Criswell v. Carter
| Decision Date | 26 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22A-MI-2253 |
| Parties | Daniel K. Criswell, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Douglas G. Carter, as Superintendent of the Indiana State Police, and the Indiana State Police, Appellee-Respondents |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Kurt Eisgruber Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D06-1911-MI-48303
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Indianapolis, Indiana
Gerald A. Coraz
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Frances Barrow
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
[¶1] The Indiana State Police (ISP) fired Daniel Criswell (Daniel) for throwing a rock through the window of his ex-wife's car and for interfering with the subsequent investigation into potential ISP misconduct. The ISP Review Board and the local trial court both upheld his termination. On appeal, Daniel argues that the ISP's decision to terminate him was an arbitrary and capricious agency action, unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.
Facts[1]
[¶2] When Daniel's ex-wife, Stephanie Criswell (Stephanie), needed a new car, Daniel helped Stephanie select an Audi A-4 being sold by Pete and Pamela Passon. The Passons and Stephanie executed a BMV form Bill of Sale (Passon Bill of Sale) conveying the car to Stephanie for $500. But despite the listed price, Daniel gave the Passons an envelope containing $3,000 in cash to complete the purchase. The Passons passed along the car's title to Daniel a short time later, although the title did not list any details about the car's new owner. Stephanie drove the car after the purchase, but no one registered it with the BMV or paid taxes on the vehicle at this time.
[¶3] About a month later, during an argument with Stephanie, Daniel picked up a rock from their driveway and threw it at the Audi, breaking the rear window.
Neither party reported the incident to police. But later that month, ISP learned of allegations that Daniel had battered Stephanie and assigned Sergeant Jason Fajt to investigate.
[¶4] Nothing came of the battery allegations, but through Sergeant Fajt's investigation, ISP learned about the rock throwing incident. When interviewed by Sergeant Fajt, both Daniel and Stephanie confirmed that Daniel threw a rock at the Audi, and Daniel further admitted to breaking the car's rear window. Stephanie also referred to the car as "my car" multiple times and never suggested that Daniel owned the Audi. Appellant's Supp. App. Vol. II, p. 79. A title check on the car with the BMV showed Stephanie as the owner, although she had registered the vehicle nearly a month after the window was broken and had listed a purchase date after the incident as well. When Sergeant Fajt interviewed the Passons, they also identified Stephanie as the car's owner and provided Sergeant Fajt with a copy of the Passon Bill of Sale.
[¶5] Sergeant Fajt uploaded the Passon Bill of Sale into ISP's Records Management System (RMS). Four days later, Daniel e-mailed Sergeant Fajt a copy of a hand-written document that Daniel claimed was a bill of sale showing that he sold the Audi to Stephanie two weeks after he threw the rock through its window. Daniel also provided Sergeant Fajt with an insurance card demonstrating that the Audi was insured under his name during the incident and a repair bill for the Audi's window showing him as the owner. After concluding his investigation, Sergeant Fajt gave his report and evidence to the Morgan County prosecutor, who ultimately declined to file criminal charges against Daniel.
[¶6] The case was then assigned to ISP Sergeant Timothy Isenberg to conduct an internal investigation into whether Daniel's actions amounted to misconduct. One of the first steps Sergeant Isenberg took was to re-interview Daniel. Although little new information came to light, Sergeant Isenberg became suspicious when Daniel appeared so well-prepared for his interview that it "seemed as if Daniel knew every question that would be asked." Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 24. An RMS access audit later revealed that Daniel had accessed the investigation against him hundreds of times, including up to 34 times in the four days between Sergeant Fajt uploading the Passon Bill of Sale and Daniel coming forward with his own handwritten bill of sale.
[¶7] When Sergeant Isenberg confronted Daniel with the RMS audit results, Daniel admitted accessing the RMS but claimed he merely wanted to review the investigation results because he was concerned about the accuracy of the information available to other State Troopers. Daniel also admitted to emailing his bill of sale to Sergeant Fajt in response to seeing the Passon Bill of Sale on the RMS. Daniel attempted to justify this behavior by presenting a text message he received from Sergeant Fajt stating, "You are always welcome to send me something that clears you." Appellant's App. Vol. III, p. 121.
[¶8] ISP Superintendent Douglas Carter determined that Sergeant Isenberg's investigation warranted bringing misconduct charges against Daniel. The two relevant charges alleged that Daniel committed criminal mischief by breaking the Audi's window and that he interfered with the subsequent investigation into the incident. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the charges, Superintendent Carter found the evidence supported the misconduct charges and terminated Daniel's employment.
[¶9] Daniel sought review of his termination with the ISP Board. The six-member Board issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, upholding Daniel's termination. The Board noted that because it was undisputed that Daniel threw a rock through the Audi's window, the only issue was whether Daniel owned the Audi at the time. Ultimately, the Board unanimously concluded that substantial evidence supported Superintendent Carter's finding that Stephanie owned the car. The Board also upheld the interference charge, finding substantial evidence that Daniel accessed information about the investigations against him on the RMS over 400 times and that he acted on the information to try to mislead investigators.
[¶10] Because the Board concluded that substantial evidence existed for both misconduct findings, it upheld Daniel's termination. Daniel then sought judicial review of that administrative decision with the trial court, which also affirmed his termination.
[¶11] Indiana Code § 4-21.5-5-14 provides the standard of review for agency decisions, which this Court has described as follows:
We will reverse the administrative decision only if it is (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to a constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; or (5) unsupported by substantial evidence.
Walker v. State Bd. of Dentistry, 5 N.E.3d 445, 448 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014). The agency serves as the factfinder and reviewing courts are "prohibited from reweighing the evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses and must accept the facts as found by the administrative body." Id. An administrative decision may not be overturned simply because the reviewing court would have reached a different result. Id. As the challenging party, Daniel bears the "burden of demonstrating the invalidity" of ISP's action. Id.
[¶12] Daniel attacks the Board's decision to uphold his termination in two ways: (1) as arbitrary and capricious; and (2) as unsupported by substantial evidence. Although related to each other, these terms have distinct meanings. An agency's decision is "arbitrary and capricious when it is made without consideration of the facts and lacks any basis that may lead a reasonable person to make the decision made by the administrative agency." Winters v. City of Evansville, 29 N.E.3d 773, 778 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015) (quoting Ind. Real Est. Comm'n v. Martin, 836 N.E.2d 311, 313 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005)). Put another way, an agency's decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is "patently unreasonable," Bd. of Dirs. of Bass Lake Conservancy Dist. v. Brewer, 839 N.E.2d 699, 701 (Ind. 2005), or is "issued in disregard of the undisputed facts and circumstances." Gary Police Civ. Serv. Comm'n v. City of Gary, 124 N.E.3d 1266, 1272 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019).
[¶13] As for Daniel's other claim for relief, that the ISP Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, he must show that the evidence amounts to less than "a scintilla." Ind. Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Prosser, 132 N.E.3d 397, 401 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) (quoting State v. Carmel Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., 660 N.E.2d 1379, 1384 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996)). In other words, substantial evidence is "something less than a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
[¶14] The ISP fired Daniel for violating ISP Personnel Rules. Before discharging, demoting, or suspending an ISP employee for cause, the ISP Superintendent must present the individual with the charges in writing. Ind Code § 10-11-2-15. Although initially charged with six violations, Superintendent Carter determined that only two supported Daniel's termination. See Appellant's App. Vol. III, pp. 132-33.
[¶15] The ISP charged Daniel with committing criminal mischief, in violation of Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2, for "recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damag[ing] the property of another without the person's consent when ...
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