Critcher v. Pannell

Decision Date31 December 1804
Citation5 N.C. 31
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesJAMES CRITCHER v. WILLIAM PANNELL.

A horse-racing contract must be in writing, and parol evidence is not admissible to contradict it.

THE plaintiff and one George Parker, on 24 December, 1799, by articles under their hands and seals, agreed

to run a horse race, one quarter of a mile, on the first Thursday in May, 1800, on Rice's path: Parker's nag to carry one hundred and forty-five pounds, and Critcher's nag one hundred and thirty pounds, for $500, to be staked on the day of the race, in cash, good property or bonds; the nags to be turned thirty feet from the starting poles, and to turn and run the first time locked, and judge the difference.

The parties met at the time and place stipulated, staked their bonds in the hands of the defendant, and weighed their riders, according to the terms of the articles. They then attempted to start the nags, and made many attempts to do so without success; Parker's nag being very restive and ungovernable, and refusing to start from a standing position (as it had usually done before on like occasions), but would have started readily if walked down the paths. Critcher's nag was easily managed, and would have run off without difficulty if walked down the paths with Parker's; this he refused to do, or to make any other effort to lock the other nag, further than by placing his own in a proper situation to be locked, which he frequently did; but always when the other was standing. The plaintiff in the evening ran his nag over the ground without being locked, demanded the stakes, and brought this action of detinue to recover them.

On the trial the defendant offered testimony to prove that Parker used every effort in his power to lock the other nag and start; that his conduct was fair, and not fraudulent, and that his failure to lock was entirely owing to the restiveness of his nag. This evidence the court rejected, holding him bound to lock the other nag and run.

The defendant's counsel then took two exceptions to the plaintiff's right of recovery. First, that the nags had never been locked, and that, by the terms of the articles, they were not bound to run until the nags were locked. It appearing that the plaintiff had frequently put his horse in a situation that Parker might have locked him, if his nag had not been restive and unruly, and that Parker had never put his nag in a situation to be locked, the court was of opinion that Parker was bound by his...

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