Thomas v. County Office Committee of Cameron County

• Decision Date: 30 April 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 71-B-23.
• Citation: 327 F. Supp. 1244
• Parties: John H. THOMAS and Oliver N. Kilgore v. The COUNTY OFFICE COMMITTEE OF CAMERON COUNTY and the County Office Committee of Willacy County, Texas.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

327 F. Supp. 1244

John H. THOMAS and Oliver N. Kilgore v. The COUNTY OFFICE COMMITTEE OF CAMERON COUNTY and the County Office Committee of Willacy County, Texas.

Civ. A. No. 71-B-23.

United States District Court, S. D. Texas, Brownsville Division.

April 30, 1971.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas Sharpe, Jr., Brownsville, Tex., for plaintiffs.

Anthony J. P. Farris, U. S. Atty., William L. Bowers, and Charles Wolfe, Asst. U. S. Attys., Houston, Tex., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NOEL, District Judge.

In order to expedite the disposition of this cause and to meet the natural propensities of the Texas Rio Grande Valley growing season, the Court announced its ruling in this cause from the bench on March 24, 1971. At that time the Court informed the litigants that it would reduce its oral pronouncement to writing.

Background

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on February 19, 1971, seeking to enjoin the Cameron County, Texas, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Committee (hereafter County Office Committee) from discharging its decisions of January 20, 1971 and February 1, 1971, preventing Cameron County cotton producers from transferring their cotton allotments to other producers for use in other Texas counties. In essence, plaintiffs charged that the County Office Committee had incorrectly applied the provisions of the new 1970 Agricultural Act which became effective on November 30, 1970, and that there was insufficient evidence adduced at the Committee hearings to support its decision. They admitted, however, that they had not filed individual transfer requests because they believed such requests would be frivolous in light of the County Office Committee's prior general policy statements prohibiting inter-county transfers.

The Court convened on February 25, 1971, in Brownsville, Texas. It determined that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and postponed its disposition of the case until exhaustion could be achieved. The Court preliminarily noted that exhaustion would require each plaintiff to file a written request for permission to transfer their allotments with the Cameron County Office Committee as called for in 7 U.S.C. § 1344b(b) (vii) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended in 1965 and 1968, and carried forward in the Agricultural Act of 1971 in § 601(3) (1) (a) (2) (November 30, 1970), and would require that the County Office Committee hold a hearing to determine if the necessary prerequisites for transfer as enumerated in § 601(3) (1) (a) (2) of the Agricultural Act of 1970 had been fulfilled. Namely, the County Office Committee was called upon to determine if the persons who held liens on the farms from which the allotments were sought to be transferred approved, 7 U.S.C. § 1344b(b) (iii) (1938) as amended in 1965 and 1968 and carried forward in § 601(3) (1) (a) (2) of Pub. Law 91-524 (November 30, 1970), and to determine if a demand for the acreage allotments sought to be transferred existed at that time in the transferor county. § 601(3) (1) (a) (2) of Pub.Law 91-524 (November 30, 1970).

On March 5, 1971, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order advising the parties of its belief that administrative exhaustion would not be completed until a party aggrieved by the decision of the County Office Committee appealed that decision administratively to a County Review Committee as provided for in 7 U.S.C. §§ 1363-1366 (1938) as amended 1951; and procedurally governed by the provisions contained in 7 C.F.R. §§ 711.1-711.27 (1970).¹

Meanwhile the Cameron County Office Committee met March 3, 1971, to rule upon the plaintiffs' transfer requests. The County Office Committee heard numerous witnesses, examined statistical evidence and heard the arguments of counsel before it made its determination to deny plaintiffs' applications. Plaintiffs then presented their appeals to the County Review Committee on March 9, 1971. The Review Committee held a de novo hearing and affirmed the County Office Committee's decision.

On March 11, 1971, the Court again traveled to Brownsville to review the administrators' decision. At that hearing it heard the argument of counsel and took the case under advisement. On March 18, 1971, the Court entered its second Memorandum and Order in which it advised the parties that it was remanding the case to the Review Committee so that it could articulate the basic factual determinations it had made and could enumerate the legal criteria it had used. The Court also delineated the scope and meaning of the demand test used in § 601(3) (1) (a) (2) of the Agricultural Act of 1970.²

In response to the Court's mandate the Review Committee convened on March 23, 1971, in Corpus Christi, Texas. After hearing the argument of counsel and receiving additional evidence, it reaffirmed its previous decision and enumerated its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The Court convened in Corpus Christi, Texas, on March 23, 1971, to review the revised determinations of the Review Committee. The Court received into evidence the transcript containing the Review Committee's March 23, 1971 proceedings and determinations and heard the arguments of counsel. The Court adjourned the hearing until the next morning. On March 24, 1971, the Court reconvened the hearing, heard further argument of counsel and entered its preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of law from the bench. In substance, the Court affirmed the Review Committee's determination because it found that the agency's decision to affirm the Cameron County Office Committee decision was supported by law and substantial evidence.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

It is appropriate now to enter revised findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case. Accordingly, it is ordered that these shall replace and supersede the oral but preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of law which the Court previously made on March 24, 1971.

1. The Review Committee and this Court have jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1363-1366 (1938), as amended in 1951 and 1960, for the reasons previously set forth in the Memorandum and Order of this Court entered March 5, 1971, at page 1252, Appendix I.

2. The findings of fact and conclusions of law which were made by the Review Committee on March 23, 1971, are sufficient and can be reviewed by this Court. See the authorities and discussion set forth in the Court's Memorandum and Order entered March 18, 1971, at page 1255, Appendix II.

3. Although the Court is using the standards of review called for in § 1366 of Title 7 of the United States Code, it is important to note that it would be using the same standards if it were proceeding under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1946) as amended in 1966. Using the standards enumerated in either Act, the Court would reach the same decision. See: Chandler v. David, 350 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1965); cert. denied 382 U.S. 977, 86 S.Ct. 548, 15 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966); Review Committee v. Willey, 275 F.2d 264, 273 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied 363 U.S. 827, 80 S.Ct. 1597, 4 L.Ed.2d 1522 (1960) (Review under 7 U.S.C. § 1366); Universal Camera Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); Hayes v. Celebrezze, 311 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1963).

4. The Court's scope of review is a limited one. The Congress has allowed the Court to determine only if the decision of the agency below—namely the Review Committee—was supported by law and substantial evidence. Furthermore, its review procedures are limited. It cannot hear the evidence de novo. Instead, the Court must make its determinations by the examination of the agency's proceedings as reflected in the transcripts of its proceedings and its findings of fact and conclusions of law. See: Jones v. Hughes, 400 F.2d 585, 590 (8th Cir. 1968); Chandler v. David, supra; Crolley v. Tatton, 249 F.2d 908, 910-912 (5th Cir. 1957); see also: Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B., supra; Hayes v. Celebrezze, supra.

5. Plaintiffs had the burden of proof before the Review Committee, as they do here. See Jones v. Hughes, supra. That is, plaintiffs had the burden before this Court of demonstrating that the decision of the Review Committee below was not supported by substantial evidence under application of the correct legal criteria. Id.

6. Substantial evidence exists in the record of the Review Committee, considered as a whole, if the Court finds that there is more than a scintilla of credible evidence on that record to support the decision, and if the Court finds that the decision reached by the Review Committee is reasonable. Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B., supra; Hayes v. Celebrezze, supra; Review Committee v. Willey, supra.

7. It should be borne in mind that the individual cotton producers to whom the Cameron County Office Committee granted or allocated cotton allotments are not vested with unlimited personal property rights in such allotments. See: B. Parrish, Cotton Allotments: Another "New Property", 45 Tex.L.R. 734 (1967). Instead, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said in Allen v. David, 334 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1964); cert. denied 379 U.S. 967, 85 S.Ct. 660, 13 L.Ed.2d 560 (1965), "There are no personal rights of property created in the plaintiffs * * *. The Agricultural Act is a public law; therefore, no vested rights may be obtained under it. The chief purpose of the Act is to control the production of certain agricultural products * * *" Id., 599. There the Court was careful to caution that the aggrieved producers were free to use their allotments only in the manner conditioned by Congress in the legislation which governed the creation and granting of those allotments to cotton producers. Id.; Dighton v. Coffman, 178 F.Supp. 114, 115, 122 (E.D. Ill.1959); affd. 279 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1960).

The cotton producers...