Crocker v. Collins
Decision Date | 01 October 1892 |
Citation | 15 S.E. 951,37 S.C. 327 |
Parties | CROCKER v. COLLINS et al. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Beaufort county; J. J NORTON, Judge.
Action by Daniel W. Crocker against Joseph W. Collins, as intendant and N. Christensen and others, as wardens, constituting the town council of Beaufort. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appeal. Reversed.
W. J Verdier, for appellants.
Elliott & Townsend, for respondent.
This action was brought for the purpose of enjoining the defendants from entering upon certain premises in the town of Beaufort, claimed by the plaintiff, and from pulling down, destroying, or otherwise injuring the buildings standing on said premises. By consent the testimony was taken by a special master, and reported to the court, and the case came on for hearing before his honor, Judge NORTON. After the pleadings were read, the defendants interposed an oral demurrer, upon the ground that the facts stated in the complaint were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendants excepted, giving oral notice of appeal. Thereupon the circuit judge stated that defendants were entitled to a stay, but the defendants, waiving this right, consented to proceed, and the case was heard upon the merits. Subsequently the judge rendered his decree granting a perpetual injunction, as prayed for, and defendants appealed, as well from the order overruling their demurrer, as from the final judgment granting the injunction.
To determine the question as to the demurrer it will be necessary to consider the allegations of the complaint, which are substantially as follows:
The first ground upon which the demurrer was rested is that it does not state the name of the municipal corporation of which the defendants are alleged to be officers. We do not think there is anything in this purely technical objection. Neely v. Yorkville, 10 S.C. 141. If there was any error in fact in stating the correct name of the municipal corporation, such error would not constitute any ground for demurrer, but should be corrected by some other mode of proceeding.
The next ground upon which the demurrer is rested seems to be that there is no sufficient allegation that the acts complained of were done or threatened by any officer of the municipal corporation. We do not think this ground can be sustained, for it seems to us that the allegations contained in the complaint, if true, are sufficient to show that the acts complained of were done by the executive officer of the town council, under the authority of that body; and, if there is any want of particularity or distinctness in the statements found in the complaint, that should be remedied by a motion to make the allegations more definite and distinct, and not by a demurrer.
The next ground relied upon to sustain the demurrer is that the plaintiff's claim of title rests only upon adverse possession, and this...
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