Criste v. City of Steamboat Springs
| Decision Date | 09 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-WY-576-CB.,00-WY-576-CB. |
| Citation | 122 F.Supp.2d 1183 |
| Parties | Dr. David CRISTE, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF STEAMBOAT SPRINGS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Edward L. Serr, Wells, Love & Scoby, Boulder, CO, for plaintiff.
Josh Adam Marks, Hall and Evans, Denver, CO, for defendant.
Plaintiff Dr. David Criste brings this action against the City of Steamboat Springs, Colorado (the "City") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging due process violations. The Court exercises jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The matter is currently before the Court on the City's motion for summary judgment on grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Having considered the parties' briefs and oral arguments, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby FINDS and ORDERS as follows:
Background
This case stems from a dispute between Plaintiff and the City over Plaintiff's development and remodeling of commercial / residential real estate located within city limits. In 1993, Plaintiff submitted an application for development of the property that included a second story addition. The City approved Plaintiff's application and granted a Development Permit upon condition that the addition not encroach any further into the existing setbacks, which were already non-conforming.
In 1995, Plaintiff applied for a building permit to construct the second story addition. The City approved the building permit, apparently not noticing that the permit plans called for exterior steel supports for the second story, which supports violated the already non-conforming setbacks. Having received the building permit, Plaintiff moved forward with acquisition of materials and initial construction of the addition.
Then, in August 1996, the City issued a stop work order on the basis that the addition was not in compliance with the 1993 Development Permit. Later that same month, however, the City withdrew the stop work order, subject to certain conditions, and allowed Plaintiff to continue construction. One of the conditions of the withdrawal required Plaintiff to submit an application to amend the 1993 Development Permit. Plaintiff submitted the application and continued with the addition. In January 1997, however, the City Planning Commission denied Plaintiff's application to amend the 1993 Development Permit and Plaintiff ceased all substantial construction on the property.
On April 8, 1997, the City filed a suit for injunctive relief against Plaintiff in state court. The following day, Plaintiff commenced a state-court action against the City and members of the City Council and Planning Commission. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his due process rights. The state court consolidated the two cases under the case brought by the City.
On August 26, 1997, the state court issued an order granting the City's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief. The court dismissed Plaintiff's equitable claims on the basis that Plaintiff had failed to appeal the City's decision and failed to give notice of his estoppel claim as required by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 24-10-109. The state court further dismissed Plaintiff's § 1983 claims on ripeness grounds. This portion of the court's decision reads: "The claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is [sic] dismissed for lack of ripeness ... as no variance has been applied for and no property interest has been shown." (Def.'s Mot. for Summ.J.Ex. 5.)
In September 1997, with the state-court action proceeding on the City's claim for injunctive relief, Plaintiff requested that the City grant a variance for his building. After a series of delays, the City ultimately denied the variance on March 17, 1998.
On April 14, 1998, within one month of the City's decision to deny the variance, Plaintiff (the state court defendant/counterclaimant) brought two, after-acquired counterclaims against the City. Plaintiff's first counterclaim requested a declaration that the City had "exceeded its jurisdiction and/or abused its discretion in denying [Plaintiff's] request for a variance." (Id. Ex. 6 at 7.) Plaintiff's second counterclaim sought "an injunction against [the City] prohibiting enforcement [of] the Development Permit ... and prohibiting the City from otherwise interfering with the completion of the construction of the improvements." (Id. Ex. 6 at 8.) Plaintiff did not counterclaim under § 1983 for violations of his due process rights, despite that such claims apparently ripened upon the City's decision to deny the variance.1 After a bench trial, the state court ruled in Plaintiff's favor and entered an order requiring the City to accept the use as permitted, even with the set back violations, and to recognize Plaintiff's second-story addition as a legal, non-conforming structure.
Plaintiff now brings his § 1983 claims in this Court alleging violations of due process rights. Defendant moves for summary judgment on grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Because the Court agrees that res judicata bars litigation of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, this memorandum does not address Defendant's collateral estoppel argument.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Garratt v. Walker, 164 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir.1998) (en banc). "A fact is `material' if it `might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,' and a `genuine' issue exists if `the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Occusafe, Inc. v. EG&G Rocky Flats, Inc., 54 F.3d 618, 621 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
Federal courts "must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered." Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980)). Accordingly, the claim preclusive effect in federal court of Plaintiff's state-court judgment is determined by Colorado law. Id. Disposition of Defendant's motion, therefore, requires application of Colorado claim preclusion rules as announced by the Colorado Supreme Court. Fields v. Farmers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 831, 834 (10th Cir.1994). If the Colorado Supreme Court has not decided the issues presented by this case, the Court must then predict how that court would rule. Id.
Under Colorado law, "[r]es judicata constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions only when both the prior and subsequent suits have identity of subject matter, identity of cause of action, and identity of capacity in the persons for which or against whom the claim is made." Michaelson v. Michaelson, 884 P.2d 695, 699 (Colo.1994) (quotation omitted). "The `same claim or cause of action' requirement is determined by the injury for which relief is demanded, and not by the legal theory on which the person asserting the claims relies." Id. Thus, res judicata bars litigation of all issues actually decided as well as all issues that might have been decided. See Klein v. Zavaras, 80 F.3d 432, 434 (10th Cir.1996) (applying Colorado law); City & County of Denver v. Block 173 Assocs., 814 P.2d 824, 830 (Colo.1991); Batterman v. Wells Fargo Ag Credit Corp., 802 P.2d 1112, 1118 (Colo.Ct.App. 1990).
The City first contends that the state court's August 26, 1997 order dismissing Plaintiff's § 1983 claims constituted an adjudication on the merits, which precludes subsequent litigation on these claims. The Court disagrees. The August 26, 1997 order plainly dismisses the initial § 1983 causes of action on ripeness grounds, which does not constitute an adjudication on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion. See Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof'l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 65 (2nd Cir.1988) ().
Defendant next argues that because Plaintiff's § 1983 claims became ripe upon the City's decision to deny the variance, Plaintiff could have asserted this claim along with his counterclaims for declaratory and injunctive relief, and that his failure to do so bars litigation of the § 1983 claims. As noted above, Plaintiff concedes that he could have brought the instant causes of action as counterclaims in the earlier state-court proceeding. Further the parties agree that there exists identity of subject matter, cause of action, and capacity. Plaintiff, however, contends that he was not required to bring the § 1983 claims in the earlier proceeding under Colorado's declaratory judgment exception to res judicata. Defendant counters that the exception has no application to the facts of this case. Resolution of these competing points of view will determine the outcome of this case.
In Atchison v. City of Englewood, the Colorado Supreme Court held:
We reaffirm the rule that a declaratory judgment is conclusive as to the questions raised by the parties and passed upon by the court.... A declaratory judgment, however, does not constitute an absolute bar to subsequent proceedings where the...
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