Cronin v. Brownlie

• Decision Date: 05 December 1952
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 10614
• Citation: 348 Ill.App. 448,109 N.E.2d 352
• Parties: CRONIN v. BROWNLIE.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 352

109 N.E.2d 352

348 Ill.App. 448

CRONIN v. BROWNLIE.

Gen. No. 10614.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Dec. 5, 1952.

Rathje & Woodward, Wheaton, for appellant.

Thomas H. Price, Elmhurst, for appellee.

ANDERSON, Justice.

Margaret M. Cronin, plaintiff-appellee, received personal injuries arising out of her slipping on an icy sidewalk on the premises of her landlord, William A. Brownlie, defendant-appellant. She recovered a judgment in the Circuit Court of DuPage County based on a verdict of a jury in the sum of $2,500 against the defendant. Motions on behalf of the defendant for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were overruled by the Trial Court and this appeal follows.

The defendant contended in the Trial Court and assigns as error here that as a matter of law the plaintiff failed to establish that she was free from contributory negligence and that the defendant was negligent.

The undisputed evidence discloses that the defendant owned a four-apartment building in Elmhurst, Illinois; that the plaintiff had lived in one of the apartments under a written lease for several years; that the defendant, who also lived in one of the apartments, had no janitor but performed the ordinary janitor services himself; that there was a cement sidewalk 160 feet long and 30 inches wide extending from the front entrance of the apartment to York Street; that the sidewalk was in a good state of repair and had no structural defects; that this sidewalk was used by all of the persons living in the building; that there was no provision in the lease that the landlord should keep the ice and snow off the sidewalks; that there was a small light burning at night outside the door at the entrance to the apartment; that a street light on York Street did not light up the entrance sidewalk; that on and prior to February 6, 1949, there was ice all over the city of Elmhurst and the plaintiff had used the sidewalk in question on several occasions prior to Saturday, February 5, 1949, at all of which times the sidewalk was in an icy condition due to natural accumulations of ice and snow.

Margaret M. Cronin testified in substance that when she left her apartment about 1:30 P.M. on February 5, 1949, the ice was frozen thick on the entrance sidewalk; that the ground was covered with snow in that area; that a Mr. Berry came up to the apartment entrance and together they walked down the sidewalk to an automobile; that he did not assist her; that she was wearing black suede dress shoes with heels about an inch and one-half high; that she had no galoshes or rubbers on; that the occasion of her leaving the house was to attend a wedding reception; that at the reception she had not more than three cocktails containing whiskey; that she had the last drink several hours before she returned home; that some friends brought her to the York Street entrance of her apartment in an automobile about 1:30 Sunday morning, February 6; that the condition of the sidewalk was the same as when she walked on it in the afternoon; that the sidewalk from the apartment to the street was a glaze of ice; that there was snow some six to ten inches high adjacent to the sidewalk; that when she came within about fifteen feet of the apartment doorway, while walking on the sidewalk, she slipped and fell on the ice; that her leg was broken as a result of the fall. She further testified that the ice was rough but was in the same rough condition on all the sidewalk on the night she returned to her apartment; that no one escorted her from York Street to her apartment on her return; that she had been back and forth on the sidewalk to her home three times on Friday and the ice was the same as it was on Saturday and on Sunday morning; that she did not know whether or not anyone had shovelled the snow off the sidewalk from Friday to Sunday morning.

Clement Cuthbert testified that he was one of the tenants in the apartment building; that he observed the sidewalk from Friday, February 4, through Sunday, February 6; that Friday afternoon it had sleeted and then it froze Friday night and on Saturday it snowed and covered the ice with snow and on Saturday night he 'noticed it was icy over the snow' and he 'swept the sidewalk so that people using it would at least see the ice on it.' He further testified that the sidewalk was in the same condition Saturday evening that it was on Friday evening--'nothing but ice.'

William A. Brownlie, the defendant, testified that on February 3 it snowed and he shovelled the snow off the walk; that after he had shovelled the walk on February 3, it was icy; that he also shovelled it on February 4; that he used no salt or ashes on the sidewalk; that he could not get the ice off the sidewalk; that on February 4 he left for Detroit and did not return until Sunday evening about 6:30; that when he left for Detroit his tenant, Mr. Cuthbert, said he would take charge of clearing the sidewalk during his absence; that he did not pay Cuthbert for his services.

The evidence further discloses that prior to the time of the injury the plaintiff was in good health and that on the day of the trial she had fully recovered from her broken leg. It is further disclosed by the record that during the period in question no one put any salt or sand on the sidewalk in question.

Charles L. Berry testified that he called for the plaintiff on Saturday, February 5, about 1:30 P. M.; that he met her at the front door of the apartment and they walked to York Street on the sidewalk; that 'the sidewalk from the building to the street was a glaze of ice,' and there were no ashes or salt on the sidewalk and the 'sidewalk was just a sheet of glass.'

The first question presented here is whether or not the landlord defendant owes any duty to the plaintiff tenant to remove ice and snow accumulated from natural causes on the sidewalk used to enter the building. It follows, of course, that if no legal duty exists, there can be no negligence. We find no cases in Illinois exactly in point. The authorities throughout the country appear to be divided. The cases on the subject collected in A.L.R. are: 25 A.L.R. 1273; 39 A.L.R. 294; 58 A.L.R. 1411; 75 A.L.R. 154; 97 A.L.R. 220.

The law is settled in this State that a city is not liable for injuries resulting from the slipperiness of its streets and sidewalks caused by the presence of ice and snow accumulated as a result of natural causes. Strappelli v. City of Chicago, 371 Ill. 72, 20 N.E.2d 43. The basis of this rule of law is that it is unreasonable and impractical to compel a city in our climate to perform the labor necessary to remove ice and snow from its streets and sidewalks to keep them safe for travel. If the accumulation is caused by some defect of the street or sidewalk and this creates the dangerous condition, then a city may be liable. Graham v. City of Chicago, 346 Ill. 638, 178 N.E. 911. The rule denying liability of cities on grounds of unreasonableness and impracticability while not decisive of the issues here is in some measure pertinent. The authorities in jurisdictions on the question of where there is a duty on the landlord who has rented the premises to several tenants to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow on steps or sidewalks, which have resulted in injuries to tenants by slipping are not in harmony. From an examination of cases cited in the above A.L.R. notes and cases reviewed in this opinion, the weight of authority is that there is no such duty. The Courts of Massachusetts, Ohio, New York, Maine, and Washington hold that there is no duty of a landlord in the absence of a special agreement to remove accumulations of ice and snow due to natural causes from the sidewalks, steps, or driveways which are used in common by several tenants of an apartment building. Boulten v. Dorrington, 302 Mass. 407, 19 N.E.2d 731; Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 283 N.Y. 647, 28 N.E.2d 43; Turoff v. Richman, 1944, 76 Ohio App. 83, 61 N.E.2d 486; McNeill v. Home Savings Bank, 313 Mass. 664, 48 N.E.2d 695; Oerter v. Ziegler, 1910, 59 Wash. 421, 109 P. 1058; Rosenberg v. Chapman Nat'l Bank, 126 Me. 403, 139 A. 82, reported in 58 A.L.R. 1405; 52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 417, page 46.

The minority rule holding that there may be liability is followed in New Hampshire and Connecticut. United Shoe Machine Corporation v. Paine, 1 Cir., 26 F.2d 594, 58 A.L.R. 1398; Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 128 A. 705, reported also in 39 A.L.R. 287.

In the Turoff case the plaintiff tenant was injured by slipping on ice and snow on a driveway on the leased premises. This driveway had been covered for some time by ice and snow due to natural causes. The landlord had not cleared the driveway which had been used by the tenant plaintiff and other tenants in the leased apartments on several occasions prior to the time of her injury and she was well aware of its slippery condition. The Court held that a different rule should not be applied to the landlord than the non-liability rule of a city and says:

'* * * In cases where there is no act on the part of the landlord creating a greater danger than was brought about by natural causes the dangers that are created by the elements such as forming of ice and the falling of snow, are universally known and unless the landlord has contracted to provide against these dangers, all persons on his property must assume the burden of protecting themselves therefrom.

'This rule, which is sustained by the greater weight of authority, is stated as follows in 25 A.L.R. 1301: 'Ordinarily, the landlord of premises leased to different tenants who use in common the approaches thereto, and the halls and stairways, is not liable for accumulations of snow and ice due to natural causes and hence is not liable for injuries to persons using these portions of the premises, due to accumulations of this character.'

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