Crosby v. Reynolds

• Citation: 763 F. Supp. 666
• Decision Date: 06 May 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 89-0291-B.
• Parties: Juanita I. CROSBY, Plaintiff, v. Edward J. REYNOLDS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

763 F. Supp. 666

Juanita I. CROSBY, Plaintiff, v. Edward J. REYNOLDS, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 89-0291-B.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

May 6, 1991.

Jerome B. Goldsmith, Bangor, Me., for plaintiff.

Timothy C. Woodcock, Bangor, Me., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

HORNBY, District Judge.

This civil rights action alleges that Penobscot County Jail officials violated a female federal pretrial detainee's constitutional rights by housing her with a male transsexual for two periods in 1989. She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. The defendants, three officials of the Penobscot County Jail, have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 56. For the reasons discussed below, I GRANT their motion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Since the plaintiff has not contested the defendants' statement of material facts in support of their motion for summary judgment, those facts are deemed admitted. See Local Rule 19(b)(2). I have nevertheless considered the affidavits and the plaintiff's deposition in the light most favorable to her and have resolved any discrepancies in her favor.

Cheyenne Lamson, a/k/a Cheyenne Deneuve a/k/a Roger Miles ("Lamson"), is a 6'1" preoperative male transsexual. According to the Jail's contract physician, Richard Sagall, M.D., Lamson receives hormone treatments and has developed tissue resembling female breasts as a result. Though Lamson's male genitalia remain anatomically intact, Lamson has virtually no capacity to function sexually as a male. In Dr. Sagall's opinion, Lamson was psychologically a female throughout 1989. Dr. Sagall examined Lamson for the Jail initially in 1984 and recommended then that Lamson be housed with neither the male nor the female inmate populations. Later, however, when Lamson requested placement within the female population, Dr. Sagall told Jail authorities that he approved of this housing situation from a medical standpoint. He did not want Lamson housed with the male inmates because of both the physical and psychological harm that Lamson would likely suffer. Both Captain Thomas McCrea and Lieutenant Cheryl Gallant were aware that Dr. Sagall approved of Lamson's integration into the female inmate population and that he believed this would be in Lamson's best psychological and physical interest. Moreover, Dr. Sagall would not have approved the integration of Lamson into the general female inmate population if he thought that Lamson would constitute a physical threat to any of the female inmates. Prison officials specifically instructed Lamson to respect the privacy of the female inmates.

The plaintiff, Juanita Crosby, was placed in the Penobscot County Jail as a federal pretrial detainee on March 1, 1989. On two occasions during that year, she was housed in the same cell block as Lamson. Between July 6 and July 10, 1989, the plaintiff and Lamson shared a three-room cell block (S-Block) comprised of two cells, each containing a bed and a sink/toilet combination, and a common room containing a television set and a shower stall. On two instances during their incarceration together, Lamson entered the plaintiff's cell while she was using the toilet. Both times Lamson left immediately upon learning of the plaintiff's position. The plaintiff prepared herself to shower once but, because Lamson was in the common room and did not leave, decided not to take a shower. From July 6, 1989 to July 10, 1989, the plaintiff did not make any oral or written complaints to any prison officials about being housed with Lamson. She was transferred out of S-Block at her request, but did not inform the jailers of her motive in requesting the move.

For protective reasons, on October 1, 1989, Jail authorities housed all female prisoners and Lamson together in U-Block because of a reported sexual incident involving a male guard and female prisoner. The plaintiff, Lamson and nine other female inmates were placed in U-Block. U-Block has no sink/toilet combinations in the individual cells. Instead, adjacent to the day room, there is a common bathroom area containing all toilets, sinks and shower facilities. On October 2, 1989, Lamson walked into the bathroom area while the plaintiff was using the toilet and left immediately upon being informed of the plaintiff's presence. On one other occasion, because Lamson was preparing to meet a visitor, Lamson entered the bathroom area to put on makeup while the plaintiff was using the toilet. The plaintiff told Lamson she was using the toilet, but Lamson did not leave. The plaintiff took from 30 seconds to a minute to complete her use of the toilet. The final specific instance the plaintiff complains of occurred when she was emerging from the shower. The other inmates of U-Block, waiting for lunch, were lined up at the main cell door next to the door into the bathroom area. The plaintiff made eye contact with Lamson through a window in the door as she stepped naked out of the shower. She then stepped behind a toilet stall partition and quickly dressed. The plaintiff has asserted that on a number of occasions, she dressed beneath her covers to avoid exposing herself to Lamson.

Following the incident on October 2, 1989, the plaintiff and several other female inmates complained orally to prison officials about being housed with Lamson. Complaints were made to Corporal Rose Mannette, Sergeant Linda Hannan and Commanding Officer Bart Langley. Additionally, the plaintiff and five or six other inmates filed two written grievances dated October 16, 1989. According to the plaintiff's affidavit, Sergeant Brochu came into the U-Block on October 14, 1989 in response to the inmates' complaints and told them "you will all live together and get along, like it or not. If you do not like it, you can be moved to segregation."¹

Lamson was removed from U-Block on October 16, 1989.² Following Lamson's removal to K-Block, the plaintiff had no further contact with Lamson.³

DISCUSSION

The plaintiff charges a deprivation of her constitutional right to both procedural due process and privacy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lamson is no longer housed at Penobscot County Jail nor, except for purposes of her deposition in this case, is the plaintiff.⁴ The claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are, therefore, MOOT. Only the damages claim remains.

I. Procedural Due Process

The plaintiff claims that her right to procedural due process was violated when Sgt. Brochu threatened to place any inmates filing further grievances concerning Cheyenne Lamson in "segregation" or "in the hole." It is apparent from the facts that the threat was never fulfilled. The plaintiff apparently was not intimidated or "chilled" by Sgt. Brochu's remarks since she and several other female inmates filed two written grievances two days after Sgt. Brochu's visit on October 14, 1989. She was never put into segregation or punished in any way after filing the two October 16, 1989 grievances. Finally, Lamson was moved to K-Block two days after Sgt. Brochu's visit, thus removing the subject of the plaintiff's complaints. I find no procedural due process violations.

II. Constitutional Right To Privacy

Both the United States Supreme Court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals have recognized the existence of a constitutional right to privacy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-154, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726-27, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-485, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1681-82, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1988). The origins of this right to privacy have been attributed to the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. But the constitutional rights of a lawfully incarcerated prisoner are circumscribed or limited, see Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2537-38, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3199, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984).

Nevertheless, "a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime." Wolff v. McDonnell, ...