Crockett v. Board of Education of Carbon County School Dist.

• Citation: 199 P. 158,58 Utah 303
• Decision Date: 14 June 1921
• Docket Number: 3647
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: CROCKETT v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CARBON COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. et al

199 P. 158

58 Utah 303

CROCKETT v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CARBON COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. et al

No. 3647

Supreme Court of Utah

June 14, 1921

Appeal from District Court, Seventh District, Carbon County Delworth Wooley, Judge.

Application of R. W. Crockett for a writ of mandamus against the Board of Education of Carbon County School District and others to compel the defendants to publish the annual statement required by statute. From a judgment granting the writ of mandamus prayed for, defendants appeal.

AFFIRMED.

O. C Dalby, of Price, for appellants.

O. K Clay, of Price, for respondent.

CORFMAN, C. J. WEBER, GIDEON, THURMAN, and FRICK, JJ., concur.

OPINION

CORFMAN, C. J.

Plaintiff commenced this action in the district court of Carbon county against the defendants, as the board of education of said county, to compel them to make publication of an annual statement of receipts and disbursements of moneys during the year ending June 30, 1920, as provided for by section 4614, Comp. Laws Utah 1917.

It is, in substance, alleged in the complaint:

That the plaintiff is a resident, taxpayer, and citizen of said Carbon county. That the defendants, as such board, caused to be published in a newspaper having a general circulation in said county a pretended statement (as specifically mentioned and set forth in the complaint) of receipts and disbursements during the said year ending June 30, 1920, which was not in compliance with said statute, in that it failed to show:

"First, the amount on hand at the date of the last report; second, the amount of sinking fund and how invested; third, the money paid out, to whom, and for what paid; fourth, the balance of school moneys on hand; fifth, the number, date and amount of every bond issued and redeemed, * * * and the amount received and paid therefor."

That at the time of said publication of said pretended statement demand was made upon the defendant board of education that it publish a statement in compliance with the said statute, but that said board then, and ever since has, wholly disregarded and refused to comply therewith and threatens to continue to do so.

An alternative writ of mandate issued out of said court. Defendants appeared and filed a demurrer, both general and special, and also an answer to the complaint admitting that a demand had been made upon them, and that the statement as pleaded in the complaint was published, but denying that the same did not meet the requirements of the statute. The special demurrer was upon the grounds that the plaintiff had no legal capacity to sue, either as an individual or on relation of the state, and that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action. The demurrer was overruled by the court, and thereupon the plaintiff moved for and was granted a judgment upon the pleadings. The trial court found that the statement as published did not substantially comply with the statute, and by its judgment commanded that the defendants publish a statement meeting the requirements thereof in the particulars called for in the plaintiff's complaint.

Defendants appeal. They assigns as errors the overruling of their demurrer and the entering of the judgment upon the finding made that they had not complied with the statute.

The statute (section 4614, Comp. Laws Utah 1917), among other things, expressly provides that it shall be the duty of the clerk of the board of education to prepare and submit to the board "an annual statement, under oath, of the receipts and disbursements during the year ending June 30th, which statement the board shall cause to be published in a newspaper having general circulation in the county," showing the specific things pleaded in the plaintiff's complaint hereinbefore set forth.

Defendants contend that the statement as published by them was a substantial compliance with the statute. We deem it unnecessary to set forth in this opinion the statement as made and published. Suffice it to say that the statement contains nothing more than a general statement of receipts and disbursements for the year ending June 30, 1920, without giving any information in the particulars called for by the plain and positive provisions of the statute, as complained of by the plaintiff. It is apparent from a reading of the statute that it was designed for the benefit and interests of the citizen taxpayers so that they may be informed as to whether or not the financial affairs of the school district each year have been properly and lawfully conducted on the part of the board of education.

It is one of the cardinal rules of construction that a statute must be construed with reference to the objects sought to be accomplished by it. The mere general statement that certain sums of money were received and certain sums paid out on account of the support and maintenance of the public schools affords no information to the taxpayer and subserves none of the purposes intended by the enactment of the statute under consideration.

As illustrative of the noncompliance with the statute on the part of the defendants, the statement complained of shows that during the school year ending June 30, 1920, the following disbursements were made:

"Administrative and general expenses, exclusive of bond interest, $ 18,022.70; school operating expense, $ 150,611.61; school furniture and apparatus, $ 5,845.78; injuries to employes, $ 132.75."

And nothing more is stated for the information of the tax-paying public, whereas the statute expressly provides that the statement published shall show "the moneys paid out, to whom, and for what paid." In not a single instance does the statement published show to whom and for what the moneys were paid. The statement is also deficient in all the other particulars complained of by the plaintiff.

We thing the statute is mandatory in its requirements and that its plain and positive provisions manifest its purposes so clearly that the contention made by the defendants that they have substantially complied with it must fail. 25 R. C. L. § 16; 36 Cyc. p. 1110; Wykoff v. W. H. Wheeler & Co., 38 Okla. 771, 135 P. 399.

It is next contended by defendants that, even though they failed to make publication, in compliance with the statute, the time in which they might legally comply with its provisions has passed, and that therefore a writ of mandate will not lie. In support of this contention we are cited to the following authorities: Roll v. Perrine, 34 N.J.L. 254; People v. Greene County Sup'rs, 12 Barb. (N.Y.) 217; People v. Westchester County Sup'rs, 15 Barb. (N.Y.) 607; People v. Highway Com'rs of Town of Seward, 27 Barb. (N.Y.) 94; State v. Lehre, 7 Rich. (S.C.) 234; Stacy v. Hammond, 96 Ga. 125, 23 S.E. 77; Rice v. Walker, 44 Iowa 458.

We do not...