Crisp County Lumber Co. v. Bridges

• Decision Date: 14 January 1939
• Docket Number: 12566.
• Citation: 200 S.E. 777,187 Ga. 484
• Parties: CRISP COUNTY LUMBER CO. v. BRIDGES et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

200 S.E. 777

187 Ga. 484

CRISP COUNTY LUMBER CO. v. BRIDGES et al.

No. 12566.

Supreme Court of Georgia

January 14, 1939

Error from Superior Court, Crisp County; A. J. McDonald, Judge.

Suit by Lee Bridges and others against the Crisp County Lumber Company to have life tenancy forfeited, to recover money which the defendant had received under a storm policy, for general relief, and for process. To review a judgment refusing to dismiss the petition on motion in the nature of a general demurrer, the defendant brings error.

Judgment affirmed.

W. E Grubbs and J. W. Dennard, both of Cordele, for plaintiff in error.

R. R Forrester, of Tifton, and J. M. Forrester, of Cordele, for defendants in error.

Syllabus OPINION.

ATKINSON Presiding Justice.

1. 'The tenant for life shall be entitled to the full use and enjoyment of the property if in such use he exercises the ordinary care of a prudent man for its preservation and protection, and commits no acts tending to the permanent injury of the person entitled in remainder or reversion. For the want of such care and the wilful commission of such acts he shall forfeit his interest to the remainderman, if he shall elect to claim immediate possession.' Code, § 85-604. 'Equity seeks always * * * to relieve against forfeitures, where the rules of construction will allow.' Code, § 37-216.

2. It has been held by this court: 'The tenant for life in property is entitled to the possession of the 'corpus' of the property for his own use, subject to a right in the remainderman to have the property in a state of security, to be forthcoming to them, on the termination of the life-estate.' Bowman v. Long, 26 Ga. 142. 'Because of this duty to preserve and protect the estate in remainder, the relation of the life tenant to the remainderman has been held to be, to a certain extent, a fiduciary one, and termed an implied or quasi trusteeship.' Barmore v. Gilbert, 151 Ga. 260, 262, 106 S.E. 269, 270, 14 A.L.R. 1060.

3. Under application of the foregoing principles, where a lumber company purchases the interest of a life-tenant and takes out storm insurance in its own name on a building on the premises, the owner of the life interest paying the premium with its individual funds, and upon the destruction of such building by storm collects the insurance, the proceeds of such insurance stand in the place of the property destroyed, and should be used in rebuilding the dwelling, or should be held by the owner of the life interest for the benefit of the remaindermen upon the life-tenant's death, in which case the owner of the life interest would be entitled to the interest on the fund during such period. See Clark v. Leverett, 159 Ga. 487(1), 126 S.E. 258, 37 A.L.R. 180. (a) Accordingly, the petition set forth a cause of action to require application of the fund derived from collection of storm insurance as indicated above. (b) The petition also set forth a cause of action to compel similar application of the value of the materials salvaged from the wrecked building and converted by the company.

4. As the...