State v. Hatfield
| Decision Date | 27 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 20180386,20180386 |
| Citation | 462 P.3d 330 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Michael Scott HATFIELD, Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., John J. Nielsen, Asst. Solic. Gen., Ryan N. Holtan, Asst. Att’y Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellee
Lori J. Seppi, Heather J. Chesnut, Salt Lake City, for appellant
INTRODUCTION
¶1 The State charged Michael Scott Hatfield with four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor after he was caught in the middle school classroom where he taught with "scrapbooks" containing homemade collages comprised of pornographic images of adults and images of underage, and sometimes nude, girls. Hatfield moved the district court to dismiss these charges arguing that the collages did not meet the definition of child pornography in the Sexual Exploitation Act (Act). The court denied Hatfield’s motion. Hatfield then entered a Sery plea of no contest to preserve his right to bring this appeal.
¶2 Hatfield’s appeal presents two primary questions. First, Hatfield asks us to interpret the Act, and, specifically, the Act’s definition of child pornography. See UTAH CODE § 76-5b-103(1). Second, he asks us to hold that the Act, properly interpreted, does not criminalize his possession of the collages and that the district court therefore erred by failing to dismiss the charges founded on those images.
¶3 We affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss two of the counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and affirm the convictions based upon those charges. However, we reverse the district court on the remaining two charges.
¶4 Hatfield taught English at a charter school in West Valley City. A school employee found two homemade scrapbooks in Hatfield’s classroom desk.2 Although both scrapbooks contain collages with photographs of minors that were cut and pasted to create the appearance that the minors were engaging in sexual activities, the State based the charges against Hatfield on three pages in a single scrapbook.
¶5 The first collage page (First Page) contains a partial profile of an adult male, mostly clothed, but with his erect penis visible. Above the penis is a cut-out of an open hand. There is also a photograph of a nude pre-pubescent girl facing forward. The photographs of the hand and penis do not touch the photograph of the nude minor, but the effect of the collage is to suggest that the girl is reaching to touch the man’s erection. The page is also decorated with heart and bow stickers.
¶6 The second collage page (Second Page) is also comprised of a partial profile of an adult male with his erect penis extending from his unzipped pants. On the right side of the page is a cut-out of a fully clothed young girl with her arm in reaching motion so that it appears that she is holding the man’s penis. A typed text bubble that says, "Is this right, mister?" hovers above the girl. In the bottom left corner are the typed words, "Teach her well."
¶7 The third collage page (Third Page) contains multiple images. Photographs of two young girls are cut and pasted in the center of the page. Both girls are fully clothed. One of the girls has been positioned so that she appears to be hugging an erect penis—a penis that appears to be taller than she is. In the upper right and left corners of the page are two explicit images of adults engaging in sexual congress. In the bottom right corner is a photograph of a nude pre-pubescent girl facing forward.
¶8 The images of adults appear to have been cut from pornographic magazines. The images of the nude pre-pubescent girls, as well as the clothed smiling girl on the Second Page, were taken from art and photography books. The images of the clothed minors on the Third Page were clipped from personal photographs.
¶9 The State ultimately charged Hatfield with four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor based on the three collage pages. Count one is based on the First Page. Count two is based on the Second Page. Counts three and four are based on the Third Page.3
¶10 Hatfield filed a "Motion to Quash the Bindover (Preservation of the Motion Made on Record and Stipulated by the State)." Hatfield argued the three collage pages did not depict minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct and therefore did not meet the statutory definition of child pornography set out in Utah Code section 76-5b-103(1). Hatfield also argued that if the Act criminalized his possession of the collages, then it violates the First Amendment and due process provision of the United States Constitution.
¶11 After a hearing, the district court denied Hatfield’s motion. The district court found that none of the photographs constituted child pornography on their own, but when the photographs on a page were considered part of a single collage, each page constituted child pornography under the Act. Specifically, the district court concluded that the pages reflected the "visual depiction of nudity or partial nudity for the purpose of causing sexual arousal of any person" within the meaning of section 76-5b-103(10)(f). The district court also concluded that the statutory definitions of child pornography in sections 76-5b-103(1) and 76-5b-103(10)(f) were constitutional.
¶12 Hatfield then entered a Sery plea of no contest to all four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. The district court sentenced Hatfield to one to fifteen years in prison on each charge of sexual exploitation of a minor. 4
The court ordered that the sentences run concurrently. The court of appeals certified the case to us for decision.
¶13 As noted above, this appeal presents two primary issues. The first involves the Act’s interpretation. "A district court’s interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we ... review for correctness." Bell Canyon Acres Homeowners Ass’n v. McLelland , 2019 UT 17, ¶ 7, 443 P.3d 1212 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶14 The second asks if there was sufficient evidence to sustain four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. Hatfield appeals the district court’s conclusion that sufficient evidence existed to convict him. Hatfield claims he raised the issue by way of a Motion to Quash the Bindover. The State argues that there was no bindover for the district court to quash but acknowledges that Hatfield’s motion sought dismissal of the charges based upon a lack of evidence. No matter what label the motion bore, we review whether there was sufficient evidence underlying the four sexual exploitation charges. When "addressing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we may reverse only when it is apparent that there is not sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the crime charged." State v. Bagnes , 2014 UT 4, ¶ 10, 322 P.3d 719 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶15 The State charged Hatfield with sexual exploitation of a minor based upon his possession of child pornography. Hatfield claims that the district court misinterpreted the statute and that this misinterpretation caused the district court to erroneously conclude that the images he possessed met the statutory definition of child pornography. This requires us to determine what the Act considers child pornography.
¶16 When interpreting the meaning of a statute, we first look to the statute itself. "The point of statutory interpretation is to understand what the Legislature intended." State v. Sanders , 2019 UT 25, ¶ 17, 445 P.3d 453. We do this by looking first to the statute’s plain language. Id. "As we examine the text, ‘[w]e presume that the legislature used each word advisedly.’ " Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). However, "we do not view individual words and subsections in isolation; instead, our statutory interpretation ‘requires that each part or section be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole .’ " Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. , 2013 UT 22, ¶ 15, 301 P.3d 984 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
¶17 We begin our interpretive task by "examining the ordinary meaning or usually accepted interpretation" of the statutory language. Arbogast Family Tr. v. River Crossings, LLC , 2010 UT 40, ¶ 18, 238 P.3d 1035. State v. Lambdin , 2017 UT 46, ¶ 22, 424 P.3d 117 (citation omitted).5
¶18 A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor if he, among other things, "(i) knowingly produces, possesses, or possesses with intent to distribute child pornography; or (ii) intentionally distributes or views child pornography." UTAH CODE § 76-5b-201(1)(a).
¶19 Section 76-5b-103(1)(c) defines child pornography as "any visual depiction ... whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where ... the visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct."
¶20 The Act defines sexually explicit conduct as actual or simulated:
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