Crolley v. Tatton, 16554.

• Decision Date: 09 January 1958
• Docket Number: No. 16554.,16554.
• Citation: 249 F.2d 908
• Parties: Grant CROLLEY, Erwin Zabel and Charles S. Brown, in their capacities as members of the Statutory Review Committee, Department of Agriculture of the United States, Appellants, v. J. Meredith TATTON, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

249 F.2d 908 (1957)

Grant CROLLEY, Erwin Zabel and Charles S. Brown, in their capacities as members of the Statutory Review Committee, Department of Agriculture of the United States, Appellants, v. J. Meredith TATTON, Appellee.

No. 16554.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

December 10, 1957.

Rehearing Denied January 9, 1958.

Malcolm R. Wilkey, U. S. Atty., Sidney Farr, Asst. U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for appellants.

Austin C. Wilson, Houston, Tex., Conde N. Anderson, Victoria, Tex., Fulbright, Crooker, Freeman, Bates & Jaworski, Houston, Tex., Stofer, Proctor, Houchins & Anderson, Victoria, Tex., of counsel, for appellee.

Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and RIVES and JONES, Circuit Judges.

RIVES, Circuit Judge.

Appellee sought judicial review¹ of the amended determination of the Statutory Review Committee for Refugio County, Texas, denying appellee a cotton acreage allotment for 1956.²

Appellee agrees that appellants' brief presents an adequate history of the case as follows:

"Appellee\'s wife owns a large tract of land called Salt Creek Ranch, located in Refugio and Aransas Counties, Texas. It is undisputed that prior to 1956 no one had been planting cotton on this land. Accordingly, under the provisions of 7 C.F.R. § 722.717(e) (3) (ii), Appellee early in 1956 filed with the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Committee an application for an allotment for a new cotton farm. The county committee denied his application, whereupon Appellee appealed to the Review Committee for Refugio County, an administrative tribunal composed of three local farmers appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture under 7 U.S. C. § 1363 to review and pass upon administrative appeals from the determinations of the county committee.

"After the first hearing on May 18, 1956, the Review Committee found that Appellee met the necessary qualifications and granted him a cotton acreage allotment of 1697.5 acres for the year 1956. Thereafter, on motion of the Secretary of Agriculture under 7 C.F.R. § 711.29, the Review Committee reopened the hearing. After the second hearing on June 22, 1956, the Review Committee met on July 13, 1956, to deliberate and reach a decision. Certain agents of the Department of Agriculture were present at this meeting and discussed the case with the committeemen, following which they were excused, while the Committee reached a decision in private. Neither Appellee nor his attorneys had been notified of this meeting. After this conference, the Committee set aside its first determination and entered an amended determination denying Appellee any allotment at all on the grounds that he was not the `operator\' of the farm on which an allotment was sought and that he was not largely dependent on income from the farm for his livelihood.

"Appellee thereupon filed suit in the District Court under 7 U.S.C. §§ 1365 for a judicial review of this amended determination. After hearing the trial court entered judgment vacating the amended determination of the Review Committee on the ground that the manner in which it was reached was basically unfair to Appellee. The Court then remanded the cause to the Review Committee with directions for it to reinstate its original findings, conclusions and determination of May 18, 1956."

Appellants do not question the correctness of the district court's decision that the Review Committee's amended findings, conclusions and determination of July 13, 1956 were reached in an unfair manner. Their sole specification of error is that:

"The District Court erred in directing the Review Committee to reinstate its original decision of May 18, 1956, instead of merely remanding the cause to the Review Committee for reconsideration and formulation of an independent determination in accordance with lawful administrative procedure."

There has been, and can be, no question as to the validity of the administrative action in reopening the hearing.³ Nor did the appellee contend that there was anything unfair in the taking of testimony at or the conduct of the second administrative hearing of June 22, 1956. The improper conduct occurred when members of the Review Committee met on July 13, 1956 and discussed the case with certain agents of the Department of Agriculture in the absence of and without notice to the appellee or his attorneys. Because of that misconduct, it is not questioned that the district court properly vacated the amended determination which denied appellee a cotton acreage allotment for 1956. It by no means follows, however, that the Committee should be directed to reinstate its original findings, conclusions and determination.

At each administrative hearing the disputed issues have been whether the appellee was the "operator" of the farm as defined by 7 C.F.R. § 722.712(k), that is, the person in charge of the supervision and conduct of the farming operations, and whether he was "largely dependent on income from the farm for his livelihood" so as to qualify for a cotton acreage allotment for a new farm under 7 C.F.R. § 722.717(e) (3) (ii). The terms of the written leases between appellee and his lessees offered in evidence in the first hearing before the Review Committee would support, though they might not require, an administrative conclusion that appellee was not the operator, the real supervisor, of the farm. Additional evidence to support that conclusion was offered on the second hearing before the Review Committee, and there was also substantial evidence that appellee was not "largely dependent on income from the farm for his livelihood."

The duty and power of making findings of fact are entrusted to the Review Committee, and, if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, its findings are conclusive. The review by the district court is limited to questions...