Crookshanks v. Ransbarger
| Decision Date | 20 March 1917 |
| Docket Number | 3198. |
| Citation | 92 S.E. 78,80 W.Va. 21 |
| Parties | CROOKSHANKS ET AL. v. RANSBARGER ET AL. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted March 6, 1917.
Syllabus by the Court.
A contract of sale of land, describing the subject-matter as the tract of land on which the vendors reside, either in express terms or by necessary implication arising from words used in it, is not void for indefiniteness of description.
If however, the vendors own two noncontiguous tracts and reside on only one of them, such description extends to and includes only the one on which they reside.
Threats of a civil suit to enforce a claim arising out of a contract for the sale of land, under the influence of which a new contract is made, do not constitute duress vitiating the latter or affording ground for rescission thereof.
A new contract of sale of land at a price higher than that named in an older one, though lower than that offered by a third person, signed, acknowledged, and delivered, upon demand and under threats to sue for enforcement of a claim of liability arising out of the latter and false representations as to the character of the holder and as to his having already instituted such suit, but without any misrepresentation as to the character of the contract, its terms or provisions, or as to liability thereon, is not fraudulent.
Though in such case the vendor, a husband, is not, at the time of the execution of the new contract, in his usual mental and physical vigor, the yielding of his wife, upon demand for her signature and acknowledgment, and the acquiescence of a third party desiring the property at a higher price, in the execution thereof, though with intent to endeavor to set it aside, as an assignee, in the names of the vendors, and so obtain it at such higher price, repel such inference of undue influence as might arise from the slight weakness shown and prove the contract to have been entered into by way of compromise of the claim of liability on the previous one.
The inchoate right of dower of a married woman is not released, relinquished, nor barred by an executory contract of sale of the real estate of her husband signed, sealed, and acknowledged by her and her husband, in the manner prescribed by section 4, c. 73 of the Code 1913 (sec. 3807), and delivered to the vendee; nor will a court of equity compel her, by a decree of specific performance, to join in the execution of a deed conveying the land to the vendee.
On reversing a decree improperly canceling such a contract, upon allegations of fraud in the procurement thereof, affirming the validity and binding force of the contract as to the husband, but denying right to specific performance thereof as to the wife, upon a prayer therefor in a cross-bill, the appellate court will remand the cause to enable the vendee upon an amended cross-bill, to assert, if he desires to do so, such right, if any, as he may have against the husband's heirs (he being dead), and as may be enforceable in the pending suit.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
The word "convey" has both a technical and a popular meaning. Technically, it applies to the legal title to real estate. Popularly, it may apply to the equitable title to real estate, or to personal property, and may be read in the sense of "assign," "sell," or "transfer."
Appeal from Circuit Court, Fayette County.
Suit by Elizabeth F. Crookshanks and others against Homer Ransbarger and others. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded.
Davis, Davis & Hall, of Charleston, and R. T. Hubard, Jr., of Fayetteville, for appellants.
W. R. Bennett and J. L. Ryan, both of Fayetteville, and Ryan & Boggess, of Spencer, for appellees.
The general issue raised by the pleadings in this cause is whether or not a certain contract for the sale of real estate is valid. The original and amended and supplemental bills attacked it upon two grounds--fraud in the procurement thereof and fatal uncertainty in the description of the subject-matter. In response to these attacks and the prayer for cancellation, the defendants filed their answer and cross-bill praying specific performance. The decree appealed from granted the relief prayed for in the bill upon the theory of fraud in the procurement of the contract and dismissed the cross-bill.
If unaided by anything else in the paper, the descriptive clause might be so indefinite as to render the contract void for uncertainty. It says the land agreed to be sold is:
"All of the real estate lying north of Laurel creek, including that portion of the land lying on Laurel creek near Withrow's mill, and also all of the land lying east and west of Meadow river, at Rader's ford, said land lying in Fayette and Greenbrier counties."
But it is followed by another clause saying:
"The parties of the second part reserves the right to remain on the land in their present home and have the use of all the cleared land on both sides of the river and access for wood and coal for fuel until the 11th day of August, 1906, free of any charge, and also the refusal to rent said home as long as it is for rent, by the parties of the first part, or his assignees."
As it is permissible to read the entire contract, upon the inquiry for the intention of the parties, the two clauses may be read together, and, so read, they describe the land as the farm or tract of land on which the vendors resided. A deed or contract describing land generally, as being the tract on which the vendors reside, or as the home tract or farm, or as all the land they own in a certain county, is amply sufficient as regards descriptive matter. Furbee v. Furbee, 49 W.Va. 191, 38 S.E. 511; White v. Core, 20 W.Va. 272; Mundy v. Vawter, 3 Gratt. (Va.) 518.
The application of this rule does not, however, completely solve the problem presented. The land claimed under the contract was not all in one boundary. The portion described as being "all of the land lying east and west of Meadow river, at Rader's ford," was the tract on which the vendors resided. "That portion lying on Laurel creek near Withrow's mill" is separated from the tract on which they resided by another tract of 150 acres, which they seem to have sold out of their farm. It is composed of two tracts, one derived from Ashley, containing 16.7 acres, and the other from McClung and containing 26.3 acres, a remnant of a 400-acre tract out of which the 150-acre tract was sold, leaving a large remnant at one end and a small one at the other. On the large one they resided, wherefore the contract covers it; but it is not broad enough in its terms to reach the noncontiguous tract of 43 acres, composed of these two small tracts. It does not purport to sell all of the lands of the vendors. Though it says "All of the real estate lying north of Laurel creek, including that portion of the land lying on Laurel creek near Withrow's mill," it does not say whose land that is which lies on Laurel creek near Withrow's mill, and the vendors did not reside on that tract. It was not a part of the tract on which they resided. Between it and the tract on which they resided there lay another 150-acre tract belonging to the Gauley Coal Land Company. The words of the contract, therefore, fall short of any description of this small tract. Though it may be said the parties intended to sell all the land they had, the contract does not say so by any words used in it, and it is absolutely essential that some words importing intent to cover the land be found therein. Words in the contract, not mere circumstances outside of it, nor the relation of the parties to the land, form an indispensable element. Oil Co. v. McCormick, 68 W.Va. 604, 70 S.E. 371; Crawford v. Whiteman, 64 W.Va. 10, 61 S.E. 319. No doubt, the parties intended to contract the sale of these small tracts. If mere inference arising from their situation, their relation to them, the obvious intent and purpose of the vendee, and all the other facts and circumstances disclosed by the extrinsic evidence could supply want of language in the contract, it could be said the intent to sell these tracts is clear. But the law rigidly exacts the presence of words in the contract expressing the intention. It cannot be supplied by mere inference arising from facts disclosed by extrinsic evidence and the relation of the parties to the instrument.
Freudenberger Oil Co. v. Simmons, 75 W.Va. 337, 83 S.E. 995.
It is hardly necessary to say a contract for a conveyance must be equally broad in its scope, for specific performance thereof results in a deed, and a court decreeing specific performance would not be justified in going beyond the terms of the contract.
A letter signed by A. F. Crookshanks and dated September 6, 1905, less than one month after the date of the contract, describes these two small tracts as being land covered by, and included in, the contract. That this letter may be read in aid of it and as constituting a part thereof is perfectly manifest. Johnson v. Ronald's Adm'r, 4 Munf. (Va.) 78; McCandless v. Warner, 26 W.Va. 754; Moore v. Ward, 71 W.Va. 393, 76 S.E. 807, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 390, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 263; Parrill v. McKinley, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 1, 58 Am. Dec. 212; Bowles v. Woodson, 6 Gratt. (Va.) 78. Inasmuch as the letter is a sufficient memorandum, it is unnecessary to say whether the bill and lis pendens notice filed by the plaintiffs and admitting the two small tracts were parts of the land intended to be sold constitute memoranda of sale sufficient under the statute of frauds.
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