Crocker v. Crocker
| Decision Date | 07 April 1908 |
| Citation | 198 Mass. 401,84 N.E. 476 |
| Parties | CROCKER v. CROCKER et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Herbert Parker and Henry H. Fuller, for petitioner.
Robert M. Morse and William D. Turner, for respondents.
KNOWLTON C.J.
This is a petition for leave to file a writ of review to set aside a decree of the Supreme Judicial Court sitting in its appellate character as the Supreme Court of Probate. The bill is addressed to the Supreme Judicial Court in equity. This form is not strictly accurate, for a court of equity has no jurisdiction to deal with statutory proceedings which are prescribed for the probate court. Wolcott v Wolcott, 140 Mass. 194, 3 N.E. 214; Waters v Stickney, 12 Allen, 1, 90 Am. Dec. 122. But the practice of the Supreme Judicial Court in probate appeals follows the practice in equity so far as it is applicable. Rev. Laws, c 162, § 15; Id. c. 159, § 20; Crocker v Crocker, 188 Mass. 16, 19, 73 N.E. 1068.
The substance of the petition is more important than its form. The prayer is for leave to file a bill of review in a probate appeal. The case is reserved by a single justice upon the pleadings, which are a petition and an answer, with an amendment to the petition that embodies an important part of the facts set up in the answer, and an answer in demurrer to the petition as finally amended.
The case stated in the pleadings is that, on February 3, 1903, a decree was entered in the probate court, allowing a certain instrument as the last will and testament of Uriel H. Crocker, late of Boston, deceased, in which the petitioner was appointed executrix, that an appeal was taken from this decree and a trial was had before a jury upon issues framed for their consideration; that the jury disagreed, that afterward a second trial was had upon these issues before another jury which found the alleged will to have been procured by the fraud or undue influence of Annie J. Crocker, and that thereafter, in accordance with this verdict, and after different motions and hearings, a decree was entered reversing the decree of the probate court, and disallowing the will, and remanding the case to the probate court for further proceedings. Under this decree the case went back to the probate court, and all persons interested in the estate, including the present petitioner, filed an assent and request in writing to the judge of probate, that certain instruments presented to the court as the will and codicils of Uriel H. Crocker be disallowed, and that his estate be distributed as the estate of an intestate person. This agreement and request were the result of a compromise under which large sums were paid to the present petitioner for her right of dower or other rights in the real estate of which Uriel H. Crocker died seised, and for fees to her counsel, and otherwise for her benefit. Administrators were appointed who proceeded to settle the estate and to distribute the assets among the widow and heirs, although they have filed no account of their administration in the probate court. These payments and disbursements to the petitioner and the respondents were made with the understanding that they should be reimbursed to the administrators in the event of the allowance of a will of said Uriel H. Crocker.
A year and a half after the entry of the final decree disallowing the will, a juror, who sat in the case and agreed to the verdict, was indicted for accepting a bribe to give his verdict in favor of the appellants and against the present petitioner, and was subsequently convicted of the crime. Although some question is made by the counsel for the respondents in regard to the averment, we think the petition should be treated as sufficiently charging that he was bribed to agree to this verdict. The subsequent request of the petitioner and others, that the estate be distributed as that of an intestate person, was signed and filed in ignorance of this bribery, and in the belief that the verdict was properly agreed to and rendered. The agreement of compromise was made in the same belief.
The petitioner offers to return and restore to the estate of Uriel H. Crocker all sums of money received by her from the administrators, or under the provisions of the agreement of compromise, in the event of the establishment of the will of Uriel H. Crocker heretofore offered for probate by her.
The counsel for the petitioner strongly disclaim any belief or suspicion that either of the respondents, or of their counsel, participated in the bribery, or had knowledge of it. Misconduct of a party to induce a jury to decide in his favor is dealt with more strictly by the court in its refusal to allow one to retain the benefits of a verdict so obtained, than similar misconduct of a third party or of a juror, without the knowledge of either party. In this case the corruption which the petitioner offers to prove was such an outrage upon the administration of justice that, upon a motion to set aside the verdict, made while the case remained in the jurisdiction of this court, the judge would have been swift to nullify a finding into which such criminality entered. The punishment of the crime was for another tribunal, which has already imposed its sentence of imprisonment.
The question before us is whether the petitioner is seeking her remedy in the right way. She desires to file a bill of review in the Supreme Judicial Court.
It is important to consider, at the outset, the nature of the proceedings in which the wrong occurred. Primarily and in substance, it was a proceeding for the administration of the estate of a deceased person. The jurisdiction of the court includes administration in one of two ways; either by the appointment of an administrator and the distribution of the property as the estate of an intestate person, or by the allowance of a will and the execution of its provisions. A petition for the appointment of an administrator or for the probate of a will is an appeal to only one branch of the general jurisdiction of the probate court touching this subject. If the jurisdiction is exercised by the appointment of an administrator to deal with the estate as intestate property, and if a will is subsequently discovered, the same general jurisdiction will suffice for a revocation of the appointment and an allowance of the will. This is recognized by the statute prescribing the form of an administrator's bond, and by the practice of the courts. Rev. Laws, c. 149, § 1, cl. 5. The probate court has this jurisdiction as well when there has been an appeal from the decree upon a petition for the appointment of an administrator, and when the final appointment has been made under a decree from the Supreme Judicial Court, as when the appointment was by the probate court alone.
The general power of the probate court to deal with subjects like that now before us and to revoke its decrees for good cause was very fully considered in Waters v. Stickney, 12 Allen, 1, 90 Am. Dec. 122. This power is analogous to that of courts of common law to issue writs of review, and of courts of equity to entertain bills of review. It is to correct mistakes of fact or of law.
In Gale v. Nickerson, 144 Mass. 415, 11 N.E. 714, a will was proved in the probate court and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Judicial Court, and there the decree was affirmed, and the case was remitted to the probate court for further proceedings. Years afterwards a petition was filed in the probate court asking for a reversal of the decree. The petition came before the Supreme Judicial Court by appeal, and then before the full court, where the subject of jurisdiction was carefully considered. It was held that the probate court had jurisdiction of the petition, although that court was asked to revise a decision and reverse a decree of the Supreme Judicial Court, which was transmitted to the probate court as a foundation for further proceedings there. After deciding that the petition was rightly brought in the probate court, so far as the jurisdiction was concerned, this court considered the case on the merits, nd examined the petition in detail, by which it appeared that the matters referred to in it were the same previously passed upon and adjudicated by the decree of the Supreme Judicial Court. The opinion ends with this sentence: 'It would be an absurdity to hold that, after a delay of 16 years entirely unexplained, they are entitled to a new trial upon the bare allegation that the issues then tried were not rightly decided, which is all that the averments of the petition amount to.' If it had been averred and proved that the decree of the Supreme Judicial Court was erroneous by reason of a fraud practiced upon the court, or for any other reason that would call for a revision of it, the probate court, under the authority of this case, might have made such a decision as law and justice required. That the reasons alleged for reviewing the case and revoking the decree involved facts that might call for a change of the decree entered by the Supreme Judicial Court was held not to prevent the probate court from considering these facts, and making such order upon the review as justice might demand.
In the present case the petitioner might well go into the probate court and state her grievance thus: She might say that the estate of her...
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