Cronk v. City of Cody
| Citation | 897 P.2d 476 |
| Decision Date | 21 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-201,94-201 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of Joe CRONK, Sr., Appellant (Employee-Claimant), v. The CITY OF CODY, Appellee (Employer-Objector), and State of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, Appellee (Objector). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Dick L. Kahl, Powell, for appellant.
Robert D. Olson, Cody, for City of Cody.
Richard J. Albanese, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Powell, for Worker's Compensation Div.
Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.
Appellant, Joe Cronk, Sr. (Cronk) appeals from the district court's reversal of a worker's compensation award. Appellant claims that the district court erred in concluding that his injury was not work related.
We affirm.
Appellant presents two issues:
1. The Hearing Officer's determination that Appellant suffered a work related injury is supported by substantial evidence, is in accordance with law and is not arbitrary capricious, nor an abuse of discretion.
2. The District Court improperly reweighed the evidence presented at the contested hearing and thus its decision must be reversed.
Appellee objectors, the City of Cody and the Worker's Compensation Division, articulate three issues:
1. Whether the Hearing Officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law and thus unlawful under Wyoming Statute Section 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A)?
2. Whether the Hearing Officer's determination that Appellant incurred a work related injury was unsupported by substantial evidence in the record and thus unlawful under Wyoming Statute Section 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E)?
3. Whether the Administrative Hearing Officer properly construed and applied the statutory requirements of Wyoming Statute Sections 27-14-502 and 27-14-503?
At the time of his injury, Cronk was employed by the City of Cody as a police officer. Cronk, off-duty at the time, was injured while working out in a gym located in the Law Enforcement Center.
At the hearing, testimony showed that officers were not required to use the gym or engage in any kind of fitness program as a condition of employment. The gym, in the same building as the police department, was available for use to employees, and their family members, of the police office, sheriff department, fire department, and search and rescue. Use of the gym was strictly on a voluntary basis.
The hearing officer concluded that a nexus between Cronk's injury and his employment existed entitling him to an award of benefits. The hearing officer noted that Cronk was off-duty at the time of the injury; however, he concluded that because the gym was located in the same building as the police department and because Cronk worked out to be a better police officer, there was a sufficient nexus between the employment and the injury.
On appeal, the district court disagreed and concluded that there was not a nexus between the injury and Cronk's employment. Claiming that the hearing officer's decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the district court improperly reweighed the evidence, Cronk now appeals.
When we review an agency decision, we are not bound by the conclusions reached by the district court. Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo.1994). Our review is as if the case came directly to this court from the agency in the first instance. Id.
The requirement that a nexus exist between the injury and the course of employment is derived from W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xi) (1991) "Injury" means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business.
(Emphasis added.) Whether a nexus exists between an injury and the course of employment is a question of fact. Stuckey v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wyo.1995). Thus, our standard on review is for substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is such...
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