Crite v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 10 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-CA-0663-MR |
| Parties | JAMES JAVONTE CRITE APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Kathleen K. Schmidt Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Daniel Cameron Attorney General of Kentucky Christina L. Romano Assistant Attorney General Frankfort Kentucky
BEFORE: DIXON, LAMBERT, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
OPINION AFFIRMING
James Javonte Crite[1] appeals the Daviess Circuit Court order entered October 8, 2020, denying his motion to suppress evidence. After careful review of the record, briefs, and law, we affirm.
Crite rented an apartment that was part of a fourplex building owned and managed by Century Property Management (Century). On July 9, 2019, Crite's brother contacted Century to notify them that Crite, who was schizophrenic, had ceased taking his medication and was being taken to the hospital. Crite's brother further reported that Crite's apartment was damaged - wires had been ripped from appliances, and the AC and electric were nonfunctional - and requested repairs be made during Crite's absence.
On that same day, an agent for Century inspected Crite's apartment to contemplate repairs and assess whether the damage constituted a fire hazard. The agent observed that wiring had been pulled from the hot water heater and the HVAC unit; the thermostat had been removed from the wall; the main breaker was off, but another breaker had been pried from the fuse box; the apartment was generally a wreck; it was hot inside due to the ambient temperature of 100 degrees; and a handgun was present on the coffee table. The agent reported her observations to Century's property manager but did not alert emergency services or other tenants of the fourplex.
The following day, after engaging the services of an electrician, the property manager contacted the Owensboro Police Department to request that officers meet them at Crite's apartment. In the recorded call to dispatch, the property manager detailed the damage to the apartment and stated that she wanted to make sure the building was safe for other tenants. She further explained that officer assistance was requested because she did not feel safe given Crite's untreated schizophrenia, the uncertainty as to his present location after Crite was not admitted to the hospital, the damage to the apartment, the presence of a firearm, and because she had recently learned that Crite may be a felon. No efforts were made to contact Crite.
In response, Officers Nevitt and Matthews were dispatched to Crite's apartment. Both officers were advised prior to their arrival that Crite had an outstanding capias warrant. Additionally, Officer Matthews knew of Crite's status as a felon, though he could not remember whether he learned of it before or after he arrived on the scene. Nevertheless, both officers denied that their presence was in furtherance of a criminal investigation or the execution of the warrant.
After arriving at the apartment and receiving no response to their knocks, the officers informed the property manager that they had no reason to enter the apartment. The property manager persisted in her request that they enter to ensure it was safe, and after she unlocked the door, the officers entered to "clear" the apartment for threats. While "clearing" the apartment, the officers observed the handgun, the buttstock of what they recognized as a rifle sticking out of a couch, and ammunition on the floor. Thereafter, Crite arrived at the building parking lot where he was arrested on the outstanding warrant. Ultimately, the officers confirmed Crite was a felon and seized the rifle and magazine. The handgun was determined to be a pellet gun.
Following his indictment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,[2] Crite moved to suppress the evidence observed by the officers in his apartment. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined the officers' presence was lawful and the rifle was in plain view and; thus, the motion was denied. Crite then entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to RCr[3] 8.09, and this appeal followed. Additional facts will be introduced as they become relevant.
"The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution[4] protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government." Milam v. Commonwealth, 483 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky. 2015) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.E.2d 639 (1980)). "It is fundamental that all searches without a warrant are unreasonable unless it can be shown that they come within one of the exceptions to the rule[.]" Cook v. Commonwealth, 826 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky. 1992). The Commonwealth bears the burden of demonstrating the applicability of a recognized exception. Gallman v. Commonwealth, 578 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Ky. 1979). Evidence seized as a result of an unreasonable search is subject to suppression. See Warick v. Commonwealth, 592 S.W.3d 276, 280-81 (Ky. 2019).
Our review of a pretrial motion to suppress is twofold. Whitlow v. Commonwealth, 575 S.W.3d 663, 668 (Ky. 2019) (quoting Simpson v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, we review de novo "the trial court's application of the law to the facts to determine whether its decision is correct as a matter of law." Id. (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is "evidence of substance and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men." Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998). In assessing the evidence, we give due regard to the trial court's judgments on the credibility of the testifying officer and the reasonableness of their inferences. Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Ky. 2002).
Plain view is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, and it "applies when the object seized is plainly visible, the officer is lawfully in a position to view the object, and the incriminating nature of the object is immediately apparent." Kerr v. Commonwealth 400 S.W.3d 250, 266 (Ky. 2013) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)). Pertaining to the second requirement, Crite asserts the court erred in determining that the landlord had the authority to both enter the apartment herself and permit entry by police.
Our review begins with the trial court's determination that the landlord's entry without notice or consent was authorized by the emergency arising from the damage to the apartment's electrical system. Pursuant to KRS 383.615(2) and the lease agreement, the landlord is authorized to enter Crite's apartment without his prior consent in the case of an emergency. As noted by the parties, the term "emergency" is not defined by either the statute or the lease; however, it is a basic tenet of both statutory interpretation and contract law that undefined terms should be accorded their plain meaning. Commonwealth v. McBride, 281 S.W.3d 799, 806 (Ky. 2009); Larkins v. Miller, 239 S.W.3d 112, 113 (Ky. App. 2007).
Defining an emergency as "[a] sudden and serious event or an unforeseen change in circumstances that calls for immediate action to avert, control, or remedy harm[,]" Crite contends the evidence belies the court's finding. Emergency, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (7th ed. 1999). In support, Crite notes it was established that Century knew from its assessment the day prior that the main breaker was off, there were no flames or smoke, and the fuse box panel was cool to the touch. Additionally, Crite states that Century's decision not to alert the fire department, 911, or other tenants of any risk, and its approximate 24-hour delay in retaining an electrician, demonstrates that Century did not consider the matter emergent. Consequently, Crite insists that Century was required to give him two days' notice, pursuant to KRS 383.615(3), and Century's failure to do so rendered its entry unauthorized.
Conversely, the Commonwealth argues that substantial evidence supports the court's finding that the lease authorized Century's entry, and we agree.[5] Accepting Crite's proposed definition, there is no credible claim that the destruction of the apartment's electrical system was not an unforeseeable event. Further we are convinced that, despite the fact the damage had not presently resulted in a fire, given the apparent risk of harm to both property and life arising from pulled wires and a damaged fuse box, Century's immediate access to assess and ameliorate the risk was justified. Finally, we cannot agree that the possible 24-hour delay in retaining an electrician, which is less than the notice period Crite maintains should apply, is of such duration as to preclude the court's finding. Thus, we find no error.
Next, Crite challenges Century's authority to permit police to enter and search his apartment.
We begin, as the parties and the trial court did, by acknowledging that it has long been held that a landlord is not authorized to consent to a warrantless search of a tenant's residence. Chapman v. United States 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961) (...
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