim sued Beaumont and Jones for breach of contract, alleging that "despite repeated demands ... defendants stopped making the monthly rental payments provided for in the lease, and thereafter abandoned the premises." About a week prior to the scheduled trial date, Crim and Beaumont entered into a "Consent Judgment," which provided in pertinent part that "Beaumont is liable and indebted, as a joint obligor with Jones, to Crim, in the amount of ... $30,000, said amount representing the amount of principal and interest presently due and owing to Crim under the lease." Simultaneously, Crim and Beaumont executed a "Consent Agreement," pursuant to which Beaumont would pay Crim $6,000, which The document further specified: "Beaumont makes no representations to represent the co-defendant Jack W. Jones ... said Agreement being between Crim and Beaumont solely, and is in no way intended to relieve any obligation Jones may have to Crim." Both the Consent Judgment and Consent Agreement were made an order of the Court.
After the case was called for trial and a jury struck, Jones orally moved for and was granted summary judgment on the ground that the Consent Agreement between Crim and Beaumont had the effect of releasing him, a joint obligor, from any obligation under the lease pursuant to OCGA § 13-4-80.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred because their agreement with Beaumont was not a release and therefore not governed by OCGA § 13-4-80. It provides:
Appellants argue that the Consent Agreement is actually a covenant not to sue, applicable only to Beaumont, rather than a release applicable to both defendants. 1 " Smallwood v. Bickers, 139 Ga.App. 720, 723, 229 S.E.2d 525 (1976). "[W]hether the plaintiff has received full satisfaction and whether the parties intended the result of their negotiations to be a complete freedom from further liability for all the [defendants], should be paramount in determining the effect of any agreement purported to operate as a release and should be inquired into whenever the problem arises in a case." Revis v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 170 Ga.App. 366, 369, 317 S.E.2d 237 (1984). " ' Georgia R. Bank, etc., Co. v. Griffith, 176 Ga.App. 198, 199(1), 335 S.E.2d 417 (1985).
The Consent Agreement at issue was not intended as a release. Crim did not obtain full satisfaction from Beaumont and expressly retained the right to proceed against defendant Jones. Revis, supra 170 Ga.App. at 369, 317 S.E.2d 237. Compare J & S Properties v. Sterling, 192 Ga.App. 181, 384 S.E.2d 194 (1989) ( ). Weems v. Freeman, 234 Ga. 575, 216 S.E.2d 774 (1975), does not compel a contrary conclusion. That case dealt with the common law distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue and their relative effects in the area of tort law, a distinction no longer significant in light of Posey v. Medical Center-West, 257 Ga. 55, 354 S.E.2d 417 (1987). However, consistent with our ruling here, Weems recognized that a release does not result "[w]here...
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...the parties to the agreements, it will not release a claim against joint obligors or joint tortfeasors." ...' " Crim v. Jones, 204 Ga.App. 289, 291, 419 S.E.2d 130, 131 (1992), quoting Ga. R. Bank & c. Co. v. Griffith, 176 Ga.App. 198, 335 S.E.2d 417 (1985). For other sources distinguishing......
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...Groover, the agreement cannot be construed as a general release of Groover under either of the above Code sections. Crim v. Jones, 204 Ga.App. 289, 291, 419 S.E.2d 130 (1992). This is true whether the settlement agreement is characterized as a covenant not to sue executed lis pendens as to ......
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