Crompton v. Kirkland

• Decision Date: 15 February 1946
• Citation: 157 Fla. 89,24 So.2d 902
• Parties: CROMPTON v. KIRKLAND.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

24 So.2d 902

157 Fla. 89

CROMPTON v. KIRKLAND.

Florida Supreme Court

February 15, 1946

Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County; F. R. Hocker Judge.

D. Niel Ferguson of Ocala, for appellant.

Chas. A. Savage, of Ocala, for appellee.

BROWN, Justice.

This case was brought to this Court on an appeal taken from an order of the circuit court dismissing appellant's bill of complaint wherein the appellant sought to have the description of certain deeds construed and a decree that the defendant's deed which he obtained from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida embraces no part of the lands of the plaintiff and that the defendant and all persons claiming by, through, or under him be forever enjoined and restrained from asserting any right, title, or interest in the lands so owned by plaintiff, the cancellation of the record of such deed as a cloud on plaintiff's title, and the issuance of a stay order restraining the appellee from prosecuting his ejectment suit on the common law side of the court pending the final conclusion and disposition of the matters set forth in the bill of complaint.

The appellant in his bill alleged that he, by warranty deed, on March 27 1943, acquired title to, became seized and possessed of a portion of Block Number Thirteen in Cline's Subdivision described in words and figures in the following manner:

'Commencing at a point sixty feet north of the southeast corner of Lot Number Thirteen of Cline's Addition to the City of Ocala according to plat recorded in Plat Book 'A' at page 58 of the public records of Marion County, Florida, thence west 104.6 feet thence north sixty feet, thence east 104.6 feet, thence south sixty feet to the point of beginning, same being in the northeast quarter of the northwest quarter of section 18, township fifteen south, range twenty-two east:'

Appellant further alleged that said Lot Number Thirteen is what is known as a 'fractional block,' that it is not of the same dimensions as the regular square lots or blocks of said subdivision, that it is not a parallelogram, but a trapezoid with no sides of equal length, as reference to the plat attached and made a part of such bill of complaint will show; that the south line of said Lot Number Thirteen is 204.6 feet in length and that said Lot Number Thirteen contains only 69/100 of an acre whereas the regular square blocks of said subdivision contain one acre.

Appellant further alleged that said Lot Number Thirteen has been assessed for taxes for many years by the description 'southeast quarter,' 'southwest quarter' and 'north half,' that appellant's land is embraced in the description 'southeast quarter' of said Lot Number Thirteen, that the taxes on the said southeast quarter of the said Lot Number Thirteen were paid by appellant's predecessor in title for a period of fifteen years immediately prior to appellant's acquisition thereof, and that the description 'southeast quarter' was used for purposes of assessing and taxing the land of the plaintiff's predecessors in title for a number of years prior thereto; that the southeast quarter and the southwest quarter of said Lot Number Thirteen combined contain area equivalent to that of the south half of any regular square block of said subdivision. That the north half of said Lot Number Thirteen abutting the railroad right-of-way which traverses the subdivision is a fractional north half and contains area less than that of the north half of the regular square blocks of the said subdivision. That the description 'southeast quarter' has been used to describe the land of the plaintiff and his predecessors in title for purposes of assessing and collecting taxes for a period of fifty years on the general understanding that the southeast quarter of said Lot Number Thirteen embraced the land of plaintiff's predecessors in title described as 104.6 feet east and west by 120 feet north and south in the southeast corner of said Lot Number Thirteen; and that such division of the said Lot Number Thirteen has been recognized by taxing authorities and owners and has been consented to and acquiesced in by abutting owners from the time of the ownership of the man who platted the land until the defendant acquired his tax title hereinbelow described.

The appellant further alleged that the appellee, A. J. Kirkland, on May 23, 1944, obtained a deed from the Trustee of the Internal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida to the following described land: 'N 1/2 of Bk 13 Cline's Sub. Plat Bk 'A' P. 58'

That said land had reverted to the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida on June 9, 1939, under tax certificate number 1937 of August 3, 1933, and certificate number 13223 of August 7, 1933, and that the said appellee, A. J Kirkland, immediately upon receipt of said deed attempted to take possession of a portion of plaintiff's land, claiming that plaintiff's land and houses were on the 'north half of said Lot Number Thirteen, and that the said appellee, A. J. Kirkland, has instituted in the Circuit Court of Marion County, Florida, on the common law side thereof, an ejectment suit against appellant and his wife, seeking to take from the appellant the lands he owns as aforesaid'; that the description of the appellee's land is indefinite and uncertain under the facts and circumstances and that appellee has acquired no right, title, or interest in the lands of the appellant; that the said Kirkland is the purchaser of an indefinite quantity of land, and is not an innocent purchaser, but took said deed charged with notice of all rights of adjoining land owners, and that the said Kirkland can not claim beyond the line dividing the southeast quarter and the...