Crocket v. Lee Same v. Same

• Decision Date: 07 March 1822
• Citation: 7 Wheat. 522,5 L.Ed. 513,20 U.S. 522
• Parties: CROCKET v. LEE. SAME v. SAME
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

20 U.S. 522

5 L.Ed. 513

7 Wheat. 522

CROCKET v. LEE.

SAME

v. SAME.

March 7, 1822

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Kentucky.

These causes were argued by Mr Sheffey,^a for the appellant, and by Mr. Clay,^b for the respondent.

March 7th.

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

These causes relate to the same title, and depend on the same question. It is the validity of a certificate for a settlement right granted to Angus Cameron, and of the entry thereof in the surveyor's office.

The certificate is in these words:

'Angus Cameron this day claimed a settlement and pre-emption in the District of Kentucky, on account of residing in the country twelve months before the year 1778, lying at the head right hand fork of Welles' branch, extending south east to the head of a small run that empties into the north fork of Licking, including the spring on the head of both branches, about one and a half miles above the war path that crosses the north fork. Satisfactory proof being made to the Court, they are of opinion that the said Cameron has a right to a settlement of 400 acres of land, to include the above location, and the pre-emption of 1000 acres adjoining, and that a certificate issue accordingly.'

^a Who cited Bodley v. Taylor, 5 Cranch, 229. 6 Cranch, 148. 3 Cranch, 239. 2 Wheat. Rep. 144. 2 Bibb, 144. 1 Bibb, 72. 1 Wheat. Rep. 141. 1 Wheat. Rep. 130. 3 Bibb, 623. 5 Wheat. Rep. 116. 6 Wheat. Rep. 119. 1 Bibb, 228.

^b Who cited 1 Bibb, 10. 46. 34. 129. 136. 2 Bibb, 109. 114. 259. 476. 479. Hardie, 411. 1 Marsh. Kent. Rep. 281. Print. Dec. 95. 3 Bibb, 148, 149. Wheat. Dig. Dec. tit. Local Law. XI.

The entry in the surveyor's office conforms to the location expressed in the certificate.

The right of Cameron, both to his settlement and pre-emption, was regularly conveyed to the appellant, in whose name patents have been obtained.

The appellee claims under junior entries, for which patents have been issued, younger than the appellant's patent on the pre-emption warrant, but elder than his patent on the settlement right. The appellant, therefore, filed his bill to obtain a conveyance for the land covered by his settlement right, the legal title to which was in the appellee; and the appellee filed his bill to obtain a conveyance for the land covered by the appellant's patent on the pre-emption right, to which he claimed the equitable title.

Pending the controversy, Lee purchased in the right of a person claiming under a patent older than either of those under which Crocket claimed; but as this patent was founded on a junior entry, the validity of Cameron's certificate, was still the question on which the whole case depended.

In the Circuit Court, Crocket's bill was dismissed; and, in the other suit, he was decreed to convey to Lee the land contained in his patent for Cameron's settlement right. The decrees were founded entirely on the opinion that Cameron's location was too vague to be supported. In the Circuit Court, the cause turned almost entirely on this point, and the greater part of the testimony is taken with a view to it. If the validity of Cameron's location be sustained, Crocket must succeed, because his right is prior in time, and superior in dignity, to any title conflicting with it. If Cameron's entry be invalid, then the decrees are right, either because Young's entry is good, or because the legal title was in Lee, when they were made.

The testimony which has been taken in these causes, certainly is very strong in support of the decrees of the Circuit Court; but the counsel for the appellant contends that so much of this testimony as respects the vagueness of Cameron's location must be disregarded, because neither its vagueness nor its certainty has been put in issue. Lee has noot averred in his bill, nor alleged in his answer, that this location is vague, nor has he any where, or in any manner, questioned its validity.

The principle advanced by the appellant's counsel cannot be controverted. No rule is better settled than that the decree must conform to the allegations, as well as to the proofs in the cause. The location being set out in the pleadings, the Court can undoubtedly notice any intrinsic apparent defect. If it be void in itself, no testimony can sustain it, and it would be deemed void on a demurrer to the bill. But if it be not void in itself, if its validity depends upon facts to be proved in the cause, then its validity ought to be put in issue.

The counsel for the appellee does not directly controvert this principle, but endeavours to withdraw his case from its operation, by contending that terms are used in the pleadings which are equivalent to a direct allegation that Cameron's location is too vague to be sustained.

If in this he is correct, the consequence he draws from it will be admitted; for it will certainly be sufficient, if the matter to be proved be substantially alleged in the proceedings. How, then, is the fact?

In his answer to Crocket's bill, he says that he does not 'admit that the survey has been made agreeable to location or to law.'

This allegation certainly questions the survey. If it vary from the entry, if it be chargeable with any fatal irregularity, if it be in any respect contrary to law, such defects may be shown, and the party may avail himself of it to the extent justified by his test mony, and by the law. But this allegation is confined to the survey. It does not mount up to the location, nor does it draw...