Cropp v. State, 082119 IWCA, 17-1952
| Opinion Judge | POTTERFIELD, PRESIDING JUDGE. |
| Party Name | RONDELL MANDRAY CROPP, Applicant-Appellant, v. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Attorney | C. Aron Vaughn of Kaplan & Frese, LLP, Marshalltown, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State. |
| Judge Panel | Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and May, JJ. |
| Case Date | August 21, 2019 |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bradley J. Harris and Andrea J. Dryer (second dismissal), Judges.
The applicant appeals from the dismissal of his application for postconviction relief following his 2007 convictions for robbery in the first degree and willful injury causing serious injury.
C. Aron Vaughn of Kaplan & Frese, LLP, Marshalltown, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and May, JJ.
POTTERFIELD, PRESIDING JUDGE.
Rondell Cropp appeals the dismissal of his application for postconviction relief (PCR) following his 2007 convictions for robbery in the first degree and willful injury causing serious injury. He maintains the PCR court improperly dismissed his application without giving him notice of its intention to do so or allowing him an opportunity to respond.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In March 2006, Cropp was arrested and charged with robbery in the first degree and willful injury causing serious injury. The incident in which Cropp was alleged to have participated took place in January 2006-about one month before Cropp's nineteenth birthday.
Cropp entered into a plea agreement with the State, which provided that he would be allowed to plead guilty to robbery in the second degree and willful injury causing serious injury and serve concurrent jail terms in exchange for his full cooperation and testimony against all codefendants. The agreement, which the district court accepted, included a clause that the agreement would become null and void if Cropp "fail[ed] to satisfactorily complete the" terms of the agreement.
During a later deposition of Cropp in connection with pending charges against a codefendant, the prosecutor announced Cropp had breached the plea agreement and the State was withdrawing from it.
The State filed a motion for a status hearing on the plea agreement, and, after the hearing, the district court granted the State's motion to vacate the agreement. In its written ruling, the court found: [Cropp] gave statements to law enforcement on January 23, 2006, February 28, 2006, and March 2, 2006. Additionally, [Cropp] gave a deposition on December 22, 2006. The statements made by [Cropp] in the deposition constitute the basis for the State's application to revoke the plea agreement.
In [Cropp's] deposition he substantially contradicts statements he earlier made in the three interviews with law enforcement. Specifically[, ] in the deposition [he] stated he and his co-defendants had planned to acquire one-quarter pound of marijuana from the victim for $2500. In his statements to law enforcement investigators he had indicated that he and friends intended to acquire one-quarter pound of marijuana for $1100. In his deposition [Cropp] also answered questions in such a fashion as to, reasonably interpreted, provide protection for Tyler, Seals and David Wright. Defense counsel characterizes the differences between the deposition testimony and the law enforcement investigative report statements as being because of alleged t[h]reats made by Seals against [Cropp] at the time of the taking of the deposition.
The court finds the statements contained in the deposition are materially at odds with relevant statements in the law enforcement investigative statements. [Cropp's] substantial contradictions place the State at a disadvantage in that [Cropp] has now given statements, which if the State were to use him at trial, could be used to materially impeach him.
The State reinstated the original charges against Cropp. He waived his right to a jury trial and had a bench trial on the minutes of evidence.
Cropp was found guilty as charged. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five years on the charge of robbery in the first degree and up to ten years on the willful-injury charge. The robbery sentence included a 70% mandatory minimum, and the court ordered Cropp to serve the two sentences consecutively.
Cropp appealed, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to reassert Cropp's challenge to the State's withdrawal from the plea agreement before the trial court and in failing to challenge the State's remedy for Cropp's failure to perform his obligation under the plea agreement. Our supreme court transferred the case to us, and a panel of our court affirmed. State v. Cropp, No. 07-2112, 2009 WL 139528, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2009). Procedendo issued in April 2009.
Cropp filed his PCR application in November 2016. The State responded by filing a motion to dismiss, asserting Cropp's application was barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Iowa Code section 822.3 (2016). Cropp resisted the motion, and the court set a hearing on it.
Following the May 2017 hearing, the court dismissed Cropp's claim that his codefendant's receipt of a new trial constituted newly discovered evidence Cropp complied with the plea agreement's requirement of truthful testimony and his claim that trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. The court concluded the outcome of the codefendant's case was "immaterial to the determination that [Cropp] violated the plea agreement" and did "not constitute newly discovered evidence which would relieve [Cropp] of the requirement to file his" PCR action within the three-year statute of limitations. Similarly, the court recognized that alleging ineffective assistance of counsel did not remove the claims outside the realm of the section 822.3 time-bar. The court did not dismiss as untimely both of Cropp's claims that his sentences were illegal-categorically and as applied to him-as "the court may correct an illegal sentence at any time."
Cropp appealed the decision to our supreme court, which treated the appeal as interlocutory and denied the request that the court hear the appeal.
After procedendo issued, Cropp applied to the district court to hire an expert at state expense to support his sentencing claims. He indicated the expert would prepare an opinion and testify regarding Cropp's "mental state and mental health, especially as it relate[d] to his likelihood to reoffend," and "concerning the minds of offenders around the age of Mr. Cropp and that the underlying logical of State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014) extends to them as well." The State resisted.
Before the court ruled on Cropp's application for an expert, the State filed a motion to dismiss Cropp's remaining two claims. The State asserted that Cropp's illegal-sentences claims-while not time-barred-should be dismissed as a matter of law because "no authority exists for the ground of relief as the sentence is not illegal and there is no case law or statutory authority to support the claim." Cropp resisted, and...
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