Reardon v. Shimelman
| Decision Date | 22 April 1925 |
| Citation | 102 Conn. 383,128 A. 705 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | REARDON v. SHIMELMAN. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; L. P. Waldo Marvin Judge.
Action by Elizabeth G. Reardon against Abraham Shimelman to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence in maintaining a common approach to his apartment house in such a slippery condition that the plaintiff fell while using said approach as an invited guest. The court directed a verdict for the defendant, and, from the judgment thereon, the plaintiff appealed. Error, and new trial ordered.
John A. Danaher, of Hartford, for appellant.
Philip Roberts, of Hartford, for appellee.
This action was originally brought against Abraham Shimelman, and it was alleged that he owned the premises in question. Later a stipulation was filed in which it was provided that the " writ, summons, and complaint may be amended" by adding two other parties as defendants and that " said action may proceed to final judgment as if due and timely service had heretofore been made upon all of said above-named parties." No action by the court was ever taken in regard to this stipulation nor was any amendment filed; and both the verdict and the judgment, following the only allegation of ownership in the pleadings, that above noticed run against Shimelman alone. The evidence shows that the other two persons mentioned in the stipulation were joint owners of the premises with Shimelman, and, lacking any allegation of sole occupancy or particular obligation of oversight upon his part, a question might fairly arise as to the possibility, upon this record, of holding Shimelman alone liable. Low v. Mumford, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 426, 7 Am.Dec. 469; Baker v. Fritts, 143 Ill.App. 465. This question is not, however, before us and we merely notice it that, on the return of the case, a proper amendment may be made. We shall follow the case made upon the pleadings and regard Shimelman as the sole defendant and the owner of the premises in question.
The appeal is taken from the action of the trial court in directing a verdict for the defendant. There is substantially no dispute as to the facts and the jury might well have found them to be as follows: The defendant owned two contiguous buildings which were divided into apartments rented to various tenants, four families living in one, and three in the other. Between the buildings was an open space and one means of approach to both was a walk leading from the street into that space, with various offshoots to the side and rear entrances of the buildings. The renting of the apartments and the general care of the premises was in charge of a woman who occupied one of the apartments, and herself passed back and forth over a part of this walk.
On the afternoon of January 3, 1923, the plaintiff made a call upon one of the tenants, her particular purpose having been to get two plates which she had left when attending a party held at the tenant's apartment some weeks before. Having completed her call, the plaintiff passed along the walk on her way to the street. The walk for a considerable space was covered with ice and frozen snow, and was in a slippery and dangerous condition, in spots smooth and in others lumpy, and no sand or ashes had been scattered over it. While there was little, if any, direct evidence as to the length of time this condition had existed, there were facts in evidence reasonably indicating that it had been there for some days and it also appeared that the woman in charge of the premises passed close by the spot in question in going to and from her own apartment and could see it as she sat at one of her windows. The plaintiff, because of the dangerous condition she encountered there, was not walking fast, but was " picking her steps." She slipped and fell, causing the injuries for which she is seeking a recovery. There was no evidence of any structural defect or want of repairs in the walk, nor was there any agreement between the defendant and the tenants as to the obligation to care for the walks on the premises, in fact, such care as the particular walk in question had received had come from certain tenants to whose apartments it was the principal means of approach.
It is the law of this state, as elsewhere, that, speaking generally, the landlord who rents the apartments in his building to various tenants, reserving control of the common approaches, is obligated to use reasonable care to keep those approaches reasonably safe for the use of the tenants; and that it is no defense that some one else is charged by him with, or assumes the performance of, that duty, if it be not performed. Koskoff v. Goldman, 86 Conn. 415, 424, 85 A. 588; Gaucso v. Levy, 89 Conn. 169, 93 A. 136; Cook v. Simon, 98 Conn. 98, 118 A. 634; Pavlovchik v. Lupariello, 101 Conn. 567, 127 A. 18. This obligation of the landlord extends also to all those who have lawful occasion to visit the tenants for social or business purposes; a right of ingress and egress for all such persons is essential, not merely to the enjoyment of the rented premises by the tenants, but also to the renting of them by the landlord; it is part of that for the use of which he is paid, and it exists for the mutual benefit of landlord and tenants alike. Miller v. Hancock, L. R. (1893) 2 Q. B. 177; Coupe v. Platt, 172 Mass. 458, 52 N.E. 526, 70 Am.St.Rep. 293; Gleason v. Boehm, 58 N.J.Law, 475, 477, 34 A. 886, 32 L.R.A. 645; Crane Elevator Co. v. Lippert, 63 F. 942, 945, 11 C.C.A. 521; Sawyer v. McGillicuddy, 81 Me. 318, 322, 17 A. 126, 3 L.R.A. 458, 10 Am.St.Rep. 260. The basis of the liability of the landlord to those visiting the premises for social purposes does not rest primarily upon an express or implied invitation from one of the tenants, though no doubt that might be found here, but upon the broader principle, that:
" Where the privilege of user exists for the common interest or mutual advantage of both parties, it will be held to be a case of invitation; but if it exists for the mere pleasure and benefit of the party exercising the privilege, it will be held to be a case of license." Pomponio v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 66 Conn. 528, 537, 34...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Iwai v. State
...pedestrian traffic where snow and ice created dangerous conditions). Geise found the reasoning persuasive in Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 128 A. 705, 39 A.L.R. 287 (1925): The duty of the landlord being to exercise reasonable care to prevent the occurrence of defective or dangerous ......
-
Giacalone v. Hous. Auth. of Wallingford
...to alleviate known dangers exists independent of the specific source of that danger. As the court observed in Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 388, 128 A. 705 (1925), with respect to “[t]he duty of the landlord being to exercise reasonable care to prevent the occurrence of defective or ......
-
Smith v. Town of Greenwich, 17555.
...to all those who have lawful occasion to visit the tenants for social or business purposes." (Citations omitted.) Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 386, 128 A. 705 (1925); see also Newell v. K. & D. Jewelry Co., 119 Conn. 332, 334, 176 A. 405 (1935) (when defendant store owner hired cont......
-
Another v. Target Corp. & Another
...Mass. 162, 169, 402 N.E.2d 1045 (1980), quoting Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 397-398, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). See Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 388, 128 A. 705 (1925) (“The duty of the landlord being to exercise reasonable care to prevent the occurrence of defective or dangerous condi......