Criterion Insurance Company v. Lyles
Citation | 244 A.2d 913 |
Decision Date | 24 July 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 4185.,4185. |
Parties | CRITERION INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. William Lewis LYLES, Reynolds Equipment Co., a corporation, B. J. Equipment, Inc., a corporation, and Steuart Motor Co., a corporation, t/a Steuart Truck Center, Appellees. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Columbia District |
George H. Eggers, Silver Spring, Md., for appellant.
John L. Ridge, Jr., Washington, D. C., for appellees William Lewis Lyles, Reynolds Equipment Co., and B. J. Equipment, Inc. James A. Welch, Washington, D. C., was on the brief.
R. Harrison Pledger, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Charles E. Pledger, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee Steuart Motor Co.
Before MYERS, KELLY, and FICKLING, Associate Judges.
Appellant insurance company brought suit in the trial court against a local resident, two Maryland corporations, and the Steuart Motor Company located in the District of Columbia, appellees here. The complaint, seeking damages arising out of an automobile accident in 1963, was filed on the last day of the three-year period of limitations. The clerk issued the necessary summonses the same day and gave them to appellant's counsel. They were not, however, delivered to the United States Marshal until eighteen days after the period of limitations had run. Service, except upon the individual defendant Lyles,1 was effected a few days later. The trial judge granted appellees' motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations.2 This appeal followed.
In the District of Columbia, a civil action is begun by filing a complaint with the clerk of the trial court. Customarily, the clerk issues and delivers the summons to plaintiff's attorney, whose duty is then to give it, together with a copy of the complaint, to the United States Marshal for service.3 Taking cognizance of this local custom, courts in this jurisdiction have developed the rule that an action is "commenced"4 when the complaint is filed and the summons is issued and delivered to the Marshal for service. Ordinarily, the applicable statute of limitations stops running at this point. Maier v. Independent Taxi Owner's Ass'n, 68 App.D.C. 307, 310, 96 F.2d 579, 582 (1938); Harris v. Stone, 115 F.Supp. 531 (D.D.C.1953); Bowles v. Dixie Cab Ass'n, 113 F.Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1953). Our rule and the comparable rule in other jurisdictions are based upon the principle that an action commences when a plaintiff has done all that is incumbent upon him toward the issuance and service of process. Huysman v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 12 App.D.C. 586 (1898). Since local custom places an extra obligation upon the initiator of a civil action, the statute of limitations ordinarily does not cease to run until that obligation is fulfilled.
Appellant argues that its failure to deliver the summonses and copies of the complaint to the Marshal is excusable because two of the corporate defendants were not residents of the District of Columbia and could not be sued and would not be served until appellant first filed the Traffic Act Bond required by D.C.Code, 1967 ed., § 40-423. It was the time consumed in procuring the bond which appellant contends caused the delay in delivering the summonses to the Marshal for service. This argument does not apply, of course, to the Steuart Motor Company, for which no bond was needed and which was ultimately served without difficulty at its place of business...
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...that an action is commenced upon the filing of the complaint." Id. at 396-97. However, eleven years later, in Criterion Insurance Co. v. Lyles, D.C.App., 244 A.2d 913 (1968), we virtually ignored the changes wrought by Fed.R. 3, by Reynolds, and by Clark, and reaffirmed the earlier interpre......
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