Cross v. State
| Decision Date | 12 December 1928 |
| Citation | 119 So. 380,96 Fla. 768 |
| Parties | CROSS v. STATE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
En Banc.
Error to Criminal Court of Record, Hillsborough County; W. Raleigh Petteway, Judge.
William S. Cross was convicted of larceny, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court
Accused voluntarily offering himself as witness thereby subjects himself to legitimate cross-examination whether tending to incriminate him or not; accused voluntarily offering himself as witness may be cross-examined as to previous conviction of criminal offense (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, §§ 2706, 6080). Where an accused while on trial voluntarily offers himself as a witness on his own behalf, he thereby voluntarily subjects himself to any legitimate cross-examination, whether such cross-examination tends to incriminate him or not, and the state has the right on cross-examination to interrogate him as to whether he has been previously convicted of a criminal offense.
Cross-examination of accused as to prior convictions did not compel him to become witness against himself, though subsequently charged as habitual offender (Acts 1927, c. 12022; Const. Declaration of Rights, § 12). A defendant who has voluntarily taken the stand as a witness in his own behalf during trial of the issue of his guilt or innocence under a charge of felony, and who has been cross-examined within proper limits as to prior convictions for the purpose of assailing his credibility as a witness in that trial, is not thereby compelled, contrary to constitutional inhibition, to become a witness against himself in a criminal case, even though, for the purpose of enhancing his punishment as an habitual offender under chapter 12022, Acts of 1927, a supplemental information charging the same former convictions as to which he was so interrogated on cross-examination, is subsequently filed against him, no attempt being made to use against the defendant in support of the second information the testimony adduced upon cross-examination during the former trial, the record affirmatively disclosing that in filing the second information the prosecuting officer possessed knowledge of the previous convictions independent of that disclosed by the defendant on his cross-examination, and the defendant having pleaded guilty to the second information.
Larceny may be proven by circumstantial evidence justifying inference of guilt beyond reasonable doubt (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 5142). Larceny may be proven by circumstantial evidence of such a nature and probative force that the jury could legally infer guilt therefrom beyond a reasonable doubt.
Verdict of guilty supported by sufficient evidence will not be set aside by appellate court. A verdict of guilty will not be set aside by an appellate court where there is sufficient evidence to sustain it and the attack upon the propriety of the verdict rests, not upon a lack of evidence, but upon the credibility of conflicting evidence.
Law authorizing greater punishment for subsequent conviction for felony held not in violation of constitutional provisions prohibiting ex post facto laws (Acts 1927, c. 12022). Chapter 12022, Acts of 1927, providing that upon a second or subsequent conviction for felony a greater punishment than for a first conviction shall be imposed upon proof of the former convictions, does not violate constitutional provisions prohibiting the passage of ex post facto laws.
Law authorizing greater punishment for subsequent conviction for felony held not in violation of constitutional provisions relating to double jeopardy (Acts 1927, c. 12022; Const Declaration of Rights, § 12). Chapter 12022, Acts of 1927 providing that upon a second or subsequent conviction for felony a greater punishment than for a first conviction shall be imposed upon proof of the former convictions, does not violate constitutional provisions that no person shall twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Law authorizing greater punishment on subsequent conviction for felony does not deprive defendant of jury trial (Acts 1927 c. 12022). Chapter 12022, Acts of 1927, providing that upon a second or subsequent conviction of felony a greater punishment than for a first conviction shall be imposed upon proof of the former conviction, does not deprive defendant of a jury trial upon the question of his identity as the same person formerly convicted of previous felonies.
Former conviction of crime is sufficient basis for classification of offenders with respect to severity of punishment; law providing greater punishment on subsequent conviction of felony held not denial of equal protection of law (Acts 1927, c. 12022). Former conviction of crime is a sufficient basis for the classification of offenders with respect to the severity of the punishment they shall receive for their last offense. Chapter 12022, Acts of 1927, which provides that upon a second or subsequent conviction for felony a greater punishment than for a first conviction shall be imposed upon proof of the former conviction--since the enhanced punishment thereby prescribed is dealt out to all alike who are similarly situated--does not deny the equal protection of the law to persons accused as habitual offenders.
Subsequent information under law authorizing greater punishment on subsequent conviction for felony, with sentence thereunder, held not denial of due process (Acts 1927, c. 12022). Due process of law is not denied a defendant convicted of felony by subjecting him, after conviction, to the proceeding prescribed by chapter 12022, Acts of 1927, charging him in a separate and subsequent information with prior convictions of felony which were not alleged in the information on which he was last tried and convicted, and upon the due establishment of his identity as such former convict sentencing him to the enhanced punishment which chapter 12022, supra, in such cases prescribes.
Legislature for purpose of imposing enhanced penalty on habitual offenders may provide for determination of former conviction in ancillary or subsequent proceeding (Acts 1927, c. 12022). Although the Legislature may properly provide for a determination as to former convictions in the same trial in which the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence of the last offense charged is determined, there is no constitutional mandate limiting the Legislature to that practice. For the purpose of imposing upon habitual offenders an enhanced penalty, it is competent for the Legislature to provide for a determination of the fact of former conviction upon an ancillary or subsequent proceeding of the character prescribed by chapter 12022, Acts of 1927.
Law authorizing greater punishment on subsequent conviction for felony held not invalid because authorizing consideration of previous convictions in other states or countries (Acts 1927, c. 12022). It is no fundamental objection to the validity of chapter 12022, Acts of 1927, which provides that upon a second or subsequent conviction for felony a greater punishment than for a first conviction shall be imposed upon proof of the former convictions, that it authorizes previous convictions of the defendant in other states or countries to be taken into account for the purpose of imposing enhanced punishment for the offense for which the defendant is last convicted in this state.
Florence Hazard Mims, of Tampa, for plaintiff in error.
Fred H. Davis, Atty. Gen., and H. E. Carter, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
On October 20, 1927, plaintiff in error, who will hereafter be referred to as the defendant, was convicted in the criminal court of record for Hillsborough county of the larceny of an automobile of the value of about $1,000, which offense is a felony. Section 5142, Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920. The information upon which this conviction was had was filed on August 9, 1927, and will hereafter be referred to as the first information. On October 21, 1927, the county solicitor of Hillsborough county filed a further information accusing defendant of having been previously convicted of five felonies in other states, in addition to his conviction in this state on October 20, 1927. This information, which will be hereafter referred to as the second information, was filed pursuant to chapter 12022, Acts of 1927, which took effect on June 3, 1927.
To the second information, the defendant in open court, after being duly cautioned as to his rights, pleaded guilty, thereby confessing his identity as a person convicted of five previous felonies, as well as the felony of which he was convicted in this state on October 20, 1927. The sufficiency of the second information was not questioned, either by motion to quash, motion in arrest of judgment, or otherwise.
Pursuant to the provisions of chapter 12022, supra, the trial judge, for the felony committed in this state, of which defendant was convicted on October 20, 1927, under the first information, sentenced defendant to imprisonment for the term of his natural life, to which judgment writ of error is taken.
Amongst the provisions of chapter 12022, supra, are the following:
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...and the guilt of the defendant may stand together and inseparable on one foundation of circumstantial evidence." Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 780-81, 119 So. 380, 384 (1928). A defendant's confession or statement "may be considered in connection with the other evidence," but "the corpus del......
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Diecidue v. State, 30913
...of every reasonable doubt, Stoutamire v. State, 133 Fla. 757, 183 So. 316; Deiterle v. State, 101 Fla. 79, 134 So. 42; Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 119 So. 380; Lle v. State, 96 Fla. 59, 117 So. 699; Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659, 106 So. 479; Holland v. State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 298; seco......
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Williams v. State, 95-2301
...delicti cannot rest upon the confession or admission alone.' " Schwab v. State, 636 So.2d 3, 6 (Fla.) (quoting Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 781, 119 So. 380, 384 (1928)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 950, 115 S.Ct. 364, 130 L.Ed.2d 317 (1994). Therefore, the state must introduce substantial indep......
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State v. Hodges, 62-765
...Those contentions of the state are meritorious under existing law, and we must reverse the order granting new trial. In Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 119 So. 380, 384, it was held that while proof of a corpus delicti can not rest upon a confession or admission alone, admissions may be consid......