Croft v. Morgan Cnty.
| Decision Date | 12 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20200373,20200373 |
| Citation | 496 P.3d 83 |
| Parties | Whitney CROFT, Robert Bohman, Brandon Peterson, Shelley Paige, and David Pike, Appellants, v. MORGAN COUNTY and Stacy Netz Clark, solely in her official capacity as Morgan County Clerk, Appellees, and Wasatch Peaks Ranch, LLC, Intervenor and Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Troy L. Booher, Beth E. Kennedy, Taylor P. Webb, Salt Lake City, Richard H. Reeve, Riverdale, for appellants
Jann Farris, Morgan, for appellees Morgan County and Stacy Netz Clark Mark R. Gaylord, Nathan R. Marigoni, Salt Lake City, for intervenor/appellee Wasatch Peaks Ranch, LLC
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Appellants are registered voters and residents of Morgan County who filed an application to submit an ordinance approving the development of a ski resort community to a referendum. After the County Clerk rejected the referendum application, appellants challenged the county's decision in the district court. The district court dismissed their challenge for lack of jurisdiction based on its reading of Utah Code section 20A-7-602.8(4)(a), which allows a sponsor to challenge such a rejection in the district court if the sponsor is "prohibited from pursuing" an extraordinary writ in the Supreme Court. The district court reasoned that appellants were not "prohibited" from pursuing an extraordinary writ in this court but, instead, had simply declined to do so.
¶2 We disagree. The district court erred in its interpretation of section 602.8(4)(a) and in its conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction. We conclude that rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure informs our interpretation of the statute. Specifically, we hold that sponsors are "prohibited from pursuing" an extraordinary writ in the Supreme Court under section 602.8(4)(a) when they cannot satisfy rule 19 ’s requirements. Appellants could not do so here and thus appropriately raised their challenge in the district court. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in the district court.
¶3 Wasatch Peaks Ranch, LLC (WPR) seeks to develop a ski resort community in Morgan County. To this end, WPR submitted to the County's planning office a rezoning application requesting the creation of a Resort Special District encompassing 11,000 acres of private land within the County. Approximately six months later, the County adopted an ordinance approving the requested rezoning and a development agreement between WPR and the County.
¶4 Appellants are registered voters residing in Morgan County. Unhappy with the new ordinance, they filed with the County Clerk an application for a citizen referendum of the matter. The County Clerk rejected the application because it did not contain a "certification" that each sponsor is a resident of Utah or a copy of the challenged ordinance, as required under Utah Code section 20A-7-602(2)(b) and (e) (2020).1
¶5 Appellants then filed in the district court a petition challenging the rejection of their proposed referendum. WPR made a motion to intervene, which the court granted.
¶6 WPR moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on the merits.2 WPR's jurisdictional argument relied on Utah Code section 20A-7-602.8(4)(a), which provides that a sponsor of a rejected referendum may "challenge or appeal the decision" within seven days to "(i) the Supreme Court, by means of an extraordinary writ, if possible; or (ii) a district court, if the sponsor is prohibited from pursuing an extraordinary writ under Subsection (4)(a)(i)." WPR argued this statute permits a referendum sponsor to assert their challenge in district court only if they show that they are "prohibited from pursuing" an extraordinary writ in the Supreme Court. Because appellants’ petition made no such showing, WPR contended, the district court was without jurisdiction to hear their challenge.
¶7 The district court agreed with WPR. It determined that subsection 602.8(4)(a) "is not a general grant of jurisdiction to the district court" but instead grants the district court "conditional" jurisdiction. That condition, the court reasoned, "is met only where the sponsor has been prohibited from pursuing a writ" in the Supreme Court. And because appellants presented "no factual or legal argument suggesting that pursuit of an extraordinary writ would be or was impossible," the court concluded it was without jurisdiction.
¶8 The district court granted WPR's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Appellants timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).
¶9 "The grant of a motion to dismiss presents a question of law that we review for correctness." Haik v. Jones , 2018 UT 39, ¶ 9, 427 P.3d 1155.
¶10Appellants appeal the district court's dismissal of their challenge for lack of jurisdiction under Utah Code section 20A-7-602.8(4)(a). WPR responds that the dismissal was appropriate or, in the alternative, that we can affirm on the basis that appellants’ referendum application was deficient as a matter of law.
¶11 We first address the jurisdictional question. Finding the statute ambiguous on its face, we employ additional tools of statutory construction and conclude that they disfavor WPR's proffered reading of the statute. We then explain how the correct approach is to read the statute in harmony with rule 19 of our Rules of Appellate Procedure. And we hold that a sponsor of a denied referendum application may seek relief in the district court if it cannot satisfy rule 19 ’s requirements for obtaining an extraordinary writ in this court. Because appellants could not have satisfied those requirements here, they properly filed their challenge in the district court. We thus reverse the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
¶12 Second, we briefly address WPR's arguments for summary judgment on the merits in the alternative. We conclude that we are not well positioned to adequately decide these issues and remand them to the district court for further proceedings.
¶13 The primary question we must answer on appeal is where the sponsor of a rejected referendum application concerning a local land use law can challenge that rejection. Utah Code section 20A-7-602.8(4)(a) provides:
The parties dispute the meaning of when a sponsor might be "prohibited from pursuing an extraordinary writ" in this court and, relatedly, when raising a challenge in this court is "possible."
¶14 We agree with appellants that rule 19 provides the answer. First, we conclude that the language of section 602.8(4)(a) is ambiguous because it does not identify when a sponsor might be "prohibited from pursuing" an extraordinary writ in this court or when raising a challenge in this court is "possible." Second, we apply two relevant canons of statutory interpretation and determine they disfavor WPR's interpretation of the statute. Third, we explain that the correct reading of section 602.8(4)(a) is to interpret the statute in harmony with rule 19 and our case law interpreting similar statutes. In so doing, we hold that a sponsor of a rejected referendum may challenge the rejection in the district court unless it is "impractical or inappropriate" to do so. See UTAH R. APP. P. 19(b)(5). Finally, we hold that it would not have been "impractical or inappropriate" for appellants to seek relief in the district court, and thus jurisdiction there was proper.
¶15 "Our object in interpreting a statute is to determine the intent of the legislature." Kamoe v. Ridge , 2021 UT 5, ¶ 15, 483 P.3d 720. To do so, we first look to the text of the statute and seek to interpret it "in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Id. (citation omitted). "If, after conducting this plain language review we are left with competing reasonable interpretations, there is statutory ambiguity." Id. (citation omitted).
¶16 To discern the legislature's intended meaning of section 602.8(4)(a), we must identify when it is "possible" to obtain, and when a sponsor of a rejected referendum would be "prohibited from pursuing," an extraordinary writ in this court. UTAH CODE § 20A-7-602.8(4)(a). The statute itself does not answer these questions. These terms are not defined or otherwise explained in section 602.8(4)(a), elsewhere in the Election Code, or in any other related chapter of the Utah Code.
¶17 To determine the meaning of "possible" and "prohibited from pursuing," "we look to the ordinary meaning of the words, using the dictionary as our starting point." State v. Hatfield , 2020 UT 1, ¶ 17, 462 P.3d 330 (citation omitted). Possible is an adjective typically used one of two ways: either to express an ability to do something or to express a chance of something occurring. See, e.g. , Possible , MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM , https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/possible (last visited Aug. 4, 2021) ("being within the limits of ability, capacity, or realization"; "being something that may or may not occur"); Possibility , BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (substantially similar). Prohibit , on the other hand, more singularly means to prevent or forbid something altogether. See, e.g. , Prohibit , MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM , https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/prohibit (last visited Aug. 4, 2021) ("to forbid by authority"; "to...
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