Crosby v. Rogers
| Decision Date | 04 May 1944 |
| Docket Number | 14848. |
| Citation | 30 S.E.2d 248,197 Ga. 616 |
| Parties | CROSBY v. ROGERS. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Exceptions to the allowance of testimony which show that no grounds of objection were urged at the trial are insufficient to raise any question for decision. Grounds or reasons why such evidence should have been repelled, set forth and urged for the first time in special grouns of a motion for new trial, will not be considered.
2. Under the evidence as to the existence of a partnership between the petitioner and the defendant and their agreement to jointly purchase the land involved, and evidence that the petitioner paid one-half of the purchase money and trusted the defendant to close the deal and obtain a conveyance naming them both as grantees, the defendant could not obtain an interest in the land antagonistic to that of the petitoner; and where the defendant procured a deed having that effect, equity will annul the conveyance and decree title in the petitoners to his share. The petitioner was justified in failing to read the deed which he signed or to examine the records, and in relying upon the defendant because of the confidential relationship existing between them, and where suit was brought promptly upon learning of the defendant's breach of faith the petitioner is not estopped by laches although fourteen years had passed since the deed attacked was executed.
G. C Rogers brought suit against M. E. Crosby, alleging: That on June 23, 1926, the petitioner and the defendant jointly purchased a described 299-acre tract of land in Long County Georgia, from C. M. Tyson. Previously they had been dealing jointly in business matters and the petitioner had implicit confidence in the defendant and trusted him to have the deed from C. M. Tyson made to themselves jointly, which he believed in good faith had been done until within the last few days when he discovered to his surprise that the land had been deeded to the defendant individually and the petitioner was not mentioned as one of the grantees therein. The petitioner paid half of the purchase price of the land as agreed with the defendant, and it was agreed that the deed should be made to the petitioner and the defendant jointly. Until very recently they have exercised joint control over the land, both concurring in leasing the timber for turpentine purposes, and the petitioner instructed the defendant to sign two leases on the tract for turpentine purposes, the petitioner believing that the leases were executed in behalf of both himself and the defendant. The petitioner received his share of the proceeds from the said leases. He recently learned that the defendant claimed all of said land and is now threatening to sell the same. When the petitioner first learned that the defendant was claiming to own the land, he searched the public records of Long County, Georgia, and found that the defendant had caused the deed from C. M. Tyson conveying said land to be made to the defendant alone, the deed being recorded in deed book 4, page 295. If he had known before this time that the defendant claimed all of said land, he would have moved against the defendant to establish his rights in the premises. The petitioner has acted promptly after ascertaining said claim of the defendant. He has learned of nothing to put him on notice or inquiry that the defendant was claiming to be the sole owner of the land. The defendant is wilfully, wrongfully, unjustifiably, and fraudulently undertaking to deprive the petitioner of his one-half interest in said tract. The prayers were for process, service, a lis pendens record, injunction, a decree of title to a one-half undivided interest in the land be decreed to be in the petitioner, and for general relief.
The defendant answered, denying the material allegations and alleging: That he purchased all of the land sued for and paid the full purchase price, and that the petitioner paid no part thereof and had no interest therein. The defendant did nothing to cause the petitioner to delay ascertaining that the land was deeded to the defendant. The only instance of the petitioner and the defendant owning property jointly was their purchase after June, 1926, of a tract of land in Jeff Davis County. The petitioner is barred from any relief sought because of laches. The deed was duly recorded on July 3, 1926, and the petitioner thus had constructive notice thereof. On February 11, 1927, the petitioner and the defendant jointly executed a deed to secure debt in favor of Citizens Bank of Folkston, which deed was recorded on April 6, 1927, and in which deed the land here involved is described by referring to the deed to the defendant, giving its date, the name of the grantor, Charles M. Tyson, and the name of the grantee, M. E. Crosby, with the office book and page where the same is recorded. Though the petitioner knew that the land sued for belonged to the defendant, he wilfully entered thereon within four years and unlawfully cut and removed specified timber of the value of $740.94, for which the defendant sought judgment.
Upon the trial the petitioner testified in his own behalf: The defendant told him that he had found some land that a Mr. Wilkes had in Long County for sale. Wilkes was a real estate man. There were about 300 acres in the tract. At the request of the defendant the petitioner went with him and looked at the tract of land sued for. Wilkes went with them and priced it to them at $1500. It was 299 acres and the same land described in the petition. The witness did not know at that time who owned the land. Wilkes was handling it. They decided to buy it. The witness had been buying timber for the company and was familiar with the value of timber lands, but the defendant was not. They agreed that afternoon to pay the price asked for the land, and Wilkes was so informed and advised that the defendant would see him the next week, pay the $1500 purchase price, and close the deal. They went back to Brunswick. The petitioner had $400 stock in the company they worked for and one $500 Liberty bond. The petitioner made these available to the defendant, to be used as collateral to borrow money to pay for the land. The petitioner put up possibly $200 cash and the defendant probably $375. They both signed a note to the bank for the balance of the purchase money. The defendant took the money and with it paid for the land. The defendant informed the petitioner when the latter came in on Friday or Saturday that he had bought the land. The petitioner did not ask to see the deed and never did see it. A few days thereafter the petitioner and the defendant drove their wives over and looked at the land and discussed it in their presence as 'our land' and what they were going to do with it. Beyond doubt the defendant knew then that the petitioner claimed an interest in the land. Soon Mr. Ruben Davis wanted to build a sheep pen on the land, and the defendant asked the petitioner what he thought about it and was told that it was all right. The next thing done about the land was that the defendant gave a Mr. Blount authority to cut some piling, and told the petitioner after Blount had started cutting, and the money for the timber was applied to the loan representing the purchase money. Next, Mr. Atkinson wanted to cut some lightwood, and the defendant asked the petitioner about it, and the petitioner said it was all right. Atkinson cut about 400 cords and the defendant collected for it. The next thing done with the land was that the defendant, about 1936, phoned the petitioner saying that he had a prospect to sell a turpentine lease on the land and asked the petitioner to spare a few days and check it and see how much it would cup. The defendant said that his prospective customer was a Mr. Heymans. The petitioner agreed to and did check it, and after conferring with a number of possible lessees on the price the petitioner finally told Heymans that they would accept his price of 14 cents a cup and directed him to go to the defendant who would make the lease. The petitioner told the defendant how much it would cup and that Heymans was to pay down so much when he started cupping and the balance when he finished cupping, the down payment to be $14 per thousand. The petitioner told the defendant that he thought the lease would pay all they owed on the land and what they owed for the Jeff Davis County land and leave them $175 each. The petitioner drew a draft on the defendant for $175, which the defendant turned down, and wrote a letter requesting the petitioner to go to Brunswick. When the petitioner went, the defendant said he owed a little more than the petitioner had figured, and that the petitioner did not have that much coming, and they checked up and found that the petitioner was due $100 and the defendant gave the petitioner a check for $100.
When Heymans' four-year lease expired the petitioner got in...
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