Croissant v. De Soto Imp. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 June 1924
• Citation: 87 Fla. 530,101 So. 37
• Parties: CROISSANT v. DE SOTO IMPROVEMENT CO.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

101 So. 37

87 Fla. 530

CROISSANT v. DE SOTO IMPROVEMENT CO.

Florida Supreme Court

June 2, 1924

In Banc. Error to Circuit Court, Duval County; Daniel A Simmons, Judge.

Action by Jacob Croissant against the De Soto Improvement Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

Reversed and rendered.

Whitfield and Terrell, JJ., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Every bill passed by Legislature, duly presented to Governor unless vetoed by him within time limited by Constitution becomes a law. Under the Constitution of this state (section 28, art. 3) every bill that may have been passed by the Legislature which is duly presented to the Governor, unless vetoed by him within the time limited by the Constitution becomes a law.

The general rule for computation of time within which an act is to be performed is to exclude first day and include last. Where an act is to be performed within a specified period of time, the general rule for the computation of such period is to exclude the first day of the period and include the last day.

If time within which particular act is required performed exceed a week intervening Sundays included, but if less excluded. Generally, where a limitation of time is fixed within which a particular act is required to be performed and after which the performance of the act would be without effect, if the time exceed a week intervening Sundays are included in the computation of time, but if less than a week an intervening Sunday is excluded.

Veto of Governor held without effect on bill becoming law before his objections filed; 'ten days after adjournment.' The Constitution of this state (section 28, art. 3) provides, among other things:

That 'if any bill shall not be returned within five days after it shall have been presented to the Governor (Sunday excepted) the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it. If the Legislature, by its final adjournment prevent such action, such bill shall be a law, unless the Governor, within ten days after the adjournment, shall file such bill, with his objections thereto, in the office of the secretary of state, who shall lay the same before the Legislature at its next session, and if the same shall receive two-thirds of the votes present it shall become a law.'

The regular session of the Legislature of 1921 adjourned sine die on June 3, 1921. On the 14th day of June, 1921, the Governor filed the bill involved in this case, with his objections thereto, in the office of the secretary of state.

Held: That the 'ten days after adjournment' within which the Governor 'shall file such bill, with his objections thereto, in the office of the secretary of state,' includes intervening Sundays, and that, the period of time from June 3 to June 14 being more than ten days, the filing of the bill by the Governor, with his objections thereto, in the office of the secretary of state on June 14, 1921, was after the expiration of this 'ten days" period of time and was without effect, the bill having become a law on the day before such objections were filed.

COUNSEL

John E. Mathews, of Jacksonville, for plaintiff in error.

OPINION

WEST, J.

This is an action to recover the value of an automobile, the property of plaintiff, alleged to have been destroyed by a collision with an automobile of defendant while being negligently operated by its agent. There was a plea of not guilty. By stipulation a jury was waived and the case was submitted to the court for trial upon an agreed statement of facts. There was a finding and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff took writ of error from this court.

The object of the action seems to be to test the legality of the veto by the Governor of a bill (Senate Bill No. 131) passed by the Legislature at the regular session of 1921 'with respect to the effect of the plea of not guilty in actions of tort.' This is the decisive question in the case.

If the bill became a law notwithstanding the attempted veto, the scope of the plea of not guilty was so restricted that the agency of the driver of defendant's car was not denied. Every other element necessary to establish defendant's liability was by stipulation expressly admitted. If this act limiting the effect of the plea interposed was in effect as law, the agency of the driver of defendant's automobile was not denied, and the finding and judgment should have been for plaintiff.

The alleged invalidity of the veto is upon the ground that the bill with the Governor's objections thereto was filed with the secretary of state after the time within which such action to be effectual had expired. The session of the Legislature at which the bill was passed adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock noon, Friday, June 3, 1921. On the 14th day of June, 1921, the Governor filed the bill with his objections thereto in the office of the secretary of state. This action for its authority is predicated upon section 28 art. 3, Constitution of Florida. This section is as follows:

'Every bill that may have passed the Legislature shall, before becoming a law, be presented to the Governor; if he approves it he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it with his objections to the house in which it originated, which house shall cause such objections to be entered upon its journal, and proceed to reconsider it; if, after such reconsideration, it shall pass both houses by a two-thirds vote of members present, which vote shall be entered on the journal of each house, it shall become a law. If any bill shall not be returned within five days after it shall have been presented to the Governor (Sunday excepted) the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it. If the Legislature, by its final adjournment prevent such action, such bill shall be a law, unless the Governor, within ten days after the adjournment, shall file such bill, with his objections thereto, in the office of the secretary of state, who shall lay the same before the Legislature at its next session, and if the same shall receive two-thirds of the votes present it shall become a law.'

Under this provision of the Constitution 'every bill that may have been passed by the Legislature' which is duly 'presented to the Governor,' unless vetoed by him within the time limited by the Constitution, becomes a law. Presentation to the Governor is essential. This is the last step in the legislative process. His approval is not essential. A. C. L. R. Co v. Mallard, 53 Fla. 515, 43 So. 755. So that if the action of the Governor in filing the bill with his objections thereto in the office of the secretary of state was after the expiration of the ten days' period, it was of no effect and the bill nevertheless became a law. And, if the bill became a law, the action of the secretary of state, who 'lay the same before the Legislature at the next session,' the regular session of 1923, and the action of the Legislature in refusing to again pass the bill notwithstanding the veto, were nugatory.

The generally established rule for the computation of time recognized and accepted in this jurisdiction is that, where an act is to be performed within a specified period of time, the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included. Savage v. State, 18 Fla. 970; Simmons & Capen v. Hanne, 50 Fla. 267, 39 So. 77, 7 Ann. Cas. 322. This rule has been applied in computing the period of time within which a bill, duly passed and presented, will become a law if not returned or filed with his objections by the Governor. State v. Michel, 52 La. Ann. 936, 27 So. 565, 78 Am. St. Rep. 364; Beaudean v. Cape Girardeau, 71 Mo. 392; Carter v. Henry, 87 Miss. 411, 39 So. 690, 6 Ann. Cas. 715; Corwin v. Comptroller General, 6 S. C. 390; State v. Sessions, 84 Kan. 856, 115 P. 641, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 796. The period of time from June 3 to June 14, applying this rule, excludes the 3 and includes the 14. The number of days within this period is 11. But it is said that in making this computation the two Sundays are also to be excluded. If this is done, June 14, the day upon which the veto message was filed in the office of the secretary of state, is 'within the ten days after' June 3, the day of the 'adjournment' of the Legislature. It becomes necesary, therefore, to determine whether Sundays are to be included or excluded in the computation of the 'ten days' allowed by the Constitution to the Governor after 'final adjournment' within which his 'objections' to a bill to be effectual must be filed in the office of the secretary of state. From the five days' period allowed by the Constitution within which the Governor is required to return bills 'with his objections' which may have been passed and presented to him while the Legislature is in session, Sundays are expressly 'excepted.' But intervening Sundays are not expressly excepted from the ten days' period after final adjournment within which veto messages may be filed. As to whether they are or are not excepted from this latter period the Constitution is silent.

In State v. Michel, supra, it is said that----

'There is a rule of general, though perhaps not of universal, acceptance, that, where a limitation of time is fixed within which a particular act or thing is required to be done, if done at all, after which performance or the doing of the thing would be without effect if the time limited exceed a week, an intervening Sunday is to be included in the Computation; if less than a week, Sunday is to be excluded.'

The court in that case was dealing with the article of the Constitution (article 76) of the state of Louisiana giving effect as law to a bill passed by both houses of the Legislature and presented to the Governor unless returned by him 'within five days after it shall have...