Cronin v. Minster Press

• Decision Date: 07 November 1974
• Docket Number: No. 3,Docket No. 18995,3
• Citation: 56 Mich.App. 471,224 N.W.2d 336
• Parties: Danny L. CRONIN and Shirley L Cronin, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MINSTER PRESS, a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 336

224 N.W.2d 336

56 Mich.App. 471

Danny L. CRONIN and Shirley L Cronin, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MINSTER PRESS, a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 18995.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 3.

Nov. 7, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 19, 1974.

Released for Publication Dec. 30, 1974.

Kenneth L. Block, Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellant.

Philo, Maki, Cockrel, Robb, Spearman & Cooper, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before ALLEN, P.J., and J. H. GILLIS and McGREGOR, JJ.

McGREGOR, Judge.

This is an interlocutory appeal. Plaintiffs began legal proceedings against the defendant in the United States District Court for the Northern Division of Ohio, Western District, alleging that plaintiff Danny Cronin was injured as a result of the negligence of defendant. Plaintiff claims that he was injured on June 5, 1969, while operating a punch press in Michigan which had been manufactured by the defendant in ohio. The cause of action in Ohio was instituted on May 31, 1972, in Federal court, slightly less than three years after the alleged incident. Defendant was served with process on June 26, 1972.

Although the record of the Federal court is not before this Court, it appears from the parties' briefs that, after taking depositions, defendant answered the complaint and later moved to dismiss, alleging that the suit was barred by the Ohio two-year statute of limitations. After this motion was filed, plaintiffs initiated suit in Michigan; subsequently an order was entered in Ohio District Court, on June 18, 1973, dismissing the suit there because the suit was not commenced within two years, as required by the applicable Ohio statute of limitations. The Ohio court made no ruling on the merits of the action.

On April 13, 1973, plaintiffs commenced suit in Berrien County circuit court, alleging negligence and strict liability. Defendant moved of accelerated judgment in lieu of an answer, claiming that plaintiffs' action was barred by the Michigan statute of limitations, M.C.L.A. § 600.5805; M.S.A. § 27A.5805. A hearing was held on July 16, 1973, at which time defendant's motion was denied. The trial court agreed to certify the issue of law to this Court, which was stated substantially as follows:

'Did the acquisition of jurisdiction over defendant in an identical lawsuit brought in Federal court in Ohio toll the Michigan statute of limitations as allowed by M.C.L.A. 600.5856(2); M.S.A. 27A.5856(2) thus permitting plaintiffs to bring a cause of action over 3 years after an alleged accident was said to have occurred?'

It should be noted that the litigation in the Ohio Federal court remained active for about one year, during which time depositions were taken. More unusual, plaintiff charges in his brief to this appellate court (and previously, before the Michigan circuit court, in the argument on defendant's motion to dismiss) that these plaintiffs were represented by the same attorneys who are now representing the defendants until 90% Of the statutory limitation 3-year period had run. ¹ The order of the trial court, certifying the issue of law to this Court was granted on January 30, 1974, and the claim of appeal was filed on February 13, 1974.

The question is now before this Court.

Plaintiffs raised two procedural objections which are meritless and should be disposed of immediately. First, plaintiffs contend that defendant is not following proper Michigan procedure, since it argues different issues on appeal than were raised at the hearing and then were certified to this Court. This argument has no foundation. The issue raised below was whether M.C.L.A. § 600.5856(2) applied to the instant case to toll the Michigan statute of limitations. That was the specific issue decided by the court and then certified to this Court. Both plaintiffs and defendant argued this issue in their memoranda submitted to the trial court before the hearing. Plaintiffs apparently regard arguments on 'the equities' of the situation unrelated to statutory construction. It is clear that the trial court looked to the policies and purpose behind the statute of limitations and effected what it believed to be the purpose of this statute. This is clearly an integral part of statutory construction.

The issue before us is one of statutory construction. M.C.L.A. § 600.5805; M.S.A. § 27A.5805 states:

'No person may bring or maintain any action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to himself or to someone through whom he claims, he commences the action within the periods of time prescribed by this section.

* * * ((1)--(6) these sections are inappropriate.)

'(7) The period of limitations is 3 years for all other actions to recover damages for injuries to persons and property.'

To this general statute, there are exceptions which toll the operation of the statute during the pendency of specified events. The only provision said to apply in the instant case is M.C.L.A. § 600.5856(2); M.S.A. § 27A.5856(2), which states:

'The statutes of limitations are tolled when * * *

'(2) jurisdiction over the defendant is otherwise acquired * * *.'

The question, therefore, is whether 'jurisdiction over the defendant' implies jurisdiction by a Michigan court or jurisdiction by any court, including a foreign court.

The primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Psychas v. TransCanada Highway Express Ltd., 146 F.Supp. 11 (E.D.Mich., 1956); Aikens v. Department of Conservation, 387 Mich. 495, 198 N.W.2d 304 (1972). When, as here, there is no legislative history and no prior judicial construction, the courts should make analytical interpretations. If the meaning of the language is plain and unambiguous, interpretation is not necessary, and the statute is simply applied as written. Dussia v. Monroe County Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich. 244, 191 N.W.2d 307 (1971); Gregory Boat Co. v. Detroit, 37 Mich.App. 673, 195 N.W.2d 290 (1972). But where the statute is unclear construction should be made by the court. Kizer v. Livingston County Board of Commissioners, 38 Mich.App. 239, 195 N.W.2d 884 (1972). Statutes should be construed with an eye toward the result, Magnuson v. Kent County Board of Canvassers, 370 Mich. 649, 122 N.W.2d 808 (1963), and, therefore, a reasonable construction should be given which will avoid absurd results. Magreta v. Ambassador Steel Co., 378 Mich. 689, 148 N.W.2d 767 (1967), on rehearing, 380 Mich. 513, 158 N.W.2d 473 (1968). The court, in other words, is to use common sense in its construction. Kalamazoo Township v. Kalamazoo County Clerk, 339 Mich. 619, 64 N.W.2d 595 (1954).

It has been said that it is the duty of the court to construe a statute without reference to equitable considerations. Mercy Hospital v. Crippled Children Commission, 340 Mich. 404, 65 N.W.2d 838 (1954); Shaw v. Lakeway Chemicals, Inc., 3 Mich.App. 257, 142 N.W.2d 15 (1966); reversed, 379 Mich. 601, 153 N.W.2d 653 (1967). However, it is also said that the court should effect the obvious purpose of a statute. Northville Coach Line, Inc. v. Detroit, 379 Mich. 317, 150 N.W.2d 772 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Village of Wayne, 358 Mich. 653, 101 N.W.2d 320 (1960).

In the instant case, it is quite clear that the trial court was not weighing equities, but rather was looking to the purpose of the statute of limitations as well as to the exceptions to the statute of limitations, and was attempting to effectuate the purpose.

We are faced here with no legislative history to guide the Court nor any dispositive precedent cases. The only analogous Michigan case is Ralph Shrader, Inc. v. Ecclestone Chemical Co., Inc., 22 Mich.App. 213, 177 N.W.2d 241 (1970). In that case, plaintiffs brought a claim in a Michigan Federal court in 1965, alleging an injury in 1963. The case was dismissed in Federal court in 1967 for lack of diversity jurisdiction, and plaintiff then filed in Michigan circuit court. Defendant moved for summary judgment and the trial court ruled the suit barred by the 3-year statute of limitations. On appeal, this decision was reversed, the Court of Appeals ruling that the statute was tolled by M.C.L.A. § 600.5856.

The defendant correctly distinguishes this case. Shrader, supra, held that a Federal court, sitting in Michigan, is in effect a Michigan court, that the Legislature would have considered the possibility that such situations would arise, and that no provision being made to the contrary, the excpetion should apply. This distinction is also true of Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 109 N.E. 594 (1915), upon which Shrader relies, for in that case the court was dealing with two cases in two New York state courts, the first suit being dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs contend that the language and rationale of both cases can be extended to the instant case. Justice Cardozo, in Gaines, supra, p. 539, 109 N.E. 594, first showed a distinct preference for reading the statute of limitations as narrowly as possible to preserve the rights of plaintiffs to bring suit. As he stated:

'The statute is designed to insure to the diligent suitor the right to a hearing in court till he reaches a judgment on the merits. Its broad and liberal purpose is not to be frittered away by any narrow construction. The important consideration is that, by invoking judicial aid, a litigant gives timely notice to his adversary of a present purpose to maintain his rights before the courts. When that has been done, a mistaken belief that the court has jurisdiction stands on the same plane as any other mistake of law.'

The Shrader court noted at 217 of 22 Mich.App., at 243 of 177 N.W.2d:

'Defendant received timely notice that plaintiff intended to pursue its claim against it under the substantive law of Michigan.'

The trial court found that the object of a statute of limitations is to prevent a...