Crosbie v. Partridge
| Decision Date | 07 March 1922 |
| Docket Number | 12440. |
| Citation | 205 P. 758,85 Okla. 186,1922 OK 75 |
| Parties | CROSBIE ET AL. v. PARTRIDGE. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute general in its terms, and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of the earlier statute.
The Act of March 3, 1903 (32 St. L. 982), being a special statute and applying to the sale of restricted lands for town-site purposes, was not repealed by the Act of April 26, 1906; the latter being a general statute and not expressly repealing the former.
The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts. On the faith of a construction thus adopted, rights of property grow up which ought not to be ruthlessly swept aside, unless some great public measure, benefit, or right is involved, or unless the construction itself is manifestly incorrect. Held, that the construction placed upon the Act of March 3, 1903, and the Act of April 26, 1906, and the Act of June 21, 1906, by the Secretary of Interior, is not subject to either of the above objections.
A contemporaneous construction by the Executive Department of the government of certain acts of Congress which are ambiguous and doubtful, such construction although inconsistent with the literalism of the act, but which consorts with the equities of the case, as a general rule is considered decisive.
In a proper case the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies against the government whether that of the United States or that of the states.
The theory that estoppel will not apply to restricted Indians when the validity of a sale of restricted allotment is involved, has no application to a transaction initiated by the Indian through the Secretary of Interior for the sale of his allotment, when the sale has been had by regular procedure through the Department of Interior and the purchaser has purchased in good faith and paid the full value, to the Department of Interior, and has relied upon the construction placed upon the acts of Congress by the Interior Department authorizing the sale.
Statutes of the United States providing for allotment of Indian lands and patents, with restrictions upon alienation, were enacted to protect Indians from schemes and fraudulent practices of white men, not to aid in the unconscionable and inequitable enforcement, of stale claims, to the injury of innocent parties who in good faith, for value, and by regular procedure, have purchased allotted Indian lands through the Interior Department of the United States.
Where a restricted Indian has alienated or conveyed all or part of his restricted lands, through the Department of Interior, and the sale has been conducted in accordance with the policy of the government, and the purchaser acting in good faith has paid the full value for the land, there being no fraud, and the government has received the money for the use and benefit of and approved the sale on behalf of the Indian held that, if the facts are such that the government would be estopped from questioning the validity of the deed the Indian would likewise be estopped.
Appeal from District Court, Tulsa County; Owen Owens, Judge.
Suit by Mary Partridge against J. E. Crosbie and others. Judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded, with directions to dismiss.
West Sherman, Davidson & Moore, Stuart, Cruce & Bland, Rice & Lyons, Breckenridge, Bostick & Daniel, C. A. Steele, J. P. O'Meara, E. R. Hastings, Jno. F. Kerrigan, Fred W. Kopplin, Biddison & Campbell, Randolph, Haver & Shirk, Ivel M. Boyd, Lashley & Rambo, Rush Greenslade, Jno. R. Woodard, John Rogers, J. A. Ward, and D. G. Elliott, all of Tulsa, for plaintiffs in error.
H. B. Martin, R. A. Reynolds, and Christy Russell, all of Tulsa, for defendant in error.
The facts in this controversy are undisputed and are substantially as follows: Mary Partridge, the plaintiff, is a full-blood Creek, enrolled opposite No. 6417. October 20, 1903, she received as part of her allotment the land in controversy. On April 9, 1907, she filed a verified petition with the Commissioner of the Five Civilized Tribes, alleging she desired to take advantage of the provision of the act of Congress approved March 3, 1903, and be authorized to sell a portion of her allotment, being the land in dispute, for town-site purposes, without restrictions as provided in said act. In her application she alleged the following material facts, to wit:
The description of the land being a quarter of a quarter section, less 1 33/100 acres occupied as a right of way of the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad. Plaintiff alleged the land was needed for town-site purposes and was unimproved except being in cultivation; that the cost of putting the same in cultivation was about $250; that it was not her homestead; that it joined Tulsa, a city having four railroads which are named, all of which maintain stations, and there was a post office and several express offices maintained in said city; that she could secure a large price for the land for town-site purposes; that the land immediately east had been platted and laid out in town lots; that the land immediately west is low bottom land along the Arkansas river; that many new additions to Tulsa are open now for sale principally on the east side of the city; that she believes said land will bring a better price at this time than if sold at a later date, for the reason the growth of the city is in an easterly direction and away from her tract of land; that said land has no value for oil and gas purposes, but is suitable for a residence district as an addition to said city; that she desired to sell the land in a body and had a contract to sell the same for a consideration of $10,000 which she believes would be an advantageous sale: that with the proceeds she will buy other land and improve other land owned by her in the Creek Nation; that she received nothing from any one for the right of occupancy of the land or from any other source, except annual rentals for agricultural purposes.
After filing her application with the Commissioner of the Five Civilized Tribes, the Commissioner transmitted said application to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, who transmitted the record to the Department of Interior with recommendations that the petition to sell the land in one body for town-site purposes be granted, provided the consideration should be not less than $10,000. Considerable correspondence passed between these branches of the department, and the Commissioner of the Five Civilized Tribes was authorized to have the land appraised and to advertise the same for sale, calling for sealed bids; the sale to be under the supervision of the Union Agency at Muskogee. The land was advertised, and the defendant Crosbie, and numerous other parties, filed sealed bids with the agency, Crosbie bidding $14,560 that being the highest bid, and was accepted. The land was appraised at $14,000.
On February 11, 1908, the plaintiff and her husband executed a general warranty deed conveying the land to Crosbie, and the Commissioner of the Five Civilized Tribes forwarded a report of the sale with the deed and consideration to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, recommending that the sale be approved. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs forwarded the record of the sale and the consideration to the Secretary of Interior and recommended as follows:
"In view of the fact that the land is needed for town-site purposes; that the consideration paid is adequate; and that the department is to have control of the consideration so that it will not be wasted or pass into the hands of unworthy persons, the office concurs in the recommendation of the agent and acting Commissioner Ryan that the deed be approved."
The Secretary of Interior, on April 15, 1908, approved the deed in the following language:
The deed with the approval of the Secretary, and the consideration, was returned by the Secretary of Interior, to the Union Agency at Muskogee, with instructions to deliver the deed to Crosbie and place the consideration to the credit of Mary Partridge in that branch of the department. The defendant Crosbie then took possession of the land, and the same was platted, the streets paved, sewerage installed, residences constructed, and at present there are only a few vacant lots. The lots were sold to various and different parties who are defendants herein. In 1913 Mary Partridge executed a quitclaim deed to Crosbie. It is admitted, however, that this deed was of no force and effect.
In 1920 the plaintiff brought this action for possession of the entire tract of land and to quiet her title, contending the Secretary was without authority to remove her restrictions, and the deed executed by her and approved by the Secretary of Interior was in violation of section 19 of the Act of Congress of April 26, 1906, and void.
The defendant Crosbie answered referring to the proceedings before the Interior Department, regarding the sale, that he had bid upon the land without any knowledge of defects in the title and paid the purchase price,...
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