Crosby v. Meeks
| Decision Date | 20 July 1899 |
| Citation | 33 S.E. 913,108 Ga. 126 |
| Parties | CROSBY v. MEEKS et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Where there is a dispute between a company and an individual as to which of the two owns a tract of land, and the agent of the company has falsely and fraudulently represented to such other claimant that his company has title to the property and "back deeds" to the same, and, acting upon this, such other claimant purchases from the company an interest in the land, and receives from the company a deed thereto, which interest he, for value, transfers by deed to an innocent purchaser, who likewise acts upon the representations made by said agent, the agent is afterwards estopped from setting up title in his own name against such purchaser. This is true though such agent may afterwards acquire a perfect legal title to the property, not derived from either of the claimants above mentioned.
2. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.
Error from superior court, Ware county; J. L. Sweat, Judge.
Action by Silas A. Crosby against Charles F. and Warren Meeks. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
J. C McDonald and G. J. Holton & Son, for plaintiff in error.
Hitch & Myers, for defendants in error.
Silas A. Crosby brought complaint for land in Ware superior court against Charles F. and Warren Meeks. To his petition was attached an abstract of title dating back to a grant from the state to John Chancey, made in 1842. To this petition the defendants, besides denying the allegations of title in the plaintiff as set forth in his declaration, set up substantially the following equitable defense: John Denton under whose warranty deed the defendants claimed title to the land, had a regular chain of title to the premises in dispute, when the plaintiff came to him, and represented to him that the Waycross Lumber Company, of which plaintiff was then the agent, had the true title to the land, and that the chain of title which Denton had was defective; that all said company wanted was the turpentine and timber rights on the premises; and, to settle all differences and save litigation plaintiff proposed to Denton that if he would make the Waycross Lumber Company a deed to the turpentine and timber on the land he (plaintiff) would obligate himself in writing to cause the said company to make Denton a deed to the land, and would get up and deliver to Denton the true title. This agreement was executed between the parties to the extent of Crosby's giving the written obligation to Denton, and afterwards delivering to Denton a deed from the company. The defendants further charged in their answer that at the time this agreement was made the Waycross Lumber Company had no title to the land, and that the representations as to its title made by Crosby were false and fraudulent, and made with the purpose of deceiving Denton, and defrauding him of the timber and turpentine on the land. Subsequently Crosby procured his title to the land, but, instead of taking title thereto in the name of his company, he caused the deed to be made to himself, upon which he entered suit, and was seeking to eject the defendants from the premises. It appears from the testimony introduced on the trial that there was some dispute or difference between John Denton and the Waycross Lumber Company as to who had the true title to the land. We infer from the testimony that Denton was in possession of the property at the time of the agreement had with the company's agent, Crosby. The defendants desired to purchase the land, but did not know whether the company or Denton owned the same. Crosby had represented that his company had the "back titles" to the land, and that Denton did not have the correct chain of title. When the compromise agreement was had Crosby gave to Denton the following receipt: ( It further appeared from the testimony that the lease privilege was granted by Denton to the company, that the company afterwards executed to him a deed to the premises, and that in pursuance of the lease the company enjoyed the privilege thereunder of getting the turpentine and sawmill timber from the land. After Denton had thus procured his title from the lumber company, on the 13th day of December, 1889, he conveyed the premises by warranty deed, for a valuable consideration, to the defendants. The defendants, in trading for the land with Denton, acted upon the representations made by Crosby, the plaintiff, to the effect that the lumber company had the true title and the back deeds to the property, and immediately after receiving their deed from Denton they went into possession of the land, and have continued in possession ever since. In 1893 the plaintiff purchased the premises in dispute from the party who held the regular chain of title under a grant from the state, and, instead of taking title thereto to the lumber company, Crosby had the deed executed to himself individually. The defendants likewise introduced a chain of deeds, tracing their title back to the original grantee of the state, but it appears that this original grantee's deed in their chain was of subsequent date to that introduced by the plaintiff in his regular chain of title. Plaintiff also introduced a previous suit against these defendants, instituted within seven years from the time they went into possession under their deed, and showed that this original suit was dismissed, and the present one instituted within six months thereafter. The only testimony materially contradicting that of the defendants was contained in the depositions of the plaintiff himself, who denied making any representations as charged about the title to the land; but he nowhere...
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