Crockett v. Nea-Alaska, 3:18-CV-00179 JWS

• Decision Date: 14 March 2019
• Docket Number: 3:18-CV-00179 JWS
• Citation: 367 F.Supp.3d 996
• Parties: Tracey CROCKETT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NEA-ALASKA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Alaska

367 F.Supp.3d 996

Tracey CROCKETT, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.NEA-ALASKA, et al., Defendants.

3:18-CV-00179 JWS

United States District Court, D. Alaska.

Signed March 14, 2019

John B. Thorsness, Clapp, Peterson, Tiemessen, Thorsness & Johnson, LLC, Anchorage, AK, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Pro Hac Vice, Mitchell Law PLLC, Austin, TX, Matthew Price Browne, Talcott Jay Franklin, Pro Hac Vice, Talcott Franklin P.C., Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Eric P. Brown, P. Casey Pitts, Scott A. Kronland, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, Kim Dunn, Landye Bennett Blumstein LLP, Sarah E. Josephson, Saul R. Friedman, Jermain Dunnagan & Owens, P.C., Jeffrey G. Pickett, Attorney General's Office, Anchorage, AK, for Defendants.

ORDER AND OPINION

[Re: Motions at docket 49, 53]

JOHN W. SEDWICK, SENIOR JUDGE

I. MOTIONS PRESENTED

At docket 49, Defendants NEA-Alaska, National Education Association, and Matanuska-Susitna Education Association ("Union Defendants") move to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims against them. They argue that Plaintiffs' claim for prospective relief with respect to compulsory payments to unions must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They argue that Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim and Alaska tort claims for retrospective monetary relief in relation to these compulsory payments must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. They argue that Plaintiff Kathryn McCollum's claim challenging Alaska's system of exclusive representative collective bargaining and asking for prospective relief and treble damages must also be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

At docket 53, Defendant Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District ("School District") joins the Union Defendants' motion to the extent it addresses the more limited claims against it. Plaintiffs only seek prospective relief against the School District with respect to its collection of compulsory union payments and with respect to its exclusive collective bargaining activities.

Plaintiffs¹ respond at docket 56. Plaintiffs concede that the court lacks jurisdiction over their claims for prospective relief with respect to compulsory union payments, but they maintain that they are entitled to retrospective monetary relief for the past collection of these payments. Plaintiff McCollum concedes that Supreme Court precedent bars her constitutional challenge to exclusive representative collective bargaining but maintains her challenge to such a system based on federal antitrust laws.

The Union Defendants reply at docket 58. The School District replies at docket 59. Oral argument was heard February 15, 2019.

II. BACKGROUND

Alaska's Public Employment Relations Act ("PERA") authorizes bargaining units of public employees to choose to be exclusively represented by a labor union for purposes of bargaining with public employers as to employment terms.² To cover the costs of union representation, PERA authorized public employers and unions to agree that all represented employees would pay their proportionate share of the costs of representation, regardless of union membership.³ That is, a union could require through its collective bargaining agreement that public employers collect "fair share fees" from non-union members that would be remitted to the union to apply towards its bargaining activities. In the event an employee qualified as a religious objector to union activities under PERA, a bargaining agreement could nonetheless require that the employee pay a fair-share fee to the union, but the union had to donate the amount of that fee to a charity of its choosing.⁴ Until recently, such fair-share fees were explicitly authorized by Supreme Court precedent, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.⁵ Abood held that public employees may be required to pay their proportionate share of the costs of union representation for collective bargaining purposes.⁶

Matanuska-Susitna Education Association ("MSEA") is the union that represents a bargaining unit of the School District's employees. Plaintiffs McCollum and McKee are employees in that bargaining unit. The agreement between the School District and the employees includes a fair-share provision that required the School District to deduct fees from its payments to non-union members and remit them to MSEA. Plaintiff McCollum was not a union member at the time Plaintiffs filed their complaint; therefore, she was required to pay fair-share fees. Plaintiff McKee was a union member at the time. She alleges that she has long opposed the union but chose to remain in it because she otherwise would have had to pay a fair-share fee "and the difference in money between the full membership dues and the [fair-share fees] would not have been worth the loss of [her] vote and ... influence ... in collective-bargaining matters."⁷

The other plaintiffs are current or former public school teachers that worked in other school districts and were represented by NEA-Alaska affiliate unions for collective bargaining purposes. Plaintiffs Ness and Christopherson were compelled to pay non-union member fair-share fees to their representative union. Plaintiff Carmen was not a union member but was compelled, as a religious objector under AS 23.40.225, to pay fees to the union for charitable purposes. Plaintiff Liston is a retired teacher who had been a union member during his career but, like Plaintiff McKee, alleges that he only became one because he otherwise would have been required to pay fair-share fees.

On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Janus v. AFSCME ,⁸ which overruled Abood and held that requiring non-union members to pay union fees as a condition of public employment "violates the First Amendment and cannot continue."⁹

On August 2, 2018, Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Alaska common law, and federal antitrust law. Their complaint can be divided into four different requests: (1) a request for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the future collection of fair-share fees, including religious objector fees; (2) a request that the Union Defendants be required to refund all fair-share fees collected prior to Janus ; (3) a request that the Union Defendants be required to refund a portion of union membership dues paid by Plaintiffs McKee and Liston; and (4) a request for prospective relief that would make Alaska's exclusive representative collective bargaining system unlawful and prevent its future use, as well as a request for treble damages to public employees who have not been allowed to negotiate on their own behalf.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's claims. In reviewing such a motion, "[a]ll allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."¹⁰ To be assumed true, the allegations, "may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." ¹¹

Dismissal for failure to state a claim can be based on either "the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory."¹² "Conclusory allegations of law ... are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss."¹³

To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to " ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ "¹⁴ "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."¹⁵ "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."¹⁶ "Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ "¹⁷ "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief."¹⁸ "In all cases, evaluating a complaint's plausibility is a ‘context-specific’ endeavor that requires courts to ‘draw on ... judicial experience and common sense.’ "¹⁹

In deciding whether to dismiss a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court is generally limited to reviewing only the complaint, but may review materials which are properly submitted as part of the complaint and may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record that are outside the pleadings.²⁰ Furthermore, documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.²¹

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Prospective relief with respect to compulsory union fees

Plaintiffs concede in their response brief that they cannot seek injunctive relief against the Union Defendants and the School District to prevent the future collection of compulsory union fees because there is not a current controversy to be resolved on this point.²² The day Janus was announced, NEA-Alaska sent a letter to all non-union members in bargaining units represented by its local affiliates to inform them that it would cease collecting fair-share fees. It informed them that any such fees that had been collected in advance—to cover the period falling after the Janus decision date up to the end of the fiscal year—would be refunded. Refund checks were mailed the next day. NEA-Alaska local affiliates contacted school districts to notify them to immediately stop deducting fair-share fees. Given that it is undisputed that the collection of fair-share fees ceased immediately after Janus , there is no actual, live controversy sufficient to establish this court's...